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ABSTRACT 
A DEWEYAN-BASED CURRICULUM FOR TEACHING ETHICAL INQUIRY 
IN THE LANGUAGE ARTS 
by Maria Aurora L. Buenaseda-Saludo 
 
 Informed by Dewey’s account of ethical experience and the nature of 
philosophical inquiry, my theory of ethical inquiry has four components:  body-based 
reasonableness, moral imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content. Body-
based reasonableness is thinking that is critical, creative, committed, contextual, and 
embodied (Sprod, 2001). Exercising embodied reasonableness in aesthetic education 
means that we pay critical attention and seek to address the ethical and social aspects of 
art. We pay attention to fiction that will potentially engage students in a constant process 
of ethical judgment, depicting characters and situations that call for our moral evaluation. 
In a similar vein, exposure to certain art can sensitize us to the right reasons and objects 
for our emotions. Vehicles for ethical inquiry are those by which human situations can be 
understood and are found in the English Language Arts curriculum and the arts, such as: 
The Odyssey by Homer, Romeo and Juliet by Shakespeare, Prokofiev, and Tchaikovsky, 
The Joy Luck Club by Tan, and works by the artists Frida Kahlo and Kiki Smith. 
Highlighted are the issues of body, sexuality and gender, principal areas of ethical 
concern and central to adolescence.  The pedagogy by which students can adequately 
address ethical concerns is Philosophy for Children, where characters in a narrative text 
exemplify discursive modes of thought and the conduct of ethical inquiry.  
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 1 
Introduction: Overview of a Theory of Ethical Inquiry                               
[T]he important thing about knowledge in its moral aspect is . . . the active desire 
to examine conduct in its bearing upon the general good. . . . There is always the 
possibility of being on the alert for opportunities to widen and deepen the 
meaning of existing moral ideas. . . . The need for constant revision and expansion 
of moral knowledge is one great reason why there is no gulf dividing non-moral 
knowledge from that which is truly moral. (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, pp. 311-312)  
“The value of knowledge is in being ‘instrumental to the enrichment of immediate 
experience through the control over action that it exercises.’” (Dewey, 1934, p. 
294, as cited in Shusterman, 2000, p. 18)       
   As a teacher of art appreciation and the language arts, I am keenly aware that 
moral growth occurs in the transactions that students have in their encounter with art, 
including that of the process of making art. Growth includes meaning, self-discovery, and 
a desire to contribute to the world. The focus of my research is education in ethical 
inquiry, that is, education that aims at preparing students to practice ethical inquiry and to 
make and act on sound ethical judgments. My objective is to present a pedagogical 
framework and novella in ethical inquiry guided by the ramifications of Dewey’s 
metaphor of the experiential flow in nature. My aim is in some ways more modest than 
that of preparing students to develop ethical character, lead ethical lives or to become 
moral selves. However, in that the components of ethical inquiry do not presuppose any 
particular model of an ethical character, life, or self, the former aim could also be said to 
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be broader.            
   This chapter begins with a brief introduction to John Dewey, in order to give a 
sense of the philosopher in the aspects of his thinking that bear on this project. It is 
followed by a discussion encapsulating the main features of his experiential aesthetic 
theory and his theory of knowledge, as they relate to ethics and inquiry. First, one must 
learn to recognize just what an experience is. Second, one should recognize that a non-
discursive meaning is the aesthetic aspect of an experience. Third, we can improve the 
experience, if we are aware of its aesthetic qualities. I describe a theory of ethical inquiry 
comprising embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotions as judgments, and 
ethical content. The third section of this chapter relates in practical terms the role of an 
education in ethical inquiry. In succeeding chapters, I present arguments to support my 
contention that ethical inquiry is best served by a curriculum in the arts because the 
subject matter opens horizons of feeling and imaginative vistas that are known to shed 
light on the meaning of social practices and cherished values.    
   John Dewey was America’s foremost philosopher during his lifetime and one of 
the twentieth century’s most important thinkers (Morse, 1998). This was due in large 
measure to his personal qualities, prolific output, and his concern for the practical 
ramifications of political, ethical and educational thought (Boisvert, 1985; Martin, 2002). 
Of him, a fellow colleague remarked that Dewey was unpretentious and easygoing, a 
prodigious thinker “like Socrates” (Martin, 2002, p. 236). At age 90, he had published 
about a thousand essays and books (Martin, 2002). He embarked on a reconstruction of 
philosophy because he believed that philosophical practice had little relevance due to 
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fixed ethical concepts and absolutist metaphysical categories (Boisvert, 1985), he termed 
“the philosophic fallacy”1 (Teehan, 2002, pp. 228). He proposed that in inquiry, attention 
be paid to the uniqueness of problematic situations, his aim being to bring about desirable 
consequences and meaning
2
 through appropriate conduct (Teehan, 1995). 
It is accordingly, relevant, to the theme of needed reconstruction to say that the 
adverse   criticisms of philosophies of the past are not directed at these systems 
with respect to their connection with intellectual and moral issues of their own 
time and place, but with respect to their relevancy in a much changed human 
situation. (Dewey, 1948, p. viii) 
      In remapping the flawed landscape of American philosophy, Dewey was 
influenced by Darwin’s Origin of Species and neo-Hegelianism (Boisvert, 1985). Instead 
                                                 
1
 The “philosophic fallacy” (Dewey, 1925, p. 35) pertains to a fixed and antecedent 
reality (e.g. dualistic thinking) as a priori to inquiry. “It consists in the supposition that 
whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or 
without limits and conditions” (Dewey, 1922, p. 175). 
2“The meaning of something is (a) its relations, actual and potential, to other qualities, 
things, events, and experience(s)…past, present, and future” (Johnson, 2007, pp. 265 & 
273);  (b) the practical consequences of ideas (Connell, 1994; Garrison, 2004; Lipman, 
1991; 2003); (c) the outcome of shared inquiry (Connell, 1996); (d) “find[ing] out the 
difference [something] makes to you and me “(Alexander, 1990, p. 327).  
 4 
of dualism and separation, Dewey saw continuities, for example organism-environment 
and body-mind, which he attributed to Hegel. (The body-mind concept and its relevance 
to pedagogy and curriculum are elaborated further in Chapter Two.) He wrote in From 
Absolutism to Experimentalism: “Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and 
spirit, the divine and the human, was however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated 
as an immense release, a liberation” (Backe, 1999; Boisvert, 1985; Dewey, 1930, as cited 
in: Alexander, 1987, p. 16; Bernstein, 1967, p. 167; Menand, 2001, p. 267; Garrison, 
2006, p. 13). In Darwin’s principle of natural selection,3 Dewey saw a transactional 
relationship between living beings and the environment, a mutually constitutive 
relationship, of which imagination and emotion are some of its contemporaneously 
inherent traits. To this interchange, he gave the name experience, a term, which “might 
conceivably apply to the case of, say, delight in certain tones, colors or tastes” (Dewey, 
1887, p. 168; 1895/2003, pp. 32-30). Rather than a class of objects, Dewey regards art as 
experience that is refined and intensified (Teehan, 1995; Perricone, 2006). Further to 
their intrinsic value, Dewey saw the arts as tools to highlight, explain, and judge lived 
experience (Perricone, 2006). I will return to this subject in more detail in forthcoming 
chapters.  
                                                 
3
 The principle of natural selection states, “all organic adaptations are due simply to 
constant variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful in the 
struggle for existence” (Dewey, 1910b/1997b, p.11). 
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      Dewey’s project brought to philosophy a uniquely American perspective 
comprising: the view that logic and philosophic inquiry are instrumental and flow from 
thought processes to action; a strong concern for social ills manifested in “a special 
empathy for the second-best, the second-class citizen, the loser in society;” (Martin, 
2002, p. 236) and a principled pluralism sensitive to conflict from unexamined emotion 
(Stengel, 2007). Dewey was a philosopher who had immense influence as a public figure 
and whose embrace of society was inclusionary, rather than exclusionary. The point of 
the discussion that follows is to explain the process of learning how to locate the aesthetic 
within the experiential continuum.                                                                     
Ethics as Experience, Inquiry, and Knowledge  
      A persistent motif in Dewey’s pragmatism4 is that of improving ordinary 
experience,
5
 be it social, political, or moral. For this kind of improvement, Dewey offers 
                                                 
4
 Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that gives importance to action whose 
meaning is a reconstruction of the actual, in light of the possible (Alexander, 1990). 
5
 Experience is a polysemic term used by Dewey and is confusing  (Shusterman, 2010). 
For our purposes, it may help to clarify its use first, as a term for anchoring thinking to 
practical activity; second, as a description of the interactive nature of human existence; 
and third, as an integrating principle among disciplines. In many instances, confusion 
occurs regarding Dewey’s terminology because it has not been operationalized. James, 
however, simplified it: “My experience is what I agree to attend to” (James, 1890/1950, 
p. 402; as cited in Garrison, 2005, p. 112). 
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a three-part model of aesthetic experience. The first component of Dewey’s model is to 
learn to recognize what experiences qualify as aesthetic ones. In addition to encounters 
within art museums and concert halls, aesthetic qualities are also located in ordinary and 
quotidian experiences, including our daily freedoms, imaginative projects, and 
commonplace interests and pleasures. Dewey explained that, in fact, all experience has an 
aesthetic dimension described as an integrative quality that makes an experience, here 
referred to as “situation,” coherent and meaningful: 
[A] situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we 
describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a 
qualitative whole is sensed or felt. Such an expression is, however, valuable only 
as it is taken negatively to indicate that it is not, as such, an object of discourse. 
(Dewey 1938/1991, pp. 73-74) 
Dewey’s (1934) aesthetics6 as elucidated in Art as Experience locate the embodied 
human being “recovering the continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of 
living” (p. 10).7 Beauty, dissonance, harmony, balance, and other aesthetic qualities come 
                                                 
6
 Aesthetics is from the Greek aesthesis meaning feeling. Every generation has its styles 
of feeling expressed in art objects objectifying experiences of feeling (Langer, 1962). 
Thus, aesthetics can be viewed as the study of art as felt experience (Auxier, 2004). 
7
 The entire statement reads: “Even to readers who are adversely inclined to what has 
been said, the implications of the statements that have been made may be useful in 
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about from – and are part of the meaning of – the vital interaction between living 
organism and surroundings whereby energy, action, and material are reorganized. Dewey 
(1934) writes:  “[T]he esthetic is no intruder in experience from without[,] . . . it . . . 
belong(s) to every normally complete experience” (p. 46). Art is merely a focus on, and 
refinement of aesthetic qualities that animate ordinary experience. Its aim “is to serve the 
whole creature in his unified vitality,” – an end in itself. “To esthetic experience then, the 
philosopher must go to understand what experience is” (p. 278). 
The second component of Dewey’s model is his argument that the aesthetic aspect 
of an experience is distinguished by a non-discursive value or meaning that is felt, as well 
as, inferred. Each aesthetic experience possesses a consummatory, integral, or unified 
quality that uniquely inheres in it, indicating that it is markedly emotional in character 
(Dewey, 1934). 
I have spoken of the esthetic quality that rounds out an experience into 
completeness and unity as emotional. . . . In fact, emotions are qualities, when 
they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and changes. . . . All 
emotions are qualifications of a drama and they change as the drama develops. . . . 
The intimate nature of emotion is manifested in the experience of one watching a 
play on the stage or reading a novel. It attends the development of a plot; and a 
plot requires a stage, a space, wherein to develop and time in which to unfold. 
                                                                                                                                                 
defining the nature of the problem: that of recovering the continuity of esthetic 
experience with normal processes of living" (Dewey, 1934, p. 10). 
 8 
Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it. 
(Dewey, 1934, pp. 41-42) 
Emotion belongs of a certainty to the self that is concerned in the 
movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked. . . . In order to 
become emotional, [automatic reflexes like fright] must become parts of an 
inclusive and enduring situation that involves concern for objects and their issues. 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 42) 
Emotion is the moving and cementing force. It selects what is congruous 
and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to 
materials externally disparate and dissimilar. It thus provides unity in and through 
the varied parts of an experience [and] an esthetic character even though it is not, 
dominantly, an esthetic experience. (Dewey, 1934, p. 42) 
The third component of Dewey’s model provides that, if we are aware of the 
aesthetic qualities of an experience, we have opportunities to engage in improving that 
experience: elevating its beauty, meaning and value; creating order, harmony, and 
balance; and avoiding dullness and ugliness. The aesthetic includes our capacities to 
bring experiences to satisfactory fulfillment by engaging in inquiry into the meaning of 
the aesthetic qualities that we sense. This inquiry depends on our discernment of the 
cognitive aspects of our aesthetic emotions, such as “the thrill of verification” and “the 
feeling of surprise” (Sheffler, 1991, pp. 10 &12, as cited in Pouivet, 2001, p. 52). In a 
theory of emotions where emotions are cognitive, feelings and emotions have a reflective 
significance that becomes evident, as a result of embodied experience. For instance, the 
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emotions may be painful or pleasurable to the extent that our selves are promoted and our 
projects supported (Solomon, 2008). Concepts are formed in the process of attending to 
the continuous flow of experience and extracting its distinctive qualities or patterns 
(Johnson, 2007). Imagination brings about new ways of making sense of experience, 
thereby expanding concepts and transforming meaning (Johnson, 2007). According to 
Dewey, making art can serve as an example of intelligent inquiry toward consummatory 
experience in other domains because the creative process engages humans in higher 
orders of thought, including the intelligent discernment of valuable qualities: “The 
production of a work of genuine art probably demands more intelligence than does most 
of the so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride themselves on being 
‘intellectuals’” (p. 46). 
      There are many events in time that comprise the entirety of experience, yet those 
that are thrown into relief by their fullness and ineffable quality signify completion and 
fulfillment. According to Lipman (1967), one finds complete satisfaction in a 
consummatory experience, that “it seeks no larger sphere in which it can be placed” (p. 
18). However, as Dewey envisioned it, an experience need not be joyful, pleasurable or 
harmonious, as it could by the same token, be tragic or disturbing. An experience then is 
wrought from tension and progression in a directly embodied way, and as such is marked 
by inexpressible feeling (Alexander, 1987).  
Often such experiences remain only at an inchoate level, tacitly shaping our world 
and its meanings, dimly informing them, if consciously at all. So much of human 
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existence is shaped by such conditions it is natural that they should become the 
subject matter of art. (Alexander, 1987, p. 201) 
One further aspect remains to be explained about Dewey’s aesthetics and its 
connection with other dimensions of experience, including the ethical. In his aesthetics, 
Dewey sought to make connections between various disciplines, circumventing the many 
distinctions between experts, their specializations, and the public at large (Shusterman, 
2000). His democratizing impulse not only extended the realm of aesthetic value beyond 
fine art, to encompass all endeavors imbued with aesthetic qualities (Dewey, 1934), but 
also made aesthetic work the model for all domains of value inquiry. For instance, in 
making practical judgments, the following formal characteristics are akin to aesthetic 
judgments: 1. The context of a person’s circumstances is an incomplete situation wherein 
there is need for something to be acted out. 2. The judgment is meant to bring about 
change in the situation that is to be completed. 3. There is an object, a state of affairs that 
poses a problem by its incompleteness. 4. There is an end-in-view. 5. It has been 
determined that something can be accomplished by action adequate and relevant to the 
situation. 6. The action, when successful, unifies or integrates, and is consummatory 
(Festenstein, 1997).   
After imagining practical consequences, which ones should we value and desire? 
Dewey’s (1934/1980) argument in Art as Experience is his response “that we should 
pursue aesthetically desirable consequences; pursue outcomes that are satisfying, 
fulfilling, harmonious, and beautiful; and explore what makes them so” (Cherryholmes, 
1999, p. 28). Because our lived world is one that is relational, an example of the 
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incomplete situation calling for appropriate conduct is that of coming face-to-face with 
people having beliefs, persuasions, and proclivities different from our own. Dewey called 
embodied habits (and dispositions, which he considered their subdued form) a “vital art,” 
viewing them as responses that can be made to become intelligent and flexible, so that 
they enable meaningful and enhanced relations with the world (Dewey, HNC, p. 31, as 
cited in Granger, 2010, p. 72). This presents itself as a task for teachers to attend to 
students’ growing ability to think and feel for others, be concerned about how the 
conduct of their dealings impacts the lives of others, and be able to interact 
collaboratively with them in reconstructing dispositions, attitudes, and behaviors to 
achieve better outcomes. Dewey enjoins teachers to nurture the ameliorative dispositions 
that students incipiently possess, and apply them to situations that demand what Dewey 
describes as a “braveness and equanimity of soul” (Dewey, LW 7:198, as cited in 
Fishman & McCarthy, 2010, p. 8). It would likewise be worthwhile to inquire into what 
makes the goal aesthetically desirable. 
So far nothing has been said regarding the major influence Dewey has had on 
other theorists, who have followed his lead in taking aesthetic criteria to be regulative in 
moral, political, educational and other domains of inquiry. Drawing on Art as Experience, 
Johnson (1993) notes that the aesthetic and the ethical are inextricable from one another 
because the aesthetic is what gives experience the dimension of meaningful order (pp. 
207-209). Similarly, Johnson has argued that, “Aesthetics is not just art theory, but rather 
should be regarded broadly as the study of how humans make and experience meaning” 
(Johnson, 2007, p. 209). He broadens the idea of aesthetic meaning, reasoning that in the 
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arts, the processes of embodied meaning are the same as those making linguistic meaning 
possible, highlighting those aesthetic aspects as “qualities, images, patterns of 
sensorimotor processes, and emotions” (2007, p. 1).  
As for pedagogy, Louise Rosenblatt and Maxine Greene have been noteworthy. 
Acknowledged by many as ahead of its time, Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of 
learning is formulated on the basis of Dewey’s book about aesthetics, Art as Experience 
(Connell, 1994; Granger, 2006; Karolides, 1999; Innis, 2001; Rosenblatt, 1998 & 2001). 
According to Rosenblatt (1995), the encounter with meaning is one that is transformative, 
and having had personal guidance from Dewey,
8
 rather than an interaction of separate 
entities acting on one another, the term transaction should be used to designate 
                                                 
8
 “I've become known as, you might say, a representative of the application of the 
pragmatist philosophy to esthetics. While I was teaching at Barnard at Columbia 
University in the thirties, although I never studied with him, John Dewey was still a 
professor of philosophy there. I did meet him and I ultimately became one of the early 
members of an organization called The Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the 
Sciences that he and other philosophers organized. In that organization I came into 
contact with Dewey, Horace Kallen and a number of the other leading philosophers and 
people in the social sciences and the humanities. The meetings dealt with problems of 
methodology in all of these areas. The work of Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as John 
Dewey and William James have been particularly important to my theory” (Rosenblatt, 
University of Miami Interview, 1999).  
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relationships between reciprocally conditioned elements. Her theory also upholds the 
pragmatist epistemic stance of warranted assertability (as opposed to “justified true 
belief”) to resolve arbitrary and invalid interpretations of meaning, requisite in 
determining the connection of meaning to immanent real world problems (Boyles, 2006; 
Connell, 1996). One is immediately aware that Rosenblatt’s frame of reference is Dewey 
and his notion of the organic nature of experience, as she writes about her own learning 
theory:  
The literary work exists in a live circuit set up between reader and text: the reader 
infuses intellectual and emotional meanings into the pattern of verbal symbols, 
and those symbols channel his thoughts and feelings. Out of this complex process 
emerges a more or less organized imaginative experience. (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 
24)   
      Greene’s (1995 & 2001) approach in teaching and learning, emphasizing the 
interplay of imagination and emotions in ethical meaning making, was guided by 
Dewey’s union of aesthetics and ethics, and served as the initial inspiration of this 
dissertation. For Greene, as with Rosenblatt, the reading experience is one of constructing 
meaning. Greene (1995) reasons that by studying art, one is also constructing meaning 
because as she encounters painting, sculpture, or architecture and participates in music, 
drama, film or dance, she embraces it as her own experience, thus imposing order to what 
she perceives and making a new context for it, as a viewer, reader, or perceiver pursuing 
meaning. Here, she writes:  
 14 
To introduce students to the manner of such engagement is to strike a balance 
between helping learners to pay heed--to attend to shapes, patterns, sounds, 
rhythms, figures of speech, contours, and lines—and helping liberate them to 
achieve particular works as meaningful. (Greene, 1995, p.125)  
      Feminist philosophy also shares with Deweyan pragmatism the unity of aesthetics 
and ethics in taking exception to narrative literature, as a locus for individuals in 
dialogue, who likewise are implicated in moral transactions (Sorrel, 1999). Dewey 
himself endorsed literary texts
9
 for their potential to engage in philosophical ethics, 
praising the pedagogical innovation as a “discovery of a new method of thinking on 
moral subjects, striking out upon new paths that will open up new fields” (Dewey, 1929-
30/2003, p. 399). Likewise, he praised the use of works by those who “approached the 
mine not as moralists but as novelists,
 dramatists, poets, or as reformers” (Dewey, 1929, 
p. 399; Seigfried, 1993). Believing that art preserved the true nature of experience, he 
wrote: 
That rich and colored experience, never the same in two nations, in two 
individuals, in two moments of the same life—whose thoughts, desires, fears and 
                                                 
9
 It was for the teacher-educator, Dr. Helen Edna Davis, Ph.D., that Dewey wrote his 
accolade in a foreword to her book. Her teaching strategy is described as that of 
problematizing incidents from biographical accounts of Tolstoy and Nietzsche, and 
highlighting intensely lived experience commonly shared by others (Seigfried, 1993, p. 
6). 
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hopes have furnished the material for the ever-developing literature of the ages, 
for a Homer and a Chaucer, a Sophocles and a Shakespeare, for the unwritten 
comedies and tragedies of daily life—was neatly and carefully dissected, its parts 
labeled and stowed away in their pigeon-holes, the inventory taken, and the whole 
stamped with the stamp of un fait accompli. (Dewey, EW1:48, as cited in 
Alexander, 1987, p. 19) 
Thus far, I have introduced the uniquely American philosopher John Dewey, 
conveyed that one can learn how to take advantage of the aesthetic in order to make 
ordinary lived experience more beautiful and satisfying, and explained that Dewey’s 
influence continues to persist especially in the area of pedagogy. Dewey’s influence, as 
well as those of others, will become evident in the course of this dissertation. I now turn 
to the meaning of a sound ethical judgment, its purpose, and fallibilistic nature.  
Ethical Inquiry and Ethical Judgment  
      For Dewey, ethics was not a category of conceptual understanding but a 
dimension of experience. Ethical experience is not removed or segregated from ordinary 
experience but a particular dimension of its meaning, which, again, is felt as much as 
thought (see Gregory, 2009). Dewey suggested that the meaning of ethical precepts and 
concepts was to be found in experience because ethical norms function to make 
experience more just, more beautiful and in other ways better (Gregory, 2009).    
      In large measure, our conventions of moral concepts, feelings, and conduct 
adequately serve to help us understand and make the most of our experiences. However, 
Dewey and Tufts (1932) pointed out that in moments when we are confronted with 
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opposing tendencies regarding our conduct, for example, discerning right from wrong, 
and eliciting praise rather than disapproval, we experience doubt regarding the ethical or 
moral meaning of our experience and are faced with troubling questions of ethics and 
morality. Tension then arises in an affective phase colored by emotions. In Dewey’s 
view, a moral problem or situation is an occasion for inquiry, which is the way we move 
“from troubled and problematic situations to ones that are more settled and less 
precarious” (Grange, 2004, p. 33). On this understanding, an ethical agent is one who is 
capable of (a) discerning ethical dimensions in experience, (b) valuing the cognitive and 
qualitative meanings of, e.g. compassion, justice, and friendship over, e.g. cruelty, 
avarice, and oppression, and (c) figuring out how to respond in ways that improve 
particular experiences in those dimensions. Ethical inquiry is an occasion not unlike that 
which Dewey identified in How We Think (1997), as one instigated by perplexity and 
ending, ideally, in a judgment that involves self-correction, sensitivity to context, and the 
consideration of relevant criteria (Lipman, 2003). Johnson (2007) explains: “Judgment is 
the fundamental act of human cognition whereby a multiplicity of sensations, images, and 
thoughts is brought into a single, larger, synthesis or unity of thought” (Johnson, 2007, p. 
214). The immediate aim of ethical inquiry is to arrive at a sound ethical judgment, which 
has three important characteristics: theoretical, pragmatic, and educative. To begin with, 
sound ethical judgments involve a nuanced understanding of relevant moral concepts like 
honesty, kindness, and justice. As Dewey and Tufts (1932) have written, “The essence of 
morals, it is implied, is to know the reason for customary instructions; to ascertain the 
criterion insuring their being just[ified]” (p. 172).  For Dewey, even normative concepts 
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and propositions are the product of ongoing, investigative, and experimental inquiry. 
What we draw on is the meaning of attitudes, actions, and commitments that have already 
brought about fruitful communal interaction (Johnson, 1993).
10
 Dewey’s view of 
knowledge places the content of ethics – substantive views of what constitutes justice, 
care, health and other forms of goodness – on equal footing with that of other disciplines, 
such as the subject matter of the sciences and the arts, constantly being updated and 
expanded through study, research, and experimentation. In that vein, he was also careful 
to ward off a charge of moral relativism: 
It is stupid to suppose that this signifies that all moral principles are so relative to 
a particular state of society that they have no binding force in any social 
condition. The obligation is to discover what principles are relevant to our own 
social estate. Since this social condition is a fact, the principles which are related 
to it are real and significant, even though they be not adapted to some other set 
and style of . . . culture . . . (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 313)  
However, conceptual ethical theory and substantive moral knowledge are 
effective only to the extent that there can be a vital connection between them and human 
                                                 
10
 “We are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed 
achievement. Morals mean growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of 
expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and 
outcome of conduct . . .. [M]orals are education. It is learning the meaning of what we are 
about and employing that meaning in action (Johnson, 1993, p. 180). 
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activity (Dewey, 1916/1997c). Thus, the second characteristic of sound ethical judgments 
is that they successfully intervene to improve the ethically problematic situations that 
prompted the inquiry in the first place. Ethical judgment is judgment about what to 
believe, value and/or do in a particular case in order to bring about intelligent resolution 
of the situation, in the qualitative terms suggested above. In the face of moral confusion 
and the absence of clarity, we draw on resources available to us – or create new ones – in 
order to make our present situation more meaningful and manageable. The practical value 
of ethical principles and rules is their use as tools in ameliorating moral life (Fesmire, 
2003). The right judgment, therefore, is one that is based not only on ethical principles, 
but also on scrutinizing needs, conditions, obstacles, and resources; drawing a detailed 
plan of action and anticipating material and qualitative consequences (Dewey & Tufts, 
1932). However, no matter how principled, ethical judgments are necessarily provisional, 
in so far as they contribute to improvement over past results. Realistically speaking, the 
measure of sound ethical judgment is if it adequately addresses a moral deficiency 
(Dewey, 1922). As Grayling (2007) writes: 
Ethical inquiry should issue in substantive suggestions for what meaning and 
fulfillment are; even better, it should provide practical suggestions for applying 
those substantive suggestions to the practice of actual life, lived in the way actual 
lives are lived: among ordinariness, demands, complexities, obstacles, accidents, 
setbacks, opportunities, good luck and bad, other people, limitations, weariness, 
tribulations, joys, and an existing framework of institutions and social practices 
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which themselves constrain part (and often much) of the possibilities that most 
individuals can reasonably expect to actualize (p. 23). 
Third, a thoughtful judgment should be what Dewey termed an “educative 
experience,” in that it effects growth in the intelligent capacities – e.g. moral discernment 
and judgment-making – of the agent. Though in Dewey’s view inquiry and growth are 
open-ended, they are processes whereby fundamental dispositions are formed so that they 
can be expressed in the way life is carried out. When speaking of dispositions, the subject 
in question is the habits that are linked to a person’s character and moral formation.  
Having explored the practical nature of ethical inquiry and ethical judgment, I 
now propose a pedagogical model for ethical inquiry guided by Rosenblatt’s Deweyan 
notion of experience as a matrix, “a continuing flow of sensations, feelings, attitudes, 
ideas, and funded or latent memories, synthesized by imagination, and from which 
thinking emerges” (Alexander, 1987; Connell, 2001; Rosenblatt, 1994, p. 42, as cited in 
Innis, 1998, p. 871).  
The Components of Ethical Inquiry 
The theory of ethical inquiry I propose is informed by Dewey’s account of ethical 
experience and the nature of philosophical (including ethical) inquiry, but incorporates 
elements of pedagogy and philosophy of body. My theory consists of four components: 
body-based or embodied reasonableness, imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical 
content. These components will be the topics of chapters to follow, and I outline them 
briefly.  
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The first component, embodied reasonableness is thinking that is critical, creative, 
committed, contextual, and embodied (Sprod, 2001). An embodied pedagogy 
presupposes the engagement of the entire person, including feelings, emotions, and affect 
(Fayne, 2010). This component derives from the work of Johnson (2006), who 
acknowledges the initial impetus coming from Dewey’s theory of emotions (1895 & 
1896). In this connection, Johnson’s area of scholarship is informed by the profound role 
of the brain and the body in shaping what and how we think, feel, and act, including our 
body image and body schema, two central concepts in the context of embodiment.
11
 It 
also draws on the work of Bowman (1998 & 2000), Gatens (1996), Lloyd (1996 & 1999), 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), Nussbaum (2001) and Spinoza (1955). Their contributions 
will be examined in light of our internal bodily states, which can be brought to our 
awareness by accessing our feelings and emotions, the aspects of experience that 
contribute to our sense of personal and social well-being. Embodied reasonableness 
involves corporeal logic.
12
 It is a process of making our bodily experience (the source 
domain) become the basis for the inferences we make and the reasoning we do about a 
target domain.  
                                                 
11
 Body image is the picture we have of our own body or the way it appears to us 
(Schilder, 1950). The body schema refers to the body’s dynamic organization operating 
without our awareness in our tacit physical movements (Johnson, 2007; Weiss, 1999).  
12
 Corporeal logic is imagistic as opposed to discursive logic which is verbal 
(Fleckenstein, 2003). 
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Moral imagination, the second component, has been defined as the ability in 
particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities, not limited by any of those 
circumstances, nor framed by habits, rules, or norms (Werhane, as cited in Fesmire, 
2003). It permits new ways to frame situations and revise or broaden one’s moral point of 
view. It also includes the capacity to empathize with others and discern creative 
possibilities for ethical action (Fesmire, 2003). Moral imagination includes the following 
aspects: (a) image schemata,
13
 (b) narrativity,
14
 as the standard unit of meaning, and (c) 
kinaesthetic or bodily awareness
15
 plans. The process of moral imagination involves such 
activities as forming images, resourceful problem solving, constructing counterfactuals, 
including alternative realities, and articulating possibilities, their consequences, and 
repercussions (Pardales, 2002). In a classroom setting, moral imagination would fuel 
emergent contexts for ethical inquiry. 
                                                 
13
 Schemata are knowledge structures containing features of a person’s lived experience 
(Reutzel & Cooter, 1996; Woolfolk, 1998). 
14
 Narrativity refers to the story-like quality of human life, so that a person could think 
about her life as a story or a number of interconnected stories. As an inherent temporal 
quality of experience, narrativity presents meanings that extend us simultaneously 
backwards and forwards in time.  
15
 Kinaesthesis or body awareness is a term in the field of kinaesthesiology meant to 
explain our proprioceptive ability to have an internal sense of physical movements when 
they are performed efficiently and successfully (Satina and Hultgren, 2001, p. 527). 
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  A third component, emotions as judgments, draws on the work of Dewey and 
other philosophers, who have recognized that emotions are cognitive, value-laden 
judgments (De Souza, 1980; Lipman, 2003; Nussbaum, 2001; Oksenberg Rorty, 1980; 
Pardales, 2002; Pouivet, 2000; Sheffler, 1991; Solomon, 1993 & 2008). Dewey and Tufts 
(1932) state, “In their root and essence, moral judgments are emotional . . . a moral 
judgment must be at least colored with feeling if it is to influence behavior” (p. 296). 
Therefore, sound judgment in any domain, including the domain of ethics, is moved 
appropriately by relevant emotions.   
We learn [emphasis added] to have good emotions, the ones that can have 
profitable consequences for knowledge and aesthetic enjoyment. To a large 
extent, our education consists not only in the obtaining of knowledge, but also of 
emotional attitudes [emphasis added] matching certain enjoyable activities. The 
same emotions are in play in both the sciences and aesthetic experience: looking 
for differences (distinguishing) or similarities (analogy, metaphor), organizing, 
rephrasing in an enlightening fashion, formalizing, and so forth. (Pouivet, 2000, p. 
52)  
Dewey recommends that an education of the emotions should take place at the high 
school level because of the adolescent’s heightened ability for higher order thinking, 
which he describes in this manner: 
In the secondary period, there is at adolescence the awakening of the reflex and 
distinctly emotional consciousness. There is a basis for aesthetic analysis within 
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certain limits, for conscious attention to the best modes of communicating certain 
ideas, and of arousing certain emotions, or making a certain conscious distinction 
between the thought and the form of the expression and the realization of the 
thought proper. 
The same reflective consciousness coming up on the intellectual side makes 
literature perhaps the unequal instrument at this time for more specific ethical 
instruction. Great literary classics do involve ethical problems and attempted 
ethical solutions, which the child, after adolescence, is likely to have an interest 
in, and while formal instruction in ethics would be too formal or subjective, the 
literary form of it, being objective, gives the student a chance to work them out. 
(Dewey, 1899/1966, p. 280) 
      The final component, ethical content corresponds with Dewey’s notion that ethics 
is part of the unfinished meaning of our ordinary experience. Sound ethical judgment 
involves inquiry into such meaning. This requires intelligent discernment of the somatic 
and affective qualities of experience, especially those with potential ethical meaning, for 
example, fear, shame, and disgust. It also involves inquiry into the meaning of certain 
ethical concepts, such as right, duty, compassion, friendship, and person, and how such 
concepts both problematize and illuminate episodes of experience, which are promising 
or which find us ethically confused and conflicted. The pedagogical model just described 
will be useful in preparing instructional materials for the purpose of learning to conduct 
ethical inquiry, the need for which I justify in the following section.  
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Education in Ethical Inquiry        
 In the popular imagination, ethics is received morality, an edifice built on certain 
foundations, as in the fundamental principles of a religious or cultural tradition. 
Consequently, ethics education is typically authoritarian. Established practice, habit, or 
rule is unyielding, confirming that particular behaviors receive widespread acceptance 
and longstanding approval. As Dewey & Tufts (1932) have said, “Conduct is regulated 
through specific injunctions and prohibitions: Do this, do not do that” (p. 307). Children 
are expected to obey these injunctions without breach or question. This regulative work 
takes place in homes and religious institutions, and also in schools and classrooms. There, 
oftentimes, ethical beliefs are strengthened or overlain by the hidden curriculum 
comprising observed patterns of normative behavior, for instance, listening in silence 
while another is speaking to bestow value on the speaker’s ideas, restraining oneself from 
inflicting blows on a perceived tormentor, according elders due respect, and other habits 
indicative of a culturally-shared code of conduct by which young people are socialized 
into existing values and morals (Wynne & Ryan, 1997, p. 144). However, the meaning of 
“specific injunctions and prohibitions,” derives from larger domains of normative 
meaning. In fact, conceived most broadly, ethics is the full set of our normative concerns 
expressed in how life is to be lived, especially if it is to be considered a good life or if a 
person is to be considered a moral self. Morality is the subset of ethics issuing in 
behavioral codes, rules and sanctions regarding our relations with others (Grayling, 
2007). Hence it is ethics, rather than morality, for which the overriding concern is 
educating character in thoughtfulness, insight, taste, and tolerance (Grayling, 2007).  
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            These behaviors are inscribed in young minds as a result of an understanding 
habituated in experience, and invested with a store of meanings. “Learning in the proper 
sense, is not learning things, but the meanings of things” (Dewey, 1997a/1910a, p. 176). 
In large measure, the conventional ethics taught in schools, including the hidden 
curriculum, have value in regulating children’s ethical beliefs and conduct – which are 
not insignificant objectives. However, if ethics is taught only as rules of behavior, it 
becomes divorced from meaning. Left out are those aspects that can contribute to 
children’s growth as moral agents, including how such rules improve experience, 
enhance personal growth and social life. Moreover, education in ethical conventions 
tends to obfuscate moral conflict and uncertainty, which even children experience.  
 In that connection, I have developed a pedagogical framework and a novella for 
ethical inquiry in the classroom that incorporates the four components of sound ethical 
judgment just outlined. The following concepts: personhood, body, and sexuality and 
gender, are primary areas of ethical concern that are also central to adolescence (Kagan, 
1972; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1972). Each of the next three chapters is given to explaining 
one of those components, and in each of these chapters I first define and explain the 
component, explain and justify its role in ethical inquiry, and make a number of 
recommendations for how education might cultivate that component.  
 The organization of succeeding chapters is as follows. In Chapter Two, my 
objective is to arrive at a method for teaching ethical inquiry whereby students undertake 
reconstructing bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. I argue that 
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Dewey’s conception of body-mind addresses somatophobia16 that is emblematic of the 
inherent tensions in body/mind dualism and an embodied reasonableness appropriately 
addresses that. Dewey’s theory of inquiry has two important features directed at 
addressing the reconstructive task: sensitivity to context and ability to self-correct 
(Ralston, 2011). These and other criteria from Dewey’s thought are everyday skills that 
serve as guideposts for learning how to do ethical inquiry. I make several pedagogical 
recommendations
17
 that correspond with the requirements for embodied reasonableness. 
In this connection, the pedagogical model for teaching practice in the language arts is 
described in Marzano’s (1991) Cultivating Thinking in English and the Language Arts. 
Philosophy for Children (P4C) complements it well, so that the objective of teaching how 
to do ethical inquiry can be accomplished.        
 In Chapter Three, I shed light on Dewey’s theory of imagination and education. 
Dewey singles out imagination’s function as one that is significantly moral, hence the 
                                                 
16
 Somatophobia refers to the relegation of the body’s importance in relation to the idea 
of a superior mind; somatic disempowerment. According to Spelman (1982), it manifests 
itself in disdain for the body and belief in the inferiority of females, a view that has lead 
to unequal relations and oppressive practices. 
17
 I analyze Philosophy for Children (P4C) as a program for ethical inquiry in light of 
those recommendations and throw light on specific aspects of traditional P4C practice 
that fulfill these recommendations, as well as some that frustrate or block them, or that 
may not be adequate.  
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notion, moral imagination. I put forth the narrative as appropriate material for learning 
ethical inquiry for certain reasons, one of which being that the processes of belief 
formation in the minds of characters taking place within the specified context of fiction 
lends itself to philosophical analysis (Zamir, 2007, p. 109). As an instructional tool, I 
propose dramatic rehearsal, both as a deliberative event and a kinaesthetic process, in 
order to create a fictional context for dialogic dramatic inquiry, a form of process drama 
whereby students attempt to reconstruct moral habits (ways of thinking, feeling and doing 
which are dynamic response patterns). As an inquiry-based pedagogy, it uses adult-
mediated dramatic play and performance to create a sequence of imagined, but authentic, 
events to promote dialogue among participants (Edmiston, 2000 & 2011). I relate my 
pedagogical decisions to the requirements of the moral imagination component and 
explain how P4C corresponds with the said requirements.    
 In Chapter Four, I explain Dewey’s theory of emotions described as a unity of 
thought and emotion in naturalistic functional coordination of behavior (Garrison, 2003). 
In this chapter, I also discuss the arts as a mechanism for educating the four components 
of ethical inquiry. According to Lipman (1995), educating emotions by attending to the 
aesthetic dimension of experience corresponds with a moral education because emotions 
indicate valuations (caring thinking or that we care about something), bringing about 
actions that embody judgments. He writes, “This is moral education in the sense that if 
students could perceive for themselves the inappropriateness of their judgments and their 
emotions, they might be less ready to act in the ways those judgments of emotions called 
for” (p. 8).       
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 Relying on its deep connections to emotional life (Nussbaum, 2001), I highlight 
music as embodied experience and ethical encounter, exploring its pedagogical 
implications for ethical inquiry and its role in nurturing appropriate dispositions, tastes, 
and the construction of identity. According to Bowman (2000), music represents events 
constitutive of ethical encounters because, by imparting appropriate habits and 
dispositions, it nurtures character that is comfortable with and adept at responding to 
contingency and particularity. Second, music is fundamentally social and intersubjective, 
requiring mutuality, openness, and attributes like cooperation, respect, and fairness. 
Third, the act of investing oneself in a collective social practice has consequences for 
valuing that extend well beyond the musical domain. Fourth, music requires acceptance 
and deference to standards of excellence that are consensual, fluid, and inarticulable. 
Fifth, music’s more important successes benefit entire collaborative communities, of 
those engaged in and committed to its advancement. Sixth, musical success is bound to 
one’s character and reflects one’s personal identity. Seventh, music demands active 
engagement in local forms of community. Finally, music raises our expectations for 
quality in subsequent experience. All musical experience is corporeally constituted 
phenomena, and for some, musical embodiment entails a commitment to healthful 
musical action. Shusterman (1997) asserts, “We have to stop pushing words and start 
moving limbs; stop talking and start dancing, in order to understand the body as the ‘non-
discursive other’” (p. 129, as cited in Bowman & Powell, 2007).     
 We can learn to listen to music and read painting and sculpture as we do 
literature. As Nussbaum (1990) wrote in Love’s Knowledge, the arts afford insight for us 
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to be able to inquire into some central ethical questions of human life. Using music, 
painting, and sculpture to demonstrate the nature of emotion, I highlight the emotions of 
fear, disgust and shame, and relate them to philosophical/real world problems that afflict 
us and are related to personhood, body, sexuality and gender. I conclude the chapter with 
an iteration of my framework for education in ethical inquiry, which I will use to justify 
my novella in the next chapter.      
 In Chapter Five, I make the case for high school ethical inquiry to focus on 
concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender and sexuality – as some of the most 
important ethical dimensions of students’ lives at this age. I describe the curriculum that I 
have prepared with a view to strengthening students’ reasoning and judgment while 
learning to do ethical inquiry, engaging them in the practice of making generic, and 
mediating or procedural, judgments. The greater part of this chapter is devoted to 
explaining the concept of the gaze and the nude in specific works of the visual arts 
covering a lengthy period of its history in the western tradition. The naked human body, 
both female and male, continues to play a pivotal role in the understanding and 
problematizing of selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality, something Paechter (1998) has 
determined holds sway over our educational institutions and life in schools. The 
curriculum is concerned with ethical content that strives to be common to all, central to 
the way we make sense of experience, and contestable or problematic, i.e. something that 
is arguable (Sharp & Splitter, 1995). I have been guided by Lipman’s instructional model 
that utilizes a P4C reader, which is a trigger text described as “an inquiry-fostering 
environment” (Lipman, 2003, p. 156), and is meant to nurture reflection and dialogue in a 
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classroom community of ethical inquiry, a cooperative learning methodology comprising 
a group and its teacher-facilitator, who have a shared commitment to engage in inquiry 
(Sprod, 2001). The P4C reader, in this case, is a narrative text I have written that aims to 
model instances of critical judgment stipulated by Lipman (2003), as the following: first, 
where students are faced with discrepancies that bewilder them and are enjoined to 
consider their underlying principles; second, where they are faced with something made 
to contain an element of surprise; and third, where they are in a situation involving the 
discrimination of value and are required to think contextually. In a way, the fictional 
narrative dramatizes philosophy, and the exercises provide practice in making judgments, 
by sharpening and strengthening cognitive skills, and promoting precision and specificity 
(Lipman, 1996). Finally, I provide a novella and unit plan for ethical inquiry at the high 
school level, following my framework. In making my focus of research a project 
involving teaching young students how to do ethical inquiry, I have taken up Dewey’s 
invitation, eloquently expressed, in the following excerpt from Ethics.  
For in its ethical sense, love signifies completeness of devotion to the objects 
esteemed good. Such an interest, or love, is marked by temperance because a 
comprehensive interest demands a
 
harmony that can be attained only by 
subordination of particular impulses and passions. It involves courage because an 
active and genuine interest nerves us to meet and overcome the obstacles that 
stand in the way of its realization. It includes wisdom or thoughtfulness because 
sympathy, concern for the welfare of all affected by conduct, is the surest 
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guarantee for the exercise of consideration, for examination of a proposed line of 
conduct in all its bearings. (Dewey, 1932, p. 285) 
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Chapter Two: Embodied Reasonableness in Ethical Inquiry 
 
Prop. XIX The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to 
exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected. 
Proof : The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body. 
(Spinoza, 1956, p. 101) 
 
Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the 
ideas of the modifications of the body. (Spinoza, 1956, p. 101) 
Organic body occupies a distinctive position in the hierarchy of being; it is the 
highest actuality of nature’s physical potentialities, and it is in turn the potentiality 
of mind. (Dewey, 1958, p. 249) 
 
  Dewey’s reconstruction of philosophy was a means for philosophy to address real 
world problems and to issue in harmonious coordination within lived situations. The 
previous chapter described how Dewey saw continuity instead of separation, as in 
organism-experience, where experience is a fundamental transaction mutually 
constitutive of live creatures and nature, human beings and their social environment. In 
the idea of continuity, Dewey sought to undo Cartesian dualism, writing thus: 
“Restoration of continuity is shown to do away with the mind-body problem” (Dewey, 
EN, xiv-xv; as cited in Alexander, 1987, p. 98). Body-mind is a unit grounding meaning 
and thought. It approaches lived experience, as a flow of imagination, emotion, and 
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action out of which questions of survival and flourishing emerge.     
 In this chapter, I argue that the most promising descriptions of the operations of the 
human mind relate to the operations in the human body, so it follows that the norm of 
reasonableness must also be embodied. The notion of the embodied mind takes into 
account that the body-mind is a single fundamental unit through which sentient living 
creatures interact with the environment. My construct of embodied reasonableness is 
based on a non-dualistic, body-based configuration for the thinking being. It is body-
mind where reason emerges, as critical, intersubjective, outcome-oriented -- ergo, 
embodied reasonableness. The chapter is further organized to arrive at a method for 
teaching ethical inquiry whereby students undertake reconstructing bodily habits of 
thinking, discourse, and conduct. I make several pedagogical recommendations that 
correspond with the requirements for embodied reasonableness drawing on Marzano’s 
(1991) Cultivating Thinking in English and the Language Arts and make reference to the 
pedagogy of P4C, which offers a method in ethical inquiry.   
  In view of the mind-body problem as germane to the subject of embodied 
reasonableness, I begin the chapter with an historical narrative of the body-mind concept, 
highlighting Dewey’s contribution, acknowledging others, such as Descartes, whose 
dualism established mind and body as separate substances,
18
 Spinoza (1955), and the 
                                                 
18
 In the definition of substance as “an existent thing which requires nothing but itself to 
exist,” Cartesian dualism establishes that mind and body are independent and completely 
separate of each other (Stumpf, 1994, p. 246). 
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philosophers Gatens and Lloyd  (1999), who are at the forefront in bringing to our 
attention Spinoza’s unique perspective on mind as idea of the body. I conclude my 
account with Merleau-Ponty (1962), who in the tradition of the science of inward 
experience known as sens intime,
19
 linked sense perception with its object and 
determined the mind is embodied. My purpose in engaging in this concise genealogy of 
thought is to shed some light on the advancement of thinking regarding body-mind as it 
informs reasonableness and the remaining components of my theory of ethical inquiry, 
i.e. imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content. 
       In A Quest for Certainty, Dewey establishes that the driving force behind 
humanity’s quest for certainty is intellectual advancement. He then points to the dualistic 
metaphysics that serves as our inheritance from Plato and Aristotle, which in turn formed 
the bedrock of the medieval Church and continues to thrive in the dualisms of the West’s 
weltanschauung, the selfsame dualisms that he labored a lifetime to overcome which he 
refers to as the “antecedently real” below (Teehan, 1992). 
Along with the elimination of myths and grosser superstitions, there were set up 
the ideals of science and of a life of reason. Ends which could justify themselves 
                                                 
19
 In the language of sens intime, expressed as “one’s immediate awareness of the 
presence of the body in perception” and “the simultaneity of a composite of impressions 
inhering in different parts of the organism, and culminating in the statement that “the soul 
is necessarily incarnated [sic] there is no psychology without biology” (Canguilhem, 
1968, pp. 374-375, as cited in Crary, 1988, p. 8) 
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to reason were to take the place of custom as the guide of conduct. These two 
ideals form a permanent contribution to western civilization.  
But with all our gratitude for these enduring gifts, we cannot forget the conditions 
which attended them. For they brought with them the idea of a higher realm of 
fixed reality . . . They glorified the invariant at the expense of change . . . It 
bequeathed the notion, which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the 
Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real . . . 
(Dewey, 1929, p. 16) 
      Plato’s formulation of the immateriality of the soul and the Christian 
metaphysical tradition played a central role in Cartesian dualism. In arguing for the 
separation of body and soul, Descartes submitted to Church orthodoxy and exempted 
God and the human mind from scientific inquiry (Toulmin & Goodfield, 1962). Never 
mind that Descartes himself was aware of empirical data that pointed to their unity 
(Copleston, 1994). What we inherited from Descartes is a way of thinking about our 
epistemological relation to the world. The body is for Cartesian philosophy both 
necessary and unacceptable, and this ambivalence drives mind and body apart.  
       Closer to Descartes’ time20 is the philosopher Spinoza (1955) in whom interest 
has been revived by the philosophers Gatens and Lloyd (1999). For Spinoza, human 
                                                 
20
  In 1641-1656, the Cartesian account became unacceptable to Spinoza (Gullan-Whur, 
2000, p. 35). Quoting Schopenhauer, Gullan-Whur (2000) writes: “Spinoza’s philosophy 
consists mainly in the negation of the double dualism between God and the World and 
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beings are part of nature (Lloyd, 1994). In his conception of the mind as the idea of the 
body, Spinoza (1955) brings to our attention that the mind and body are one [“mind and 
body are one and the same thing” (p. 131)], increasing powers of mind correspond with 
increasing powers of body, and that the body is capable of embodying mental acts and of 
exercising individual agency (Lloyd, 1996; Spinoza, 1955; Stewart, 2006). Defining 
emotions as modifications of the body, Spinoza (1955) attributes a cognitive function to 
the imagination and emotions.  
The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save 
through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected. . . . The 
human mind is the very idea or the knowledge of the human body. (p. 101)  
Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, 
which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, 
or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of 
the said action, and do not wonder at it. . . . I ask such objectors whether 
experience does not also teach that if the body be inactive the mind is 
simultaneously unfitted for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the 
mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking, 
such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everyone’s experience 
                                                                                                                                                 
between soul and body which his teacher [sic] Descartes had set up” (Ep. 21, Jan. 1665: S 
158, as cited in, p. 156) 
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will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking 
on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being 
stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less 
fitted for contemplating the said object. (Spinoza, pp. 132-33) 
For Spinoza, the imagination’s unique strength is its imaging capability, which can 
impart a vivid sense of a body, even when it is absent or no longer exists. Out of the 
imaginative experience emerge those emotions establishing our affinities, such as 
yearning for faraway or deceased loved ones, and compassion for the suffering of distant 
others. He writes: 
[T]he ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of 
things . . . When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. . 
. . If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it is at the same 
time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of the imagination must be 
set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault. (Spinoza, p. 100) 
According to Spinoza, the ability to make associations is embedded in 
experiential contexts and schema. It can be reinforced in memory by a fictional narrative 
and involves numerous images, so that as a result “ . . . when the mind afterwards 
imagines any of them, it will straightaway remember the others also” (p. 100). He 
explains further that associations are a function of one’s experience, which he describes 
as “intelligibility”: 
For instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember 
than the same number in the form of a narration. . . . If we read, for instance, a 
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single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very well, . . . for it will reign 
alone in the memory. (p. 31) 
Further, a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; 
therefore, we cannot help remembering. (p. 32) 
To a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once 
pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the 
thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse 
to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.. (p. 101) 
Spinoza also claims that the mind’s strength is in its capacity to learn many things and to 
be adaptive to nature:  
Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it 
understands a greater number of natural objects. . . . Again, the more things the 
mind knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature; 
by increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules 
for its own guidance; and by increased knowledge of nature, it can more easily 
avoid what is useless. (p. 15) 
Spinoza’s account of imagination and emotions emphasizes awareness of the 
body (Lloyd, 1996). It is the awareness of our bodies that stands as warrant for 
imagination and which is constitutive of the mind. Imagination bestows direct contact 
with bodily reality and has a powerful ontological dimension, our ability for enhanced 
perception; as other bodies persist in being, conatus, is a mediating force. Spinoza’s idea 
of conatus or striving to persist in being is important for the dimension it brings to our 
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understanding of self and the endeavors which we conduct in order to increase our 
powers because they are the activities we love and enhance our ultimate pursuit of 
happiness. Individual strivings result in affects as bodily modifications, and the 
experience of other bodies gives rise to a feeling for others (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; 
Lloyd, 1996). In regard for the need to frame a system of right conduct, Spinoza, deems it 
cannot come from universal truths, but only through actual strivings, appetites and 
desires. In part, it is a collaborative, non-teleological morality, that admits of difference 
and diversity (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999). 
In these aspects of his philosophy, Spinoza prefigures Dewey: his view of the 
essential unity of mind and body expressed in the mind is the idea of the body (the 
primacy of the body), his theory of the function of imagination and emotions, his notion 
of conatus, i.e. that bodies are in nature, striving to persist in being, and his view of 
narrative fiction. 
In a reference to Spinoza’s conatus Dewey (1917) argues that rather than passive, 
and informed by imagination and emotions, the process of adaptation as it occurs in 
nature is one that is active, nuanced and temporal. His emphasis is on the imaginative 
transformation of actual conditions, in light of the possible: 
Conatus often ignore[s] all the important facts of the actual process. . . . as if self-
control, self-development went on directly as a sort of unrolling push from within. 
But life endures only in virtue of the support of the environment. And since the 
environment is only incompletely enlisted in our behalf, self-preservation—or 
self-realization or whatever—is always indirect—always an affair of the way in 
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which our present activities affect the direction taken by independent changes in 
the surroundings. Hindrances must be turned into means [emphasis added].  
 We are also given to playing loose with the conception of adjustment, as if that 
meant something fixed [emphasis added]—a kind of accommodation once for all (ideally 
at least) of the organism to an environment. But as life requires the fitness of the 
environment to the organic functions, adjustment to the environment means not passive 
acceptance of the latter, but acting so that the environing changes take a certain turn 
[emphasis added]. (Dewey, 1917, pp. 9-10) 
      In the history of American philosophy, it is Peirce, who in 1880, gave a place to 
embodiment in epistemology when he wrote, “The connection of the mind with the 
nervous system is so intimate that the essential laws of the former must necessarily 
correspond to those of the latter” (cited in Kaag, 2007, pp. 190-1). In Europe, 
embodiment studies within phenomenology gained importance early in the 20
th
 century 
and later, in the late 1970s, influenced cognitive science. We owe the notion of the 
embodied mind
21
 to the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who is regarded somewhat as the 
patron saint of the body (Shusterman, 2008). In opposition to Descartes, he wrote:  
The connection between essence and existence is not found in experience, but in 
the idea of the infinite. It is then, true in the last resort that analytical reflection 
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 The term, embodied mind, took hold in the work of Francisco Varela (Kaag, 2007, p. 
191). 
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entirely rests on a dogmatic idea of being, and that in this sense it does amount to 
an act of self-discovery. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 44) 
To a Cartesian doctrine, these descriptions will never have any philosophic 
importance . . . The theory of phenomena, then, implies a theory of reflection and 
a new cogito. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 50) 
According to Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), thinking is not performed separately from the 
body because the mind is always embodied. It emerges through corporeal relations with 
the world and thinking is the outcome of those relations. Furthermore, the embodied 
agent structures perceptions and representations in the context of transactions undertaken 
to survive in the natural world. As it is within the perceptual world, selfhood must be 
embodied. Assuming that other bodies have consciousness, a self should be perceivable 
to another (Mensch, 2003). Citing the instrumentalists (e.g. Dewey), Merleau-Ponty 
wrote: “The example of the instrumentalists shows even better how habit has its 
abode…in the body as mediator of the world” (p. 145). Merleau-Ponty has a pragmatic 
appeal in the stance of “I can,” rather than “I think that” (Anderson, 2003; Mensch, 2003; 
Shusterman, 2008). However, pragmatism obtains better prospects for  “full-bodied” 
engagement in practical somatic awareness because Merleau-Ponty overlooks 
experiential self-conscious perceptions, such as distinct feelings, observations, and 
visualizations, and the more internal bodily senses, kinaesthetic feelings and 
proprioception (Shusterman, 2008). John Dewey advocated reflective body consciousness 
in the Alexander technique, a general educational philosophy of body-mind unity and 
self-improvement (Bowman, 2007; Shusterman, 2008). Many actions that individuals 
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now perform spontaneously were once beyond the repertoire of unreflective performance, 
and in order to effect this improvement, conscious critical reflection was brought to bear 
on the unreflective action, so that it could be apprehended and subjected to disciplined 
practice (Shusterman, 2008). All in all, because pragmatism is amenable to individual 
differences and contingencies, plurality and reconstruction, it holds more promise for 
somatic applications of philosophy (Shusterman, 2008). 
      Feminists, who have also taken exception to Cartesian dualism draw attention to 
its association with reason’s dominance over emotion, and relatedly, cerebral man’s  
dominance over fleshy woman (Paechter, 2004).
22
 It is in this respect that Dewey’s 
conception of body-mind makes possible an embodied reasonableness, which in this 
chapter is dealt with at length. In turn, embodied reasonableness mediates as a 
countervailing force against the somatophobia that is emblematic of the inherent tensions 
in body/mind dualism. In general, feminist philosophers highlight the moral importance 
of community and caring, pay attention to the particularity of persons, and uphold the 
social fabric of close personal relationships (Friedman, 2000, p. 208). The personal 
viewpoint is regarded as the only appropriate standpoint in moral judgment because it 
recognizes a person’s distinctive history, desires, emotions, embodiment, and network of 
social relations (p. 208). From the feminists we get the philosophical perspective that 
acknowledges emotion’s role in the moral life (Friedman, 2000, p. 209), 
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 This has led to the sex/gender split where currently, the view upholds biological sex as 
“true” and gender, socially constructed (Paechter, 2004, p. 310). 
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interdependencies between persons, and the interdependencies that support autonomy (p. 
209). Feminist philosophers support the claim that women are more relationally oriented 
than individualistic (p. 209). Feminist ethics has a goal of ending the oppression of 
women and improving regard for female capacities and viewpoints (Friedman, 2000, pp. 
210-211). To achieve this, various methodologies are associated with feminists, such as 
defending theories and concepts that are more in keeping with women’s ways of 
understanding and reflecting (p. 211), disputing biases and attitudes that perpetuate 
women’s subordination (p. 211), emphasizing that the political and personal go hand-in-
hand, rejecting the public-private divide (p. 211), and developing theories and 
methodologies that incorporate diverse women’s understanding (p. 211). Feminist ethics 
maintain that moral reasoning is grounded in social life and located in embodied persons 
(Friedman, 2000, p. 213). 
      In 1930, Dewey wrote “the growing freedom of women can hardly have any other 
outcome than the production of more realistic and humane morals,” and that existing 
moral notions were “almost exclusively male constructions” (Dewey, [1930] 1984d, 276; 
as cited in Pappas, 1993, p. 78). Feminists share with Dewey the following: first, moral 
particularity or the attention paid to persons in particular contexts, including the 
importance of values like affection, care, trust, loyalty, independence and sacrifice, as 
they inform the lives of moral agents (Sorrel, 1999). Dewey improves on feminist 
particularism with a theory of generalization on the Good, Right, and Duty, which are 
highly abstract criteria that however, are not susceptible to charges leveled by feminists 
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against masculinist accounts because Dewey’s recommendations were made with a view 
to developing integrated selves and communities (Sorrel, 1999).  
Second, narrativity is another feature in which Deweyan pragmatism shares 
similarities because feminists exert efforts to understand particular persons and their 
growth as selves through time. In Dewey’s view, the purposive action of agents is 
integrative. Of import is the agent’s internal dialogue taking the form of dramatic 
rehearsal that in turn, can be made intelligible in a dialogic community (Sorrel, 1999).  
      Third, feminists believe that the dialogic relationship between persons, based on 
an emergent narrative, contributes to refined understanding, when they emerge from the 
dialogic transactions of individuals, who are actually implicated in moral situations. In 
this respect, Dewey shares in common with feminists the belief that it is an intrinsically 
dialogical process that comprises the moral life (Sorrel, 1999).  
      Pappas (1993) highlights feminist concern with the affective and relates that to 
Dewey’s espousal of moral sensitivity, which is aesthetic. Dewey’s picture of moral 
sensitivity is painted thus: “A person must feel the qualities of acts as one feels with the 
hands the qualities of roughness and smoothness” (Dewey [1932] 1985, 269; as cited in 
Pappas, 1993 p. 79). Imagination and bodily desire are also important parts of 
reasonableness for Dewey (Garrison, 1999). Appropriate emotions enhance the quality of 
embodied reasonableness which for Dewey (1922) is the interplay of a multitude of 
dispositions, including curiosity, experimentation, and a determination to see things 
through (as cited in Pappas, 1993). However, a caveat applies in instances where the 
preference of the emotions lies with the morally incorrect, inappropriate, or unacceptable. 
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In such cases, it is expected that one would work to enhance or ameliorate the quality of 
present experience. The determining factors taking precedence are improvement of 
character and that of relationships (Pappas, 1993). 
The preceding historical narrative regarding the body-mind was meant to 
highlight Dewey’s place in the development of mind as embodied and to show that 
philosophy has long been preoccupied with reasonableness, imagination, emotions, and 
ethics. It will become clear in the following that the embodied mind or body-mind is a 
somatic instrument of thought. 
The embodied mind 
      Every concept of reasonableness is necessarily normative, yet it must draw on 
understandings of the mind that are descriptive. As my construct of embodied 
reasonableness depends on a non-dualistic, body-based configuration for the thinking 
being, it takes into account that the body-mind is the fundamental unit through which live 
creatures carry on transactions with the environment. Let me call your attention to the 
importance of body-mind; Dewey himself granted the body-mind the utmost importance 
in his theory of experience. Beginning with an explanation of his concept of the 
embodied mind. I will now describe how the body as somatic instrument of thinking has 
a role in inquiry.  
      Dewey’s solution to the problem of meaning is a model of total biological 
coordination, the body-mind. It sets aside mind-body dualism and mutually implicates a 
living thing and her environment, whereby the environment supplies a range of energy 
for her live body to engage in its own organized pattern of activity as a means to survival 
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and well-being (Alexander, 1987). Body-mind’s non-dualistic ontology is sustained by a 
principle of continuity, wherein there are no gaps between levels of complexity within an 
organism, because complex interactions between “lower” cognitive powers give rise to 
“higher order” capacities. Mind and body are parts of a single process; thinking and 
acting, two names for making our way in a world shot through with contingency 
(Menand, 2001). 
      It is Dewey’s concept of body-mind23 from which I draw the notion of embodied 
reasonableness because he pointed the way in identifying the dichotomous problem in 
moral theories (Dewey & Tufts, 1932; Dewey, 1944; Dewey, 1958). Dewey bemoaned 
the lack of a vocabulary to describe the body-mind concept and blamed it on the 
pervasiveness of the Cartesian idea of two separate existential realms for the body and for 
the mind. Body-mind is the center of lived activity, a developer of experience, and 
explorer of its world. As a fundamental unit, it is continually engaged in its own self-
organizing activity placing one’s world in an integrated order (Alexander, 1987).  
      Because we have unquestioningly been habituated to accept the dualism of the 
mind-body split, alternative notions seem counterintuitive. In this connection, Dewey 
wrote in critical fashion:  
                                                 
23
 According to Alexander (1987), body-mind, Dewey’s attempt to create a model of total 
organic coordination, is just one of those ironic instances in Dewey’s scholarly 
achievement where a basic model of his has been used independently by others as diverse 
as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Langer. 
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When it gets beyond dualism—as many philosophies do in form—it can only be 
by appeal to something higher than anything found in experience, by a flight to 
some transcendental realm. (Dewey, 1916/1997c, p. 333-334)  
The form assumed by the denial is, most frequently, that striking division into a 
superior true realm of being and lower illusory, insignificant or phenomenal realm 
which characterizes metaphysical systems as unlike as those of Plato and 
Democritus, St. Thomas and Spinoza, Aristotle and Kant, Descartes and Comte, 
Haeckel 
24
 and Mrs. Eddy
25
 (Dewey, 1929/1958, p. 59). 
The body-mind challenges the ineluctable assumption that supports beliefs about mind as 
eternal substance and the mutual exclusiveness of mind and body. According to Johnson 
(2007), “mind” and “body” are just terms we use to make sense of experience and do not 
correspond to actual parts of us. Meaning is derived from our immediate experience of 
the world, including our perceptions, feelings, and imagination. Inquiry is our intelligent 
grappling with the world, and it is through the inquiring process that reason arises as the 
outcome of fruitful inquiry. Reason is not a preexisting capacity, but a result of our 
successful grappling. Johnson further explains that every function of inquiry is embodied. 
Imagination is our capacity to make sense of things anew. Emotions are central to our 
ability to conceptualize, reason, and imagine. Meaning is shaped by the bodily experience 
of interacting with the environment. This notion of the embodied mind gives rise to an 
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understanding of self and others (Gallagher, 2008). Indeed, our notion of personhood is 
radically called into question by this reconfiguration of cognition and embodiment.  
      We can aptly say that the body-mind is the somatic instrument of thinking 
(Shusterman, 2006). Embodiment is a relational concept that highlights an organism’s 
transactions with the real world. It presupposes that a person has the ability to act and 
respond to situations that call for attention (Quick, Dautenham, Nehaniv, and Roberts, 
2000). Dewey (1997) speaks of the initial context for inquiry as “felt difficulty” (p. 72), 
indicating that non-discursive thinking processes – bodily senses, imagination, feelings 
and emotions – are engaged in the qualitative apprehension of a problematic situation. 
This is the moment that prompts the response of reflective inquiry. Moreover, every 
thought and felt meaning occurring in inquiry has roots in an organic act of biological 
behavior and so there are physical names for mental acts shedding light on how we live 
out our lives with the kinds of bodies we have, interacting with our environments. 
Sometimes described as “the body is in the mind,” our use of language best describes the 
phenomenon: “I see what you’re saying.”; “Do you grasp what I am saying?”; “I’m 
getting a feel for your argument.”; “I’m tossing around some ideas” (Fesmire, 2003; 
Johnson, 1993, 1999, 2008).  Finally, the outcome of successful inquiry is embodied 
reasonableness: the integration of reconstructed body-mind and the reconstructed, 
situated context. Having imparted a better understanding of thinking with the body, the 
following aims to illustrate particular instances where embodied cognition, a body 
schema-based ability, is involved in many non- discursive, everyday acts constitutive of 
judgments. 
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      As somatic instrument the body-mind is capable of embodied cognition, a 
cognitive ability associated with the body schema, something we take for granted, often 
only coming to our awareness in occasions of bodily impairment or disability. The notion 
of embodied reasonableness can be attributed to developments in cognitive science 
regarding the body’s centrality in shaping the mind.  
        Wilson (2002) wrote, an instance of embodied cognition indicates that “A mind 
needs a body to make it function” (p. 625). This means that cognition takes place where 
we imagine the life of our mind takes place, not only within the brain that is encased in 
our bony skull, but throughout our entire body’s nervous system, and in fact, our entire 
physical being, so that even our hearts, digestion and immunity contribute to it, and are 
influenced by it (Siegel, 2010). The body plays an essential part in constructing 
perceptual and mental processes in its interaction with the environment itself (Bilda, 
Candy, & Edmonds, 2007).  
       Primary in this account are sensorimotor functions for successful interaction with 
the world (Wilson, 2002). A survey of philosophy of mind and cognitive science yields a 
number of ways in which the operations of the mind require, relate to, or reduce to 
operations of the body. Falling under the category of embodied cognition, it has been 
shown in recent research to play a central role in higher order thinking (Niedenthal, P.M., 
Barsalou, L.W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., et al., 2005). Embodied cognition is 
considered online embodiment when the perceiver interacts with actual social objects, 
and offline embodiment, when the perceiver represents social objects in their absence 
(Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
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      Embodied cognition involves the juxtaposition of image, emotion, and bodily 
feeling in judgment making (Brown & Reid, 2006). This means, among other things, that 
the range, acuity and functionality of cognition derive from the health, exercised 
condition and functionality of the body.  Recent empirical research in cognitive science 
has provided evidence for a common folk assumption, i.e. that body posture can influence 
thinking. For instance, a standing position facilitates biased thinking and is less 
susceptible to persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2008). In physical education studies it has been 
found that male athletes’ bodily experience can improve perceptual ability, so that a 
professional basketball player has an acute sense that a ball will make the basket sooner 
than the rest of the audience knows. A coach, on the other hand, would have median 
predictive ability (Grafton, 2009).       
      Embodied cognition occurs when the body, as a self-referential point, renders a 
sense of embodiment that is pervasive in all our perceptions, even if we are not fully 
attentive to it. We are able to monitor our own self-movement through our proprioceptive 
ability, i.e. our sense of our own movements, bodily positions, or bodily reactions to 
stimuli. As felt experiences, they can be prenoetic, i.e. underdetermined, preconceptual, 
immanent, nonpropositional, marginal or recessive, and constitute somatic self-
consciousness. This is the aspect that allows us to respond to visceral experience, the 
question “How do you feel?” and establishes the bodily basis of emotions (Gallagher, 
2006; Grange, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Shusterman, 2008). This conveys the human need to 
give expression to the qualities of life that emanate as felt experiences, paying attention 
to their nonlinguistic dimension.  
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      Embodied cognition functions in our unreflective, yet skillful actions, also known 
as situated normativity. This involves bodily posture, stance, gesture, and other 
movements that are invested with cognition and judgment, but not discursive reflection – 
for instance, when one is “reliably engaged in a communal custom. When one stands too 
close to see a large painting well and is immediately compelled to step back is such an 
instance of situated normativity” (Rietveld, 2008, p. 973-974). Even when practicing 
customary social habits or procedures, there is an element of agency involved because we 
“allow ourselves” to observe the custom in question, such as keeping proper distance in a 
confined space (Rietveld, 2008, p. 977).  
In many situations in our daily lives we act adequately, yet unreflectively. With 
certainty and    fluency, we…maintain an appropriate distance from the other 
people in an elevator, and without deliberation we stop the pedestrian next to us, 
who, while about to cross the street, does not notice an oncoming car. Often we 
just act and normally this immediate action is adequate. It is quite amazing that 
even without explicit deliberation we normally act in ways that are appropriate 
from the point of view of sociocultural practice. (Rietveld, 2008, p. 973)  
The preceding discussion has explained that embodied cognition facilitates our sense of 
embodiment and our bodily abilities to interact in skilful yet unthinking ways with the 
world. The point of what follows is that embodied cognition obtains of skilled 
performances in the specialized contexts of the arts, crafts, and thinking. I conclude with 
a brief exposition regarding the moral implications of embodied cognition in encounters 
with the others.  
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       Embodied cognition also occurs in skilled motor activity, as practiced by crafts 
persons wherein a tool becomes a bodily extension (Sprod, 2001). For that matter, a 
dancer, as well as a sculptor, painter, a musical conductor, would think and solve 
problems in real time, with her body-mind. Craftsmanship is characterized by 
appreciation, appropriateness, and immediacy, spurred on by the potential of 
improvement, and inherent emotional appeal. Sometimes labeled intuitive, skillful 
behavior is know-how that is socially acquired and controlled (Rietveld, 2008). The skills 
involved in these instances are learned and habituated into a level of expertise (Sprod, 
2001).  
 The intelligence that music facilitates derives from the capacity for ambiguity 
at the heart of embodied cognition (Bowman, 1998). In music, we think with our bodies. 
In the presence of music, embodied cognition is immediate. The unity of body-mind is 
demonstrated irrefutably in musical experience as embodied agency (Bowman & Powell, 
2007).  Music is experience that restores unity and wholeness to body-mind (Bowman, 
2002, p. 6). Its sounds enter the body and are sensed, felt, and experienced inside it. The 
body entrains itself to patterns of feeling and tempi of movement, e.g. walking or 
running. Furthermore, phrasing generally indicates human respiration, extending the 
range of embodied experience (Bowman, 1998). Not only is music constructed by 
performers and listeners alike, it also intervenes in the broader environment where music 
takes place (Bowman, 1998). 
 The case of a deaf poet-performer is a case in point. Because of the absence of the 
spoken voice, the deaf artist needs to transcend the absence of vocal speech through other 
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ways of communicating meaning, such as acting and performing. In this manner, his is an 
embodied speech or languaging. The processes of languaging (rather than language), 
becoming (rather than being) and emotioning (rather than emotion) are activities 
associated with dramatic performances that are rich in embodied experiences (Wright, 
2005).       
      Finally, embodied cognition is the ability to relate knowledge of one’s own, and 
other people’s bodies to understand oneself and others (Grafton, 2009). How we learn to 
think is illustrative of this. We readily recognize when someone is busy thinking. Even 
early on as children, we are able to infer that the entirety of someone’s facial expressions, 
bodily posture and body language indicate thinking. The physical manifestations are part 
and parcel of the act of thinking itself. Thinking is learned in social settings, such as 
classrooms, and the accompanying behaviors are internalized as well. Sprod (2001) refers 
to a list of emotionally tinged behaviors conveyed by the eyes (e.g., “He understands. I 
can read it in his eyes.” or “Plainly, he’s stumped. He’s got that ‘deer in the headlights’ 
look.”).  “Many bodily cues and dispositions are closely tied to certain types of 
thinking…and we build ‘a theory of mind,’ [the basis of which] is our ability to read 
embodied behaviour as implying mental states” (Sprod, 2001, p. 40). 
      One may feel compelled to act according to the behavioral norms of the classroom. 
Students may behave in a certain way, for example to act reasonably, even if one is not 
shown how, prompted or bound to act in such a manner because it is safe to assume that 
we all have experienced the feeling that “this is the way I should act, and not otherwise.” 
Here, embodied reasonableness undergirds that feeling, both in terms of the somatic 
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aspects of those norms, and of emotions that function as indicators of what matters 
(Rietveld, 2008). Examining the ways in which embodied cognition affects skilled 
context-bound actions, we are now prepared to look at its meaning in our moral life  
      Embodied reasonableness plays a role from the beginning of life. Newborns have 
the innate capacity to be moved affectively by others. They respond negatively to 
rejection and positively to encouragement. The innate ability for interpersonal emotional 
engagement provides the foundation for beginning to learn; for becoming attuned to 
certain regularities and over time, learning to hold and move one’s body in certain ways, 
and learning to act according to rules.  
The child’s experience—of listening to others, thinking in conversation, of 
attempting to join in, with the support of more able others, of gradually becoming 
able to think on their own as such ‘scaffolding’ is withdrawn—all takes place in 
context. Hence it is tied to the full context, including the physical arrangements of 
the participants’ bodies. The child will have difficulty in separating out what is 
essential and what is superficial…(they) come as part of the internalized thinking 
package. (Sprod, 2001, p. 39) 
Being aware of the subtle functions of embodied cognition, we may come to 
realize its role in the judgments we unthinkingly make, many of which are linked to 
beliefs acquired early in life that have become ingrained and require a process of self-
transformation and unlearning for change to occur (Nussbaum, 2004). Nussbaum (2004) 
sheds light on matters of embodied difference and their moral implications. According to 
her, we typically think people are reasonable if they accept the standard norms of society, 
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yet we know that such norms must be mistaken as well as that norms change over time 
(Nussbaum, 2004). When we stop to think, there surely are instances when we may have 
been incapable of respect towards those whose embodied experience is different from 
ours, such as in cases of gendered otherness and bodily difference. As Garrison (1996) 
has written: “The reasonable act and the generous act lie close together” (p. 2). 
Mackenzie and Scully (2007) have assessed that our own embodiment determines the 
judgments we make of others. In cases involving difference, our embodied experience 
constrains imagination, thus rendering it incapable of empathy. Therefore, the 
assumptions we make in regard to what may be necessary for the good of the Other are 
likely to be shaped and limited by the particulars of our own embodiment. Moral 
imagination is constrained by the social possibilities foreclosed or made available by an 
individual’s experience hence putting ourselves in another’s shoes is prone to error. We 
may end up reinforcing our prejudices rather than responding to the Other (Mackenzie & 
Scully, 2007).  Furthermore, when we consider that difference covers handicaps and 
disabilities of all kinds, including poverty, obesity, ugliness, awkwardness, lack of skill in 
sports, lack of some desirable secondary sexual characteristic, a gender preference 
outside the dimorphic paradigm, we may come to realize that we marginalize many more 
persons than we can imagine (Nussbaum, 2004; Paechter, 1998).  
Our attention has now been called to the possibility of moral failings in embodied 
cognition relative to bodily difference of one kind or other. The preceding description of 
the embodied mind is the basis of a concept of embodied reasonableness consisting of 
normative practices that enable a person to recognize problematic dimensions of 
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experience and make sound judgments – including, for our purposes, ethical judgments. 
We now turn our attention to the role of embodied reasonableness in inquiry. I begin with 
an explanation of what it means for embodied reasonableness to be critical, 
intersubjective, and outcome-oriented. 
Embodied Reasonableness         
      Dewey’s pedagogical criteria provide for philosophy to be the methodology of 
education (Lipman, 2004). That young learners have a right to develop their thinking 
abilities is established. So, too have they a right to moral strengthening in order to meet 
life’s trials with strength and resiliency. Reasonableness, as a primary trait, is a regulative 
ideal in character development (Lipman, 2003). Because it qualifies as inquiry, ethical 
inquiry necessarily requires practices of embodied reasonableness. Embodied 
reasonableness is an ideal of thinking, feeling, and action that manifests itself in a variety 
of ways all of which involve judgment.  Embodied reasonableness falls under three 
dimensions: critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented. These dimensions have been 
thoroughly described by Lipman in Thinking in Education (2003). He writes: 
Critical thinking aims at reasonableness. This means that it is not just rational, in 
the sense of a thinking that is rule- and criterion-governed, but that it is also a 
thinking that accepts the fallibility of its procedures, that engages in self-
corrective practice, that takes contextual differences into account, and that is 
equitable, in the sense that it respects the rights of others as well as its own. 
Reasonableness thus entails the cultivation of multidimensional thinking. 
(Lipman, 2003) 
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The kinds of rules and criteria that Lipman suggests govern critical thinking include the 
truth-preserving rules of logic, such as those contained in the Table of Validities
26
, and 
strategies for avoiding faulty thinking, such as the rules and standards of evidence used in 
courts of law, and taxonomies of informal fallacies. Critical reasonableness also involves 
the careful formation, critique, and reconstruction of concepts, because our ordinary, 
common sense understandings are only good insofar as they contribute to intelligent 
human endeavor. Our norms and values, including ethical ones, being subject to 
contingency, heterogeneity, inconsistency, and flux, call for reconstructive strategies to 
accommodate new conditions or to manage practices more intelligently. 
      Embodied reasonableness is also relational and intersubjective. We learn from our 
interactions with others and from the shared world we inhabit (Johnson, 2007). These 
interactions provide us with substantive ideas, theories, and value commitments and also 
influence the mental processes that our minds undertake. As the process of 
intersubjective discourse becomes internalized, one becomes engaged in internal 
dialogue, imagination, deduction, and wonderment (Splitter & Sharp). Intersubjectivity is 
evident in a disposition to respect others, to accommodate views and feelings different 
from one’s own, and to invest one’s thinking with new, even opposing views. Thus, 
reasonableness includes the ability to listen, dialogue, think communally, make good 
                                                 
26
 See Lipman, 2003, pp. 236-237. The table of validities describes common logical 
fallacies and the faulty reasoning behind it, e.g., non sequitur, putting forth an argument 
that is irrelevant, resulting in an invalid argument. 
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judgments, and act accordingly. It applies to efforts to pay attention to social and 
affective dimensions of discourse, to make relevant contributions to dialogue, and to 
facilitate the flow of dialogue, aspects that strengthen the process of inquiry (Gregory & 
Laverty, 2007). 
      In terms of outcome, Lipman (2003) suggests that thinking results in “knowledge 
[that] is used to bring about reasonable change” in problematic situations (p. 211). 
Reasonable judgment thus involves the self-correction of subjective belief, desire, and/or 
action and of collective knowledge and practice, and also the resolution of problems that 
constitute the contexts for thinking and inquiry. Judgment therefore involves sensitivity 
to context. According to Lekan (2003), the recognition of salient particulars in a given 
situation is a crucial step in resolving a problematic situation and culminates in an action 
plan. When tested against experience, judgments may be self-corrected accounting for the 
learning that occurs in critical thinking.  
      Intersubjectivity points both to a coherent and functional environment or 
situation, and to an individual mind that is integrated, and habituated to collaboration and 
common feeling. Thus, Siegel (2010) talks about mind as “a process that regulates the 
flow of energy and information” between you and me, and as a relationship we have with 
ourselves (p. 55). In this manner, reasonable judgment has an aesthetic dimension 
because it brings forth a sense of wholeness in communal interaction and in the act of 
doing (Grange, 2004). In this section I have provided an overview of the three criteria of 
embodied reasonableness, for which there are pedagogical implications. As we shall see, 
the fundamental unit of organic experience pervades even learning. 
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Pedagogical Implications of Embodied Reasonableness 
      In the case of humans like ourselves, it is our physical bodies with which we 
directly experience the world. This vital interaction of embodied beings with nature is a 
biological and evolutionary phenomenon whereby, our bodies, brain, and nervous system 
adapted in order to gain better control of action (Semin & Smith, 2008). Other beings are 
part of our dealings and encounters with the natural world. Our interactions with them 
and with our physical, natural and constructed environments form the basis of experience, 
knowledge, and meaning.  
      We begin our discussion by invoking Dewey’s experiential theory and apply it to 
the classroom environment and the transactions that occur there. Dewey identified the 
process of adaptation as learning by doing (Wells, 1999). All learning is a process of 
meaning-making that is first encountered intercorporeally in goal-oriented striving where 
learners are guided to master functions for participating more effectively in a social 
activity, so that these functions can be translated intracorporeally (Wells, 1999). For 
instance, higher order thinking skills, before they became internalized, started life 
initially as social functions, and following a 3-step process became internalized. First, the 
learner is transformed –this involves a modification of internal processes, such as 
emotions, that changes the ways in which she perceives; second, the environment itself is 
changed, as its purpose is reconstructed on the basis of the learner’s prior knowledge, and 
finally, the situation itself is changed for other learners (Wells, 1999).  
      Other learners are integral to the situation. They help the learner grasp the 
meaning of the action as a whole, assisting where she cannot yet perform independently. 
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This teaching role is described as being in the zone of proximal development (ZPD), an 
area comprising developmental processes that are stimulated in collaborative transaction 
(Vygotsky, 1978, 1987; as cited in Wells, 1999). In the context of education, this 
indicates that a collaborative community of practice is helpful in carrying out the 
reconstruction of creative and responsible social habits (Wells, 1999). Furthermore, 
Weaver (1996) provides a context for learning in the following statement:   
Learning proceeds best when others provide the kinds of support that adults 
typically provide for young children. This includes expecting learners to succeed 
eventually, and treating them accordingly; recognizing that adult mastery will 
develop gradually as well as idiosyncratically, over several years; expecting 
closer and closer approximations to adult mastery, not perfection; responding 
positively to whatever the learner can do, rather than emphasizing what the 
learner cannot yet do; providing scaffolding (teacher or peer collaboration) for the 
learner, so that the individual learner can succeed in doing things that he or she 
would not yet be able to do alone. (Weaver, p. 155)  
      Embodied teaching asks that a teacher honor the implications of embodiment, i.e. 
that it is relational and dynamic, and be more attentive to students’ affects and 
dispositions for cognitive apprenticeship in the discipline (Edwards & D’Arcy, 2004). It 
is also about building relationships between self, others, and subject matter, honoring the 
trust that develops from intermingling and seriously considering how to help students 
become knowers. It has been called “falling into trust” (MacIntyre Latta & Buck, 2008, p. 
316), a heightened perceptual awareness of teaching for greater student inquiry through 
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meaningful insight on the body’s role in pedagogy. Greene (2001), stresses that 
heightened perceptual awareness is made possible in “dialogical situations where 
persons, caring for one another, [are] able to look at one another’s eyes, talk about what 
they are discovering together about themselves, about the world, about what is and what 
might be,” thus foregrounding some very important aspects for learning ethical inquiry, 
such as dialogue, caring, self-disclosure, knowledge, making plans, and projecting their 
consequences (p. 108). 
      Fishman (1993) has written that Dewey also meant body-mind to stand as a 
metaphor for learning because it is an integrated and organic unit in which parts co-
evolve and self-correct in addressing changing circumstances in nature. In like manner, 
what the body-mind does in the complementary activity of its parts, members within a 
classroom community do amidst difference, in order to meet instructional objectives. 
Fishman is quick to point out that it is Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of learning that 
best emulates Dewey’s organic model. Connell (1996, 2000, 2001 & 2008), who has 
studied Rosenblatt’s theory and writings, highlights those features that correspond with 
Dewey’s experiential theory. They are pedagogically salient for learning to do ethical 
inquiry:  
 Learning is dialogical. 
 The criteria of learning are shared and flexible. 
 Warranted assertability is invoked to resolve arbitrary or invalid 
judgments. 
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 Thinking emerges from a matrix of emotion. 
 Meaning is connected to experience.  
 Meaning is connected to belief. 
 Meaning is constructed through dialogue. 
 Inquiry has a sense of prescience. 
 Inquiry is a process of self-correction and experimentation.  
 The purpose of inquiry is to bring about active change in the world. 
 The measure of learning is its impact on the conduct of students’ lives. 
 Feeling and imagination are concurrent in a “dynamic, fluid process” 
(Rosenblatt, 1998, p. 887) that is the transaction. 
       Concerned with fostering higher-order thinking in the language arts, Marzano 
proposes that teachers be guided by four principles of learning. (a) Learning must take 
into account the beliefs and funded experience comprising student schemata (Lipman, 
1991; Marzano, 1991). This calls for personally meaningful classroom experiences. (b) 
An optimal standard of learning -- being pushed to exceed one’s personal best and reach 
the upper limits of personal ability -- should be set as the transactional response 
(Rosenblatt, 1967; as cited in Marzano, 1991). (c) Students should engage in the complex 
and extended activity of inquiry in order to engage in meaningful learning. (d) Learning 
should foster dispositions, e.g. awareness of inner states and metacognition, conducive to 
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the construction of meaning. Furthermore, he identifies three transactional aspects of 
learning that bear on doing ethical inquiry: imagery, emotions, and value.  
      In regarding imagery as transactional response, students pay attention to those 
aspects of experience that are non-discursive, episodic, and sensory (i.e. pertaining to 
smell, taste, touch, kinaesthetic association, and sound). Because emotion is tied to 
cognition, it must be subjected to inquiry if it is to be understood. He further suggests the 
following procedure in using emotion as transactional response. First, acknowledge the 
emotional response and name it. Second, identify the concept embedded in a certain text, 
music, or painting that has triggered such feelings. Third, describe the physical reactions 
and thoughts associated with specific emotions. Fourth, discuss the meaning ascribed to 
emotions and the effects of such meaning on students’ lives. 
      Another procedure Marzano (1991) suggests is similar, but instead considers 
value as transactional response: first, acknowledge emotional responses. Second, identify 
the concept embedded in a certain text, music, or painting that has triggered such 
feelings. Third, describe the specific value underlying the emotional response. Fourth, 
describe the reasoning or belief system behind the value. Fifth, give expression to an 
opposing value. Sixth, describe one’s reason for the opposing value.   
    
      Sprod (2001) suggests engaging in philosophical inquiry, which is at the heart of 
making better moral judgments. It is a practice he values for its rigor and its insistence on 
an embodied reasonableness. It fulfills Dewey’s requirement of inquiry as the process 
whereby practical and theoretical knowledge emerge. In order for inquiry to be 
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successful, it requires a keen awareness of what matters in a problematic situation; a 
sense of calculated daring to undertake experiments based on well-crafted hypotheses; a 
willingness to put a plan in action after assessing its foreseeable consequences; a 
readiness to a deal with fallibilism and in turn, to self-correct. 
       For Dewey, experience has no boundaries (Jackson, 2002). In the context of 
learning, it allows for a great deal of possibility, which would be cause for fear or 
surprise, even before the actual is known. In dealing with possibilities, where none is 
actually known, there is an understanding that allows the reconstruction of the actual in 
light of the possible (Alexander, 1990). Thus, judgments are made because we have 
imagined desirable consequences from them. Making better judgments is a matter of 
survival. As there is infinite scope and diversity of human judgment, so is there a 
necessity that “The continual presence of possibility . . .may be discriminated by the 
accumulation of learning and feeling” (Buchler, 1990, p. 149). Having presented a 
number of instructional approaches, we now consider appropriate material and pedagogy 
provided by the practice known as Philosophy for Children.    
      In the language arts classroom, narrative fiction is used to convey through states 
of mind arguments that philosophical writings do in a very different way. Characters’ 
motives are implicit and plots can be complex but making sense of it all is usually only a 
matter of inference (Seamon, 2005). Readers are able to follow the story, even if there 
might be more than one interpretation, and in such an instance, an interpretive 
community helps extract meaning. Such a community can be one engaged in ethical 
inquiry, as conceived in the instructional program, P4C. In the communal experience, 
 65 
young, inquiring minds practice philosophy in attunement with others, obtain 
clarification, and gain in self-understanding (Nussbaum, 1990). Students learn to live a 
form of moral life in the procedures and substance of their thinking, reasoning, 
imagining, reflecting, judging, caring, and acting (Mehta & Whitebread, 2004; Splitter & 
Sharp, 1999; Sprod, 2001).       
      We have established that the normative, embodied practices, which are the aims 
of education for ethical inquiry, fall under the categories: critical, intersubjective, and 
outcome-oriented. According to Lipman (2004), Philosophy for Children is his 
substantive response to Dewey’s pedagogical criteria. For instance, P4C honors 
sensitivity to context and the ability to self-correct, two important features of Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry directed at addressing the reconstructive task (Ralston, 2011). In P4C, 
philosophy is the method of education, narrative texts contain philosophical meaning, and 
deliberation takes the form of a dramatic rehearsal within a classroom community of 
philosophical inquiry. Students are introduced to the content and procedures of dialogical 
inquiry via the illustrative text. The text serves as a stimulus for developing questions that 
sets the agenda for discussion (Laverty, 2004). Participants come to terms with authentic 
ethical situations where they take into account the importance of personal interest, the 
imagination and emotions, and growth in habits of good ethical reasoning and judgment. 
A sound moral education in P4C, is also one where students are helped to understand the 
moral options available to them and how to assess those options (Lipman & Sharp, 1985). 
Paramount in P4C is a set of commitments that includes thinking well, inclusive dialogue 
and meaningfulness (Laverty, 2004). In thinking well, students are expected to: 
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 Consider alternative points of view. 
 Give reasons and evaluate them. 
 Identify and correct fallacious reasoning. 
 Be respectful and honest in dialogue. 
 Listen with attention to one another. 
 Make an effort to understand one another’s views 
 Be prepared to participate without dominating. 
 Self-correct. 
 Deepen understanding for the concept and problems in question. 
      Many of the internal states that accompany qualitative experience come to one’s 
awareness in the process of inquiry, part of which is represented by the process 
embedded in the “Philosophy Self-Assessment for Middle & High School” (Gregory, 
2008, p. 73) instrument constructed by the IAPC
27
. This serves as a potential framework 
for practices of embodied reasonableness. This instrument is organized under the 
categories of “Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry,” “Social Dimension of Inquiry” and 
“Inquiry Outcomes” corresponding to the critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented 
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criteria described in the section on embodied reasonableness. They have been informed 
by Dewey’s experiential theory, his concept of body-mind, and as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, his theory of imagination and theory of emotion. Each category on 
the instrument includes a number of criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of an in-
class inquiry. I demonstrate ways in which the body may be employed in the practice of 
these criteria. In what follows, the criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument 
appear in italics.  
      Embodied critical reasonableness.        
      The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of 
“Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry” are the following: 
 Were we reasoning well? (clarifying, asking for and offering reasons, 
making careful inferences, identifying assumptions, offering definitions, 
using criteria, making good distinctions, and testing hypotheses)  
 Were we thinking creatively? (making metaphors, using images, trying out 
other points of view, thinking of new possibilities, extending ideas, 
transferring old forms to new contexts)  
 Did our discussion open up the topic? Was it deep or superficial? Did we 
construct a rich, complex understanding of the texts?   
 Is there evidence of self-correction? (accepting criticism, correcting 
thinking mistakes, noticing missing points of view, changing one’s mind, 
revising one’s position)  
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      Each of these modes and patterns has both cognitive and somatic aspects. 
Students engaged in deep, meaningful discussions of complex concepts, elaborate 
explanations, exploratory discourse, speculation, generalization, and analysis are always 
necessarily also engaged in gestural interaction, voice modulation, facial expression, 
timing of verbal response and delivery, to indicate attunement or non-attunement with 
situated activity. To an extent, we understand one another with our bodies, in conjunction 
with language and feeling, moved and informed by the argument. We are altered by the 
shrug, the raising of an eyebrow, a blush. 
The dialogical process aims to see the advancement of argument through a variety 
of constructive means, such as gesture, language, and mind. According to Kennedy 
(1997), gesture is: 
The fundamental somatic and kinaesthetic level of intersubjectivity “before” 
language which grounds, frames, and comments on verbal and noetic levels of 
interaction. Even before we open our mouths we are making meaning together . . . 
The gestural as a sign world is one of intense, unremitting intervisibility. We all 
sit facing each other at the table—we are all in each other’s view, directly or 
peripherally. (p. 67) 
What keeps us in a state of obscure excitement as we follow the argument is the 
sense that what lures us is a summum bonum—a coordination of perspectives as 
much an emotional, gestural, and perceptual state, as a cognitive one. (p. 73) 
      Creative thinking in the form of new metaphors, images, hypotheses, and other 
ideas, derive from a plethora of non-discursive meanings or schemata that emerge from 
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the body’s concrete interactions with its environment (Cheville, 2005; Roth & Lawless, 
2002). Johnson (1987, 1993, & 2007) has explained how cognitive schemata emerge 
from bodily activity. For instance, a sense of containment comes from the experience of 
being ‘in/out’ and orients one to those conditions, even ideationally. He asserts: “when 
we actually move from one place to another, we experience ourselves as traversing a path 
from one bounded area to another. This experience . . . provides a basis for our 
understanding of negation” (Johnson, 1987, p. 39). Another instance is the embodied 
schema that orients one toward balance and has a profound effect not just on activity but 
also on cognition. In recurring experience with balance, an embodied mental structure 
arises that inclines one to recognize “balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced 
systems, balanced equations, the balance of power, the balance of justice, and so on” 
(1987, p. 87). This embodied account comprising perceptions, actions, and introspections 
is also a process of knowledge acquisition involving inference, categorization, memory, 
and other forms of higher order thinking. The acquired knowledge takes on some kind of 
conceptual representation, such as schemata, propositions, semantic frames, metaphor, 
and the like, that make up a kind of cognitive architecture. This is the wellspring from 
which one draws in creative activity. “Individuals make meaning of their bodily 
experiences finding common ground with others in communicating that meaning 
conceptually, often through the use of metaphors” (Satina, 2001, p. 523).      
      One way of testing a hypothesis before acting on it is the process Dewey (1922) 
called “dramatic rehearsal,” and which comprises a “kinaesthetic plan.” Dewey 
recommends that we attend to specific methods of inquiry and contrivance to ensure 
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efficacious outcomes: “Methods of inquiry to locate difficulties and evils; methods of 
contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypothesis in dealing with them” 
(Dewey, 1948, p. 170). Dewey (1908) refers to this as a dramatic rehearsal because moral 
deliberation is never immediate, but rather an imaginative dramatic exercise, where we 
inhabit a variety of dispositions and act out various courses of actions. Indeed, there will 
be evaluative feelings appropriate to the roles we assume and solutions we imaginatively 
perform. It is a method to gain information that we may consider investing in a moral 
judgment, an epistemic rather than merely pragmatic action (Welchman, 1995). Though 
conceived as a mentalistic exercise, dramatic rehearsal would be more effective as an 
actual, embodied performance. Hamington  (2010), whose adherence to Deweyan 
pragmatism comes from its correspondence with feminist care ethics, has been working 
to enrich that aspect of feminist theory with Dewey’s notion of “dramatic rehearsal,” an 
effort I consider nothing short of consummatory in the Deweyan sense. Hamington 
(2010) asserts that body-mind has yet to inform the concept of imaginative or deliberative 
dramatic rehearsal. He advocates a version of dramatic rehearsal that is based on actual 
theatrical performance skills and views this outgrowth as a contribution to prolonging the 
“temporal horizon” of the feminist care ethic. Hytten (2010), in particular, endorses 
dramatic performance of ethical dilemmas, e.g. simultaneous dramaturgy
28
, a bodily-
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conscious approach, because it encourages participants to act differently, as though one’s 
identity were contrary to fact. I shall return to this topic in the next chapter where I will 
be discussing dramatic rehearsal at length, as a tool in ethical inquiry. Students can work 
out scripts with staging directions for live performance, or participate in impromptu role-
playing.   
Embodied intersubjective reasonableness. 
The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of 
“Social Dimension of Inquiry” are the following: 
 Did we share control/management of the discussion, or did the teacher or 
a dominant clique control/manage it?  
 Did most of us contribute to the conversation, or did a few people 
dominate?   
 Did we work for inclusion—bringing in minority voices?  
 Did we give all opinions equal intellectual consideration?     
 Were we actively listening to each other? (looking at each other instead of 
the teacher, paraphrasing, asking follow-up questions, avoiding side 
conversations)?  
 Were we responding to each other (rather than just taking turns speaking; 
relating what we say to what has been said before)?  
                                                                                                                                                 
propose a solution to the problem which was acted out. A simple plot is one where action 
is continuous and there are no episodes (Aristotle, 1965). 
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 Were we respectful of each other? (responding, polite tone of voice and 
word choice, lack of aggression, insult and dismissal, avoiding making the 
discussion too personal, challenging others respectfully)  
 Were we caring of each other? (helping a timid person make his point, 
getting to know each other well enough to know what is important to each 
of us)  
      The items listed above are ‘behaviors’, in other words, not just ways of thinking 
and talking, but ways of using the body. Philosophical inquiry is not merely shared 
thinking but the shared conduct of dialogic interaction, in which meaning is exchanged 
and transformed through talk, gesture, expression, posture, etc. Two modes of dialogue 
deserve attention: thematic and open. Thematic dialogue occurs when instruction centers 
on a set of open-ended questions provided by the teacher. Open dialogue occurs as 
questions are formulated by students themselves (Hubard, 2010). In both instances, but 
more especially in the second, which entails creative questioning, embodiment is given 
recognition in students’ personal investments of knowledge, thinking, and affects, as they 
relate to the situated classroom activity and all class participants.     
 Furthermore, embodiment provides for a relational pedagogy informed by the 
care ethic and obtaining of certain traits, such as attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness (Bowden, 1997; Noddings, 1992; Thayer-Bacon, 2000; 
Tronto, 1994). According to Noddings (1988), a relational ethics informs a nurturing 
pedagogy that should pervade intersubjective relations in the classroom and further 
explains, in the following:  
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A relational ethic remains tightly tied to experience because all its deliberations 
focus on the human beings involved in the situation under consideration and their 
relations to each other. A relation is here construed as any aspiring or connection 
of individuals characterized by some affective awareness in each. It is an 
encounter or series of encounters in which involved parties feel something toward 
each other. Relations may be characterized by love or hate, anger or sorrow, 
admiration or envy; or, of course, they may reveal mixed affects—one party 
feeling, say, love, and the other revulsion. One who is concerned with behaving 
ethically strives always to preserve or convert a given relation into a caring 
relation [emphasis added] (p. 173).       
      According to Lussier-Ley (2010), non-verbal communication is very important 
within an embodied orientation involving interplay between the senses, kinaesthetic 
abilities, bodies, and situation. Embodiment can be understood as a process or construct 
dependent on bodily experience, a multidimensional phenomenon integrating body-mind 
and society, a clue to life histories, a reminder of manifestations of social inequities. We 
understand our world very much in non-verbal, somatic ways so that we should pay 
attention to how values, interests, and habit are all embodied. This requires a high level of 
self-awareness on the part of students, as they weigh their personal needs to express 
themselves in light of a sense of mutual respect and trust in the group.  
Embodied outcome-oriented reasonableness. 
      The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of 
“Inquiry Outcomes” are the following: 
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 Did the inquiry advance? What kinds of progress were there? (new 
connections, distinctions, definitions)  
 Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?  
 What have we learned?  
 What new questions can we now ask, that we couldn’t before?  
 Was the discussion relevant and meaningful to us? 
The first evaluation item above characterizes inquiry progress in conceptual terms, i.e. 
“new connections, distinctions, definitions,” and in being able to ask “new questions … 
that we couldn’t [ask] before.” However, attending with one’s body to the process of 
inquiry is the somatic mode of attention imminently informing our reflective experience 
in making connections, questions, and practical judgments. To address this oversight in 
the evaluation instrument, an item should be included to accommodate the embodied 
nature of communal inquiry: Did we learn in ways that will alter not only our beliefs but 
also our behavior?  
      Shedding light on the embodied nature of judgment-making, Gregory (2006) 
indicates that: 
Some qualitative experience is the object of our value judgment. Even ideals 
like justice and compassion are more often experienced as feelings of indignation  
and shared grief than as logical imperatives or contemplative ideals. (p. 112)  
It is commonplace to lose our taste for foods, entertainments, and relationships 
that experience shows to be unhealthy or perpetually unsatisfying, and to acquire 
tastes that tend in the opposite directions. Just as ideas and belief can be corrected 
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in the give-and-take of inquiry, so can preferences, desires, attachments, ideals, 
and other instances of value judgment. (p. 112)   
All of the aspects of embodied construction are happening simultaneously. In a 
manner of speaking, we refer to mental and physical acts, or acts with emotional meaning 
and aesthetic quality, when we are in fact making reference to various dimensions of the 
same embodied experience. Every act is a mental act and a physical act, and has 
emotional meaning and aesthetic quality; those are dimensions within the continuity of 
experience. Dialogue provides the means to navigate the process. Rather than looking at 
learning and knowing as intellectual things and movement, perception, emotions and the 
rest as other kinds of things, other “parts” of experience, for instance, we participate in 
dialogue where we regard our experience as a dynamic unit in which all these features are 
interwoven. Working with the concept of body-mind we become explicit about our 
abstracting of dimensions from whole, embodied experience.     
Within the continuum of experience, the aesthetic dimension lies outside what we 
know how to articulate. It is literally true that before we can say something, we have 
already lived it. We embody our personal meaning in the articulation of our own 
movements. Therefore, if learning is to be a reconstruction of personal meaning, we 
would expect from the process the emergence of language that articulates and provides 
insight into the dimensions and meaning of experience.  An important part for instance, 
would be being able to ask practical philosophical questions about embodiment and the 
relationship between quality of thought and quality of action, as in the evaluation item 
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above, “Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?” This takes the form 
of an action plan, a tentative script subject to revision and dramatized for evaluation.  
Learning is something we can learn to do better, an aspect of which is discovering 
ways to describe and reflect on personal experience, bringing to the fore the means by 
which we engage experience. The dialogic structure provides a context for generating the 
kinds of experiences from which students may draw meaning and explore the embodied 
dimensions of their experience. Dialogue involves “not only words, but feelings, actions 
and meanings. Dialogue does not stand apart from life, but rather propels and channels 
them, often in surprising directions” (Mills, 1996, p. 134). In the self-referential process 
that dialogue is, a person not only learns, but also learns how to become a better learner. 
Additionally, if learning is an act of reconstructing personal meaning, then the 
ability to incorporate awareness of how one goes about it (into the act of reconstructing in 
a particular situation) becomes embodied knowledge. “Learning embodies as much 
feeling as thought and as much action as reflection” (Mills, 1996, p. 14). It is the 
embodiment of dimensions of meaning in the experience of the learner, the “live 
creature” (Dewey, 1934, pp. 43-44). Dewey spoke of finding the “unity of mind and body 
in action,” asserting that the place to seek for the unity of “body-mind” is precisely in 
human action. That which we call metacognition includes reflections on the physical self, 
i.e. “the body perceived from within by first person perception” (Tarr, 2004, p. 229). 
“Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?” Ethical inquiry is 
imminently of practical importance and students can engage in practical applications to 
test hypotheses. 
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“The important point is to retain the idea that we do not have the final truth, that 
we can and must continue to learn in ways that will alter not only our beliefs but also our 
behavior” (Putnam, 1993, p. 69). Changes are not merely internal, they are expected to be 
observable. Body knowledge is so often unconscious knowledge, so that the change 
process is subtle. Our pre-conscious image schemata can accommodate awareness of our 
unreflective behaviors, in concrete and detailed ways.       
The final item in the IAPC evaluation instrument is, “Was the discussion relevant 
and meaningful to us?” If philosophy is to be practiced as “an art of living” (Gregory, 
2007, p. 60), the outcome of philosophical judgment should aspire for meaning in action. 
Pierce made the innovative insight that the meaning of judgment is reconstructed, 
ameliorative habit. We are one step closer to that when students “learn to translate those 
judgments into action” (Gregory, 2006, p. 75).       
The broad aim of this chapter has been to call attention to P4C as a pedagogical 
approach for embodied reasonableness. The preceding discussion brought to the fore 
those features of transactional theory that are salient in considering how ethical inquiry 
can be learned. In the next chapter, I single out moral imagination and its function in 
learning to do ethical inquiry and propose narrative and dramatic rehearsal as 
instructional tools for that purpose.  
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   Chapter Three: Moral Imagination 
 
Surely if anyone has imagined sounds, Beethoven did when he composed 
orchestral masterpieces in profound deafness. (Moore, 2010, p. 2) 
 
To suffer with people who suffer differently, and to be happy with people who 
find happiness in ways different from our own. (Gregory, 2000, p. 448) 
 
All persons are still more or less children--in process of learning moral 
distinctions. The more intense their moral interests, the more childlike, the more 
open, flexible, and growing are their minds. (Dewey, 1908, p. 321) 
 
Education, if it is to fulfill its goal of enriching experience should address the 
moral dimension of experience, questions of human conduct, which Dewey maintained is 
the substance of all inquiry (Beauclair, 2008, p.15). The previous chapter described 
Dewey’s body-mind concept as the basis for the construct of embodied reasonableness. It 
established that the normative, embodied practices in Philosophy for Children prepare 
students to practice ethical inquiry, and to make and act on sound ethical judgments. 
Within Philosophy for Children’s practices are the dispositions or acquired traits that 
fulfill an educative role. As Dewey pointed out, they are “effective in producing the 
change of disposition which philosophy indicates as desirable, but only in the degree in 
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which they are educative—that is to say, in the degree in which they modify mental and 
moral attitudes” (Dewey, 1916/1997b, pp. 328-329).  
As has been pointed out in the second chapter, certain instances find us 
constrained by our own embodied experience, so that putting ourselves in another’s shoes 
is prone to error and prejudice (Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). How we address that concern 
is the point of this chapter as we examine the component of moral imagination. In this 
chapter, I argue that moral imagination is key in making sound ethical judgments, that it 
is the process by which we move in the direction of “a freer and more humane experience 
in which all share and to which all contribute” (Dewey, LW 14:230; CF. 1932 E, LW 
7:350, as cited in Fesmire, 2003, loc. 1422). In support of my argument, the chapter has 
been organized as follows. It opens with a brief account of imagination as a concept that 
took shape during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, followed by a discussion on its 
nature, and how imagination operates in ethical inquiry and aesthetic experience. I argue 
that the narrative is a neurocognitive adaptation through which we understand experience, 
recommending its literary form as the appropriate vehicle in teaching and learning ethical 
inquiry. I proffer criteria serving as a guide for making appropriate selections of artistic 
material for ethical inquiry. As a tool in dialogic deliberation and as a “kinaesthetic plan,” 
I propose Dewey’s notion of the imaginative dramatic rehearsal. A kinaesthetic plan aims 
to remake an ethical situation the fictional context for process drama-based, dialogic 
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dramatic inquiry.
29
 In process drama, there is no external audience, but rather a script in 
process, where the teacher-facilitator frequently takes on roles with the students or acts as 
a playwright (Wilhelm & Edmiston, 1997, as cited in McCambridge and Sieger, 2004, p. 
19). Finally, I relate my pedagogical decisions to the requirements of the moral 
imagination component and explain how P4C corresponds with those requirements.  
Dewey’s theory of imagination and education highlight the imaginative function 
as preeminently moral, hence moral imagination (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 99-107). I analyze 
the nature of imagination in terms of the following three aspects: (a) image schemata,
30
 
(b) narrativity, and (c) kinaesthetic plans. Here is a brief account of the imagination, as it 
relates to the transactive claims nature makes on living creatures and human beings. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Dialogic dramatic inquiry is the dramatic enactment of the imaginative ideas that 
inquiry generates. When carried out as actions, they serve as possible solutions to a 
morally problematic situation (B. Edmiston, Carmen posting, June 21, 2007). 
30
 Schema theory and the terms schema/schemas, schemata (pl.) were conceived as 
constructs from the functional adaptations arising in the transaction of creatures with their 
lived environments. The early use of the term highlighted the transactive nature of sense 
making within a culturally and socially mediated experience (Bartlett, 1932/1995, pp. 200 
& 202, as cited by Mcvee et al., 2005, p. 535). 
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What is Imagination? 
 Imagination has had a history of being difficult to define (Engell, 1981; Kaag, 
2008). It evolved in the 18
th
 century as an idea to address problems stemming from 
Cartesian dualism. In large measure, it was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the romantic poet 
and philosopher, who conceived of imagination as an organic and harmonious process, 
one that is vital and lifelike, thereby abolishing the partition between the senses and 
reason, fusing in a stream of sensation, ideas, reflection, and language. In Coleridge’s 
conception, imagination, as both active and passive, integrates mind by providing 
“continuous feedback” (BL, I, 189, as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 339). This integrative 
process is two-phased, “a never-ending coalescence of opposites” (Engell, 1981, p. 347). 
In its first phase, imagination forms various images encountered in nature. The immediate 
and unreflective phase (p. 359) is constitutive of learning, instinctively forming 
knowledge of nature, an acquaintance with phenomena, and with sense experience (p. 
343). According to Coleridge (1907), “this self-education begins at birth and operates in 
every human mind by ‘the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting [sic] 
beings’” (as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 343). The second phase, exercising choice and 
judgment (Engell, 1981, p. 359), reconstructs those images,  “translat[ing] all mental 
activity into images or symbols, . . . produc[ing] language that contains the whole . . . 
mind” (Engell, 1981, p. 339). This vital process of the imagination (Coleridge, 
Biographia Literaria, Chapter XIII, as cited in Warnock, 1976, p. 90) has its roots in 
ordinary experience (Engell, 1981, p. 344). Imagination is transformative, so while it 
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perceives nature’s development, it generates a similar process in the self (Engell, 1981, p. 
347). 
Because the mind images in itself the natural world, in the process of integrating 
mind, imagination unites the “world of self and the world of nature” (Engell, 1981, p. 
345). The idea of imagination becomes crucial in explaining the process of sense making, 
31
 i.e. how the mind makes sense of nature and how nature shapes the mind through the 
senses, reconciling the two in a single process. Coleridge (1884, 1895) wrote:  
I have read of two rivers passing through the same lake, yet all the way preserving 
their streams visibly distinct—if I mistake not, the Rhone and the Adar, through 
the Lake of Geneva. In a far finer distinction, yet in a subtler union . . . are the 
streams of knowing and being. The lake is formed by the two streams in man and 
nature as it exists in and for man; and up this lake the philosopher sails on the 
junction-line of the constituent streams. (p. 70, pp. 261-262, as cited in Engell, 
1981, p. 330) 
As you will increasingly find in the course of this chapter, “imagination is ‘the 
laboratory in which thought[s] [are] elaborate[d] into existence’” (CN, III, 4398; cf. AP, 
                                                 
31
 Sense making in schema theory refers to building a schematic model for judgment-
making by putting together informative pieces and associating them with social 
expectations, one’s emotions, personal goals, and projected outcomes, keeping the body 
as the self-referential point in learning (Brock, Vert, Kligyte, Waples, et al., 2008, p. 
451). 
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p. 186, as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 348). An artist, such as a poet, would use language to 
give imagination concrete form in poetry because the poet has the ability to select the 
images he wishes to associate with one another, and then to determine how ideas, images, 
and feelings can be reconstructed in lively, unexpected ways (Engell, 1981, p. 331).
32
 
Also, because the artist can exercise the spiritual freedom to create, preferring particular 
ends or goals to others, the artist is generally a moral agent with an ethical purpose in her 
poetry and art (Engell, 1981, p. 331 & 344). Even if art itself does not dictate or establish 
the moral life, Coleridge’s belief is that art issues in a genuine concern for human 
welfare, and thus assumes a moral responsibility (Engell, 1981, p. 359). As it turns out, 
the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce also explored the nature of thought as a 
continuum. 
Peirce prefigured the neuroscientific finding that imagination is a nonlinear, 
recursive, and complex neuronal process. In problematic situations, it mediates between 
acting spontaneously and reactivating past adaptations, synthesizing and schematizing 
human experience (Kaag, 2008, p. 14; 2010, p. 371). In The Law of Mind,
33
 Peirce (1893) 
                                                 
32
 We also refer to personal creativity as imagination. The wilful control of imaginative 
power is elevated in the creative act (Engell, 1981, p. 144). 
33
 Peirce gave this section in The Law of Mind great importance as evidenced by: “. . . the 
existence of five subsequent documents, all written on ruled paper carrying a blind stamp 
of the ‘Aetna Life Insurance Company’ in the top left corner, in which Peirce grapples 
with that theme almost exclusively. They are all titled Law of Mind as though Perice 
 84 
wrote about the continuity of human thought: “logical analysis applied to mental 
phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely that ideas tend to spread 
continuously and to affect certain other ideas which stand to them in a particular relation 
of affectability” (§104, as cited in Kaag, 2008, p. 14). In that connection, Peirce (1893) 
asked “What can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at all any longer? . . 
. How can a past idea be present? (§107, as cited in Kaag, 2008, p. 14)” He was referring 
to imagination, which allows us to “grasp” and “handle” difference, make abductive 
inferences,
34
 and generalize from partial cases (Kaag, 2008, p. 13). According to Kaag 
(2008), an apt analogy to illustrate the recursion within imagination’s neuronal processes 
is that of successful improvisation within a jazz ensemble. The analogy of musical 
improvisation should shed light on novelty and continuity, the defining marks of jazz 
ensemble improvisation. In performance, jazz musicians, who are embodied beings, 
throughout the process engage in imaginative embodied cognition. 
Imagine a jazz quartet in which each player responds to ongoing cues of her own 
playing, but also the cues and tempo of her accompanying players. No sheet 
                                                                                                                                                 
thought the question so significant that it deserved to be treated head-on without 
preamble” (Peirce Edition Project, 2010, p. 580). 
34
 Abductive reasoning involves the creative use of imagination (Alexander, 1990, p. 
329). It is an envisioning process that is part inference, part insight, and is a particularly 
good guess established in the nexus between the individual and the larger community 
(Kaag, 2007, p. 97). 
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music is used, and in the opening moments of the first movement the styles and 
tempos are organized around a general theme. Over time, a more specific beat and 
theme are established as the musicians begin to correlate, or “get in time.” If the 
musicians have been playing together for many years, certain musical signals 
seem to instantaneously connect the four musicians, causing a deepening of the 
correlation and resonance of sound. Each new signal causes a wave of novel 
sounds that, in the midst of novelty, maintains harmony with past forms. “Such 
integration would lead to a kind of mutually coherent music that each one acting 
alone could not produce.” (Edelman & Tononi, 1987, p. 49, as cited in Kaag, 
2008, p. 15) 
 The music ensemble analogy also serves to illustrate Dewey’s view of ethical 
deliberation as imaginative, and a joint creative act. He believed that enriching “the fund 
of germane possibilities and further refining one’s imagination increase the reliability of 
one’s valuations” (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 978-81). Dewey was primarily concerned with 
bringing to the fore of moral judgments the aesthetic dimension of experience,  “the art of 
life is the goal behind Dewey’s ethics, his philosophy of democracy, and his theory of 
education” (Alexander, quoted in Teehan, 1992, p. 171). As a shared undertaking, ethical 
inquiry offers students growth in the imaginative and creative aspects of reason. If 
meaningfulness is the outcome of making rich and imaginative associations, a dramatic 
rehearsal will be more fruitful when we arrive at a judgment that is novel because it 
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enlarges the moral circle,
35
 making our relations more inclusive, fair, just, and equitable. 
Dewey (1908) wrote: “We have reached the conclusion that disposition as manifest in 
endeavor is the seat of moral worth, and that this worth itself consists in a readiness to 
regard the general happiness even against contrary promptings of personal comfort and 
gain” (p. 364).  
We can now consider Peirce’s community of inquirers as a place where 
imagination is crucial in the work of interpretation because of pragmatism’s sensitivity to 
the aesthetic, the temporal, and the experimental dimensions of experience. As a 
philosophical stance, pragmatism is predisposed to upholding the meaning of action 
based on reinterpreting and reconstructing the actual in light of the possible (Alexander, 
1990, pp. 325-328). Fellow thinkers aware of the felt, aesthetic dimensions of acting and 
learning in the world, exercise embodied reasonableness and intersubjectivity towards the 
emergence of meaning in shared activity which is the community of inquiry. As 
pragmatists, participants regard meaning as the practical consequences of an act or a 
resulting difference in habits of behavior (Gregory, 2000, p. 446) in a community of co-
inquirers laboring for an ultimate description of reality for its own sake, while 
                                                 
35
 The moral circle refers to Singer’s (1981) notion of the moral circle of altruism which 
includes those to whom we accord sympathy, protection, and respect, i.e. living creatures 
and persons that are inside the circle. Beyond the invisible perimeter we have drawn as a 
partition are those outside the moral circle and who thus elicit our indifference (p. 120, as 
cited in Pinker, 2002, p. 167). 
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downplaying the peculiarities of its individual members (Alexander, 1990, p. 328). 
According to Gregory (2000), it is moral imagining that helps us exercise reason and 
good will in the face of those peculiarities, thereby withholding judgment by observing 
mindfulness of how our conduct affects others
36
 (Gregory, 2000, p. 450).  
In Dewey’s thought, all imagination is regarded as moral imagination in a broad 
sense. One strives to achieve the aesthetic ideal in the moral life through the dramatic use 
of imagination (Alexander, 1990, p. 328), as an embodied mental act imbued with 
intentionality rather than disinterest (Casey, 2000; Granger, 2006, p. 168). To shape an 
image and make it materialize is an exercise in intelligence, skill, and productivity, and 
may be applied to a task, such as wielding a golf club, drawing a sketch, or executing a 
habit of ethical thinking, such as conscientiousness (Cabot, 1906, p. viii). The image is a 
sensation or a feeling transformed for an end-in-view (Chambliss, 1991, p. 47) “It is the 
definite statement of  . . . [moving the experience forward in a definite way]   . . . bringing 
to bear one’s past experience or habits” (Dewey, 1898, p. 64, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, 
p. 47). The image serves as a restraint. As Dewey (1900-01) wrote: "The ultimate value 
of the image is the control it gives over actions (Dewey, p. 123, as cited in Chambliss, 
1991, p. 47). He further elaborates: "The ideal (which is in a sense the ethical counterpart 
of the image), while it relates to something future, is itself a present, existent fact. It is an 
                                                 
36
 Mindfulness of others is attention to the ways in which our conduct affects others. It 
varies in degrees of intensity depending on the closeness of our relations and 
acquaintance with them (Gregory, 2000, p. 448). 
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activity which has its significance through standing for some other activity not as yet 
realized” (Dewey, 1900-01, p. 179, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, p. 47). The shaping and 
execution of the image comprise a continuum. Imagining and making a thing happen are 
conjoint initiatives in the flow of feeling and experience.  
Chambliss (1991) gives us three insights regarding Dewey's conception of the role 
of imagination in experiential reconstruction. First, the image must reveal itself in 
conduct, so there exudes a bodily manifestation, as in an act or action. The second is the 
intrinsic value of imagination in ethical matters. Therefore, transformative experiences, 
such as those that have ethical implications, are no different from creative ones involving 
artistry, where something envisaged, materializes. Accordingly, the third insight is the 
ethical nature of the transformative or reconstructive experience. As with artistic 
creations, our experiences are felt, meant to be shared, and to convey meaning. Thus, it is 
imperative for imagination to work in the context of living. In Art as Experience (1934), 
Dewey wrote that works of art are one-of-a-kind and serve as our best evidence of 
imagination’s true nature (p. 268). By extrapolation, we ourselves as unique beings are 
susceptible to the artistry of imaginative visions for us. Dewey (1893) introduced the 
notion of the self as a work of art - in progress; therefore, the realization of selfhood 
serves as the highest moral end-in-view. In Self-realization as the moral ideal (1893), he 
wrote:   
I desire to discuss the question of realization, rather than the question of the ideal 
and to emphasize the notion of a working or practical self against that of a fixed or 
presupposed self. (p. 654) . . . [the] child is possessed of an artistic capacity (p. 
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658). . . . To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as to fill up some 
presupposed ideal self. It means to act at the height of action, to realize its full 
meaning (p. 659). . . conceived as a working, practical self, carrying within the 
rhythm of its own process both ‘realized’ and ‘ideal’ self. (p. 664) 
The stage has been set with the historical significance of imagination as the backdrop for 
our project. I now discuss the nature of imagination, its content, its functions, and its 
purposes. 
 Imagination is not a discrete faculty or power, but rather a contextual orientation 
towards schemes capable of disclosing alternatives to present conditions (Granger, 2006, 
p. 168) and bringing new realities into existence (Chambliss, 1991, p. 43). Dewey (1896) 
wrote: “All building up of experience takes place through the image. . . . All learning is 
carried on through the medium of imagery” (pp. 136 & p. 324, as cited in Chambliss, 
1991, p. 44). The content of imaginative activity is always imaging in one or more of the 
five sensory modalities, i.e. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tactile “images,” 
and/or in emotive modalities, e.g. shock or sadness. Imagery is the representation of a 
percept that resembles the original (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 110). These images 
occur in the imagination as “schema” that are shaped, individuated, and related to one 
another according to culturally mediated patterns. Image schemata come from our 
sensorimotor transactions with the world and a continuous flow of experience and feeling 
(Gibbs, 2008, p. 231). Their function is to organize experience and help in meaning 
making (Beauclair, 2008, p. 150). Some are direct representations, in imagination, of 
qualities experienced materially; some are imaginative reconfigurations of those qualities. 
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In either case, image schemata are the a priori material of the imagination and mediate 
between our empirical experience and the concepts we form as a result of that experience 
(Rundell, 1994, pp. 93-94). Image schemata may also be complex patterns of sensory and 
emotive images that comprise entities such as “characters, settings, sequences of events, 
causal connections, goals, and so forth …” (Johnson, 1987, p. 19). Image schemata are 
central to embodied reasonableness because they are kinaesthetic and they organize 
experience. As Johnson (1987) writes, “The schema is a pattern of action as well as a 
plan for action” (p. 21).  
Schematic sensory and emotive images and image constructs are always involved 
in imagination’s two broad functions: in imagining-that something is the case – a 
situation or state of affairs – and in imagining-how to reach a goal or to construct 
something, by imaginative prefiguring or dramatic rehearsal (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 
303; Dewey, 1957, pp. 179-180). In each of these functions, imagination works not 
merely to entrain images, but to relate them together meaningfully. Meaning is a function 
of association. Things are meaningful because of connections we make among qualities, 
images, emotions, sensations, image schemata and concepts, and the greater the number 
of meaningful connections we make with various dimensions of experience the more 
significant is growth in meaning. Imagination enables novel connections of meaning to 
be made among schematized segments of actual experience, as well as among 
schematized images that may be only possible. This possibilizing aspect of imagination is 
what gives us an array of threads to weave into the fabric of reflective thinking. The 
pragmatic theory of experience admits of imagination and supposition as intrinsic, 
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making possible the marriage of theory and practice in dramatic rehearsal.
37
 In addition to 
dramatic rehearsals in imagination, possibilizing includes hypothesizing and pretending 
(Casey, 2000, p. 115 & 231). In Dewey’s (1934) words, imagination, 
… is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is 
the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes in 
contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, 
there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and the strange become the 
most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some measure of 
adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its 
measure, imagination. (p. 267)  
However, not all connections are equally meaningful, in terms of being fruitful or 
satisfying. Some are only potentially meaningful, some lead nowhere, some preclude or 
stunt growth depending on our purposes.  The determination of which connections are 
most meaningful, in imagining-that and in imagining-how, is the work of inquiry in 
imagination. Therefore, the paramount features of inquiry are suspension of belief; ability 
to doubt in the absence of evidence; willingness to follow an argument where it leads; 
                                                 
37
 A dramatic rehearsal in imagination is the metaphor Dewey suggested to depict one 
phase or function of the deliberative process. In this phase of moral deliberation, the 
person crystallizes possibilities and transforms them into hypotheses, expressed as action 
plans. As an essential stage in the process, the term “dramatic rehearsal” however has 
been used synonymously with deliberation (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 962-70). 
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upholding the tentative status of hypotheses; and entertaining new areas of inquiry 
(Dewey, FC/LW 13:166, as cited in Fesmire 2003, loc. 481). The work of inquiry serves 
each of the three broad purposes of imagination: to construct knowledge, to guide 
appropriate action, and to engage in imaginative activity for its own sake, i.e. imaginative 
play. Ricoeur (1976/1994) suggests that to exercise a sense of imaginative play is to draw 
up a schema of a network of ends and means, what he terms “the schema of the pragma” 
(p. 126), pragma being the thing one has to do. He further describes the schema as having 
the organization of a narrative structure and a milieu in which it is to take place: 
It is, in fact, in the anticipatory imagining of the action that I ‘try out’ different 
possible courses of action and that I ‘play’ – in the literal sense of the word – with 
practical possibilities. It is here that pragmatic ‘play’ overlaps with the narrative 
‘play’; the function of the project, turned towards the future, and the function of 
the narrative, turned towards the past, exchange schemata and frameworks, the 
project borrowing the story’s structuring capacity and the story receiving the 
project’s capacity for looking ahead. Next, the imagination shares something of 
the motivational process as well. It is the imagination that gives the milieu, “the 
luminous clearing in which we can compare and contrast motives as different as 
desires and ethical demands, which in turn can change from professional rules to 
social customs or to strictly personal values. This form of the practical imaginary 
has its linguistic equivalent in expressions such as: I could do this or that, if I 
wanted. Finally, it is in the realm of the imaginary that I try out my capacity to do 
something, that I take the measure of ‘I can.’ I can ascribe my own capacity to 
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myself – as the agent of my own action – only by picturing it to myself in terms of 
imaginative variations on the theme of ‘I could.’ (pp. 126-127) 
Engaged in one of these purposes, we are active agents in an imaginary state of 
affairs. We can imagine with relative ease and bring it to fulfillment. We can be told to 
imagine, and imagining happens instantaneously; in fact, it can occasionally surprise us 
with a proliferation of images. More often than not, we can exercise a sense of control 
over imagining, such as being able to initiate imaginative activity, and being able to 
direct these imaginings in whatever way we like. We can also terminate imaginative 
activity or replace one imaginative experience with an altogether different one. In fact, 
there seems to be no limit on the possibility of success for any imaginative project. We 
succeed in imagining just what we intend. Nevertheless, there is always some aspect that 
is vague in imagining, such as where something may begin and end, or where this is 
located. Furthermore, there are certain things that cannot be imagined, such as objects 
formed from contradictory concepts. Having said that, our imaginative powers differ 
from one person to another, and are educable. Therefore, we can train our imaginative 
capacities through disciplined exercise (Casey, 2000, pp. 33-36).  
For instance in the context of obtaining instruction in ethical inquiry, Teehan 
(1992) suggests that students form a “moral image” of the self to give themselves a sense 
of direction in making moral judgments. Although our aim as stated in the first chapter is 
more modest than that of preparing students to develop ethical character, lead ethical 
lives or become moral selves, students could still be encouraged to shape a “moral 
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image” focusing on the person one wants to be or a schema of the means to achieve 
certain ethical goals (Putnam, 1993, p. 71) similarly suggested by Ricoeur (1976/1994).  
A moral image, in the sense in which I am using the term, is not a declaration that 
this or that is a virtue, or that this or that is what one ought to do; it is rather a 
picture of how our virtues and ideals hang together with one another and of what 
they have to do with the position we are in. It may be as vague as the notions of 
‘sisterhood and brotherhood;’ indeed, millions of human beings have found in 
those metaphors moral images that could organize their moral lives. (Putnam, 
1987, p. 81, as cited in Johnson, 1993, p. 65)  
Having described imagination’s contextual orientation and the manner in which it 
engages, we are now prepared for a discussion of its role in ethical inquiry. 
Moral Imagination: The Role of Imagination in Ethical Inquiry 
Pappas (1993) has written that in Dewey’s model of moral inquiry there are three 
predominant stages, i.e. doubt, moral deliberation, and judgment (p. 79). First,  (1) we 
discern the ethical dimensions of experience, i.e. the qualitative/cognitive meanings of, 
e.g. compassion, justice, and friendship over e.g. cruelty, avarice, and oppression, that 
occur in experience, and recognize these qualities as problematic, as beset with problems 
and opportunities. (2) We inquire into what threatens, hinders, or diminishes those 
qualities we value; determine what might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, stabilize, 
or otherwise improve them; as well as, figure out what accounts for actual and possible 
negative qualities; how they might be avoided, reduced, or mitigated; and (3) we arrive at 
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the condition of reflective ethical equilibrium.
38
 We have identified three uses or 
purposes of the imagination – to play, to construct knowledge, and to guide action – and 
we have explained that in each of these purposes, imagination involves sensory and/or 
emotive images following a process of inquiry. Each of the stages of ethical inquiry 
requires the use of imagination in arriving at the most satisfactory conclusion. 
Let us discuss this in greater detail. In the first stage of ethical inquiry, we discern 
the ethical dimensions of experience distinguished by a non-discursive value or meaning 
that is felt, but which can also be cognized, and related to other meanings in thought. As 
felt meaning, even automatic reflexes like fright become part of an inclusive situation that 
involves concern for objects and their issues (Dewey, 1934, p. 42). Dewey (1938) argued 
that not only people but also concrete situations are often “disturbed, troubled, 
ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. It is the situation that 
has these traits” (p. 105). Situations with ethical dimensions may involve an individual in 
transaction with her environment, as well as, transactions that are interpersonal or social. 
In any case, what makes certain dimensions of a situation “ethical” has to do with the 
actual and potential well-being of the agents involved in the situation. As Splitter and 
Sharp (1995) explain,  
                                                 
38
 Reflective equilibrium is the condition inquiry seeks to attain. It includes 
reasonable justification of considered judgments, taking into account the kind of world 
we live in, and the kind of creatures we are, always allowing for the possibility of 
reconstruction to admit of the new.  
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…issues relating to what counts as good, fair, reasonable, decent, and right; issues 
to do with violence and conflict, relationships, self-knowledge, desires versus 
obligations, reciprocity (retaliation, revenge), friendship, love, and respect;… are 
elaborations of major themes concerning such fundamental questions as what it 
means to live well, and how the world might be transformed and improved. (p. 
176) 
There is an element of imaginative play in empathizing with others, which is necessary to 
comprehend the full ethical meaning of each situation. We pretend,
39
 assuming the 
attitudes of others, sorting through their concerns, plans, and predilections as though they 
were our own (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 901). However, the ethical meaning of a situation is 
not always obvious. It consists not only in qualities immediately given, but also in 
qualities that are only potential. Ethical discernment, therefore, includes sensitivity to 
what is given, as well as the imaginative ability to understand the directional flow of 
experience, i.e. from where things have come and where they might lead.  
The second stage of ethical inquiry, inquiry into the causes and effects of ethical 
qualities, involves the imagination in constructing knowledge through such activities as 
categorizing qualities of similar kind, relating parts of experience in cause/effect 
narratives, forming images, constructing counterfactuals, considering alternative realities, 
and articulating possibilities, their consequences, and repercussions (Pardales, 2002). 
                                                 
39
 Students with autism despite having a normal IQ will not be able to pretend (Baron-
Cohen, 1995, as cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 9). 
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Through its possibilizing aspect, imagination permits new ways to frame situations 
necessitated by particular circumstances and mental habits, but not determined by 
conventional rules, and norms. In the process, we also reconstruct past understandings to 
engender new meanings in ideas that have lost their currency or do not contribute to 
growth. The ability to take in the full measure of a situation, all that it implies and 
signifies, and be able to bring forth something new is similar to abductive reasoning and 
accounts for the production of novel elements in inquiry (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 902-8; 
Kaag, 2007, p. 80).  
The aim of the second stage of ethical inquiry is to figure out how to and what 
might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, or stabilize or improve ethical meanings in 
experience. The work involves the imagination in generating and testing hypotheses, i.e. 
ways to improve the ethical dimension of an experience. This aspect of the moral 
imagination is familiar to us through our abilities for insight, making inferences, creating 
hypotheses, and envisioning a plan of action. As insight, one imagines possible 
competing hypotheses and determines the fit of a given suggestion. Fittingness is 
informed by environmental and contextual factors, together with the inquirer’s active 
determination of the situation. It is measured in terms of the foreseeable consequences of 
provisional hypotheses or action plans (Kaag, 2007, pp. 97-9). As Dewey wrote: “Inquiry 
is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is 
so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of 
the original situation into a unified whole” (LW 12:108, as cited in Beauclair 2008, p. 
61).  
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Finally, ethical inquiry seeks to arrive at its third stage, the condition of reflective 
ethical equilibrium, which is an instance of reasonableness in ends and means, in light of 
one another and the system as a whole, and also reasonable in light of prior obligations 
about the problem at hand (Elgin, 1996, pp. 13 & 107). Reflective ethical equilibrium has 
two components: existential and cognitive, the existential component being the ethical 
amelioration of the problematic situation in terms of felt ethical qualities of experience. 
At this stage we have arrived at a satisfactory resolution of experience. That resolution 
will involve a reconstructed habit of interaction by the agent and her natural and/or social 
environment, and in all likelihood, a reconstructed environment. Moral imagination 
consummates in artful conduct, as our very own experiences serve as our original artistic 
medium (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 89-96; Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 25).  
The cognitive component of reflective ethical equilibrium is the reconstructed 
ethical understanding and sensitivity of the actor. We work out possibilities, making them 
feasible and available as options for action (A.O. Rorty, 1988, p. 340). From this new 
perspective, we also continue to look for new projects and possibilities for action within 
the hard stuff of worldly experience exercising a firm foothold in the actual, but in light 
of the possible. In the sense that Dewey explained, the experience of ethical inquiry is 
thus “educative” because it prepares us to be more curious, discerning, responsive, 
purposeful, or skilled in future experience (just as other experiences might make us 
callous, careless, repetitive, or scattered, which Dewey called “mis-educative”) (1938; 
1967, p. 25). He had argued that immediate meanings cannot be captured in linguistic 
description because the meaning is the undergoing (Mitchell, 1989, p. 481). In Breathing 
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Curiously: Queering the Curriculum Body, Sanders (2007) sheds light on our embodied 
experience of things that we have yet to commit to language. He explains that they are 
expressive of encounters with the Other, with the invisible, and with phenomena at the 
margins of social experience. “How we recognize and communicate these experiences is 
a social and political challenge, and one that demands the development of new 
pedagogical theories” (p. 220). This can best come about through reflective and 
dialogical communal inquiry (Fesmire, loc. p. 931).  
In the sections that follow, I discuss two methods of educating the moral 
imagination: narrative fiction and dramatic rehearsal, both of which rely on reflective and 
dialogical inquiry to achieve their goal. Fictional narratives frame real-life elements in 
ways that can highlight ethical meanings and furnish opportunities for inquiry into those 
meanings. They also serve as models in framing episodes of real life as ethical narratives. 
A dramatic rehearsal involves authoring a kinaesthetic plan and engaging in an enacted 
narrative. Through a dramatic encounter, students can claim authority for a moral 
perspective and the thoughts, feelings and actions that are expressive of it (Bouchard, 
2002, p. 410).  
Educating the Moral Imagination through Fictional Narrative 
 We are distinct from other species in our approach to contingently true information 
because our knowledge is widely inferenced and our behavior highly improvised (Tooby 
& Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). Other living creatures, possessed of naïve realism, are not 
faced with the need to piece together belief systems nor grapple with their fairness, and 
when to discard them (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). Narrative as a primary mode of 
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thinking and a dynamic perspective on experience relates to Dewey’s naturalistic 
philosophy, a discourse of processes natural to doing & happening, actions, and 
intentions (Bruner, 1986, as cited in Wells, 1999, p. 144). In studying the mind and brain, 
evolutionary psychologists, who draw from evolutionary biology, cognitive science, 
anthropology, and neuroscience, assert that the functional components of the brain’s 
neural architecture are behavioral adaptations which came about through natural selection 
in the process of solving problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2000, p. 91). On this view, it is believed that much of our mental content is not 
derived from experience, but only elicited by it (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, cited in 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 22). For instance, when we are at the edge of a precipice 
like the Grand Canyon Skywalk, we might be gripped by a fear of falling, even with both 
our feet planted firmly on its transparent surface of tempered glass (see Bloom, 2010, p. 
169). Neuropsychologists hypothesize that the narrative form is itself a cognitive 
adaptation (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001) and that responses to how things seem or “alief,” 
as in the Grand Canyon Skywalk incident, are its primitive state (Bloom, 2010, p. 169). 
Unsurprisingly, stories are precisely organized within image schemata for the purpose of 
deriving meaning from experience (Abbott, 2000, as cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, 
p. 24). In that regard, literature and the arts are considered evolutionary attempts to 
achieve coherence and sanity amidst radical uncertainty within nature (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). The meaning of aesthetics in day-to-day life becomes clearer as 
we examine our relationship with fiction. 
Mind is a function of what the brain does. The human mind has a special affinity 
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for the narrative because despite its fictional nature, it exercises a powerful organizing 
influence on neurocognitive adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 21). 
Understanding, valuing, feeling, perceiving, knowing, believing, and acting come into 
play when a narrative provides opportunities for problem solving, for making 
suppositions and reasoning counterfactually, for thinking inferentially and 
accommodating fallibilism (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 20). Aesthetic experience in 
literature, music, and the visual arts allows minds to become more fully realized, thereby 
strengthening cognitive adaptations. According to Bloom (2010) this occurs because 
imaginative fiction intensifies experience. No one we know has killed his father and 
married his mother, yet this has happened in the imaginary world of Oedipus with 
psychic intensity and intimate knowledge (p. 175). Furthermore, by abbreviating time, 
fictional events reach a satisfying resolution, at best an infrequent occurrence in real life 
(Bloom, 2010, p. 175). If we wish to give students an opportunity to identify 
experientially salient features, we might enhance learning experiences in the manner of 
events in fictional narratives (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 22).  
 Tooby and Cosmides (2001) delve further into our inner worlds to suggest the 
meaning of aesthetics in lived experience. They propose that every neurocognitive 
adaptation of ours, including the process of belief formation, has an aesthetic aspect, 
whose purpose is to motivate and enhance an individual’s sense of participation in 
experience. The aesthetic aspect organizes the psychological
40
 adaptation so that it 
                                                 
40
 An objection to Philosophy for Children has been raised against its psychological 
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becomes increasingly developed, calibrated, and fine-tuned in the appropriate 
neurocognitive system. For example, as learning progresses, a child’s babbling becomes 
more organized in the language faculty and the auditory system, so that in time, the 
language system becomes more effective at communication (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, 
p. 16). Moreover, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) hypothesize that aesthetic motivations 
may be a necessary “guidance system” for the development of each adaptation, i.e. they 
motivate us so that we are able to detect, seek, and experience certain aspects of the 
world, thus further organizing psychological adaptations to reach their mature form. The 
aesthetic motivation carries out a developmental role in constructing adaptive brain 
circuitry by furnishing mind with the feelings, valuings, and objects it needs to act 
appropriately (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000a; 2000b; Steen & Owens, 2001, cited in Tooby 
& Cosmides, 2001, p. 16). In a very real sense, embodied reasonableness relies on image 
schemata, the neurocognitive adaptations, which function as psychological inputs.  
For this reason, we expect that children should live according to behaviorally 
imperative aesthetic sensibilities in an aesthetics-drenched world, although their 
standards of the fun and the beautiful will be somewhat different from ours. Beauty, 
awe, fascination, horror, and so on are terms that refer to aspects of an evolved 
                                                                                                                                                 
aspect. The program’s instrument, highlighted in Chapter 1, is said to describe outcomes 
that are strongly psychological (Biesta, 2009, p. 4). In light of the neurocognitive findings 
just described, this might actually be beneficial, if not productive. 
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psychology of aesthetics. (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 17)  
To explain the psychology of aesthetics, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) describe contrastive 
aesthetics, in the aesthetics of fear and conversely, the aesthetics of beauty. The 
insidiously harmful situation that conceals adversaries or predators frequently appears in 
fiction to sustain our interest (p. 18). Fear as an aesthetic component motivates us by 
grabbing our attention and forcing us into reconstruction because it is vital to monitor 
unexpectedly threatening situations and to act with immediacy. In contrast, beauty calls 
attention as the moment unfolds and we find that it is to our advantage to seek out such 
an experience prolonging our encounter with it. Fear pertains to the compulsion brought 
about by a potentially perilous situation that initially presents itself as safe or 
advantageous, requiring extremely sharp attention to make the distinction, i.e. mediate 
knowledge
41
 that can be learned in ethical inquiry. An understanding of the 
underpinnings of imagination helps us appreciate its essential role in our day-to-day lives. 
People enjoy stories. As infants and children, we access cultural meaning via 
stories, lullabies, games, expressions of feeling, social interaction, religion, education, 
and art (Alexander, 1987, p. 120). In the absence of a narrative structure, textbooks filled 
with factual information are seldom read for pleasure. We prefer accounts peopled with 
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  Mediate knowledge is that whereby we learn to find out what is important to know 
about situations “in order to secure, rectify and avoid being and having them. That of 
knowing so that we can have them in more meaningful and secure ways” (Dewey, EN, 
379, cited in Garrison, 1985, p. 553). 
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characters whose perspectives provide a vicarious and intelligible experience of 
unfolding events brought about by their actions (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 24). While 
Homer’s Penelope in The Odyssey weaves and unravels Laertes’ shroud, we weave and 
unravel in imagination possible narratives for action (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 1075-77). We 
make sense of our lives as narratives, often as in the Odyssey, seeing ourselves thrust into 
ongoing action in medias res (Taylor, 1989, p. 47). The form and content of the narrative 
provide meaning to both written work – especially fiction and history  – and to actual 
human lives and life episodes that can be constructed as story. Working with the meaning 
of fictional narratives enables a person to find and construct similar meanings in her own 
life. The narrative provides the most comprehensive structure for grasping the temporal 
dimension of our moral selfhood and action (Johnson, 1993, pp. 152-153; MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 205; Ricoeur, 1994, p. 149). Indeed, it is true that we are caught up in the 
gripping narrative that is life.  
Narrative can also engage the moral imagination. As ideal resources for education 
in ethical inquiry, fictional narratives engage the moral imagination in three ways, the 
first of which is to provide boundary and shape to an experience or set of experiences – 
fictional, historical or lived. Very often, the narrative arc follows the arc of inquiry for 
resolving problematic situations great or small. Indeed, there is a Jamesian view that 
regards reasoning and reflective inquiry as an irreducibly aesthetic activity, as story-
structured, i.e. a narrative structure, concluding with the resolution of discord (Fesmire, 
2003, loc. 724). In Dewey’s terms, 
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Imagination is primarily dramatic…whether it takes the form of a play enacted on 
the stage, of the told story, or silent soliloquy. The constant presence of instability 
and trouble gives depth and poignancy to the situations in which are pictured their 
subordination to final issues possessed of calm and certainty. (1958, p. 89) 
In this regard, Nussbaum (1986) explains narrative in fiction and other art forms as a 
vehicle of moral development, due to its capacity for: 
The history of a complex pattern of deliberation, showing its roots in a way of life 
and looking forward to its consequences in that life. As it does all this, it lays 
open to view the complexity, the indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of actual 
human deliberation . . . it does not display the dilemmas of its characters as pre-
articulated; it shows them searching for the morally salient; and it forces us, as 
interpreters, to be similarly active. (p. 14, as cited in Johnson 1993, p. 196) 
It is narrative structure that makes a situation morally intelligible. In fact, narrative is 
always in relationship to a particular moral perspective (Bouchard, 2002, p. 409). In 
learning to discern the narrative arc in a fictional text (whatever the genre and medium), 
students learn to regard – i.e. imagine – episodes of their own life experience in narrative 
terms, e.g. as ethical set pieces with determinate beginnings or causes, a cast of characters 
finite enough to make sense of, and a finite number of dramatic (including ethical) issues 
to be resolved. The cognitive skill of narrative reasoning “‘establishes not truth but 
verisimilitude’ and lifelikeness” (Bruner, 1986, p. 11, as cited in Worth, 2008, p. 49). The 
underdetermined causal relationships depicted in a story present an internal logic and an 
opportunity for developing an analytic stance. With practiced attention, one should be 
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able to discern both linear and non-linear ways of ordering experience. Understanding the 
schema of narrative reasoning means encouraging a make-believe attitude, which 
develops the analytic stance (Worth, 2008). Even though the characters, the conflicts, and 
the causal contingencies of one’s life are real, it is the work of the moral imagination to 
relate them together in a narrative of ethical choice and consequence. Needless to say, 
each such episode may be meaningfully related to past and future narratives. 
The second way that narrative engages the moral imagination is to foreground 
ethical qualities, problems and opportunities in episodes of fiction, history, and lived 
experience, typically by highlighting – i.e., drawing close attention to – dramatic conflict 
among humans, and between humans and natural, or historical forces. An engaging 
narrative stirs imagination, offering opportunities to vivify ethical understandings and 
intuitions (Vasterling, 2007, p. 81). We are moved emotionally by conflicts and contrasts 
among characters and contingent events. Moreover, a narrative text can dramatize social, 
political, and ethical principles, as instrumentalities rather than conceptual absolutes (see 
Caspary 1991, p. 184). It also delivers “physical, biological, and historic knowledge 
placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men” 
(Dewey 1930, p. 296, as cited in Caspary, 1991, p. 183). As Nussbaum (1990) explains, 
“stories cultivate our ability to see and care for particulars, not as representations of a law 
but as what they themselves are; to respond vigorously with senses and emotions before 
the new” (p. 184, as cited in Johnson 1993, p. 197). The aesthetic elements of well-
structured narratives are characters and situations that are clearly defined and fully 
contextualized, giving us a sense of them inside-out:  
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Likewise, typical narratives possess conventions that allow us to enter the minds 
of agents—whether fictional characters or real historical actors. These 
conventions involve penetrating the minds of agents, quoting their thoughts 
directly or displaying their perceptions (point-of-view shots), or telling us what 
characters are thinking, feeling, seeing, hearing, planning, intending, and so on. 
Thus, narrative possesses the means to exhibit both the inside and outside of 
virtues and vices. (Carroll, 2010, p. 382) 
Narrativity, the story-like quality of human life, engages two primary activities: 
observing and judging (Phelan 2007, p. 7, as cited in Sklar 2008, pp. 483-4). In this 
respect, a fictional narrative can function as an ‘ethics lab’ where moral cognition is 
tested following a method whereby we exercise skills of judgment making, grapple with 
ambiguity, reflect on emotional experience, and gauge the relevance of our ethical 
notions to lived experience (Stroud, 2008, p. 26; Vasterling, 2007, p. 82 & 84). Narrative 
fiction, good narrative journalism (Voparil, 2009, p. 100), and the embodied experience 
of personal testimony (Chinnery, 2010, p. 402) obtain currency when they meet the 
condition of enabling reflective thinking about some facet of life, present an opportunity 
to talk about something new, and offer a picture of how someone can conduct herself in 
the world (Stroud, 2008, p. 21). It is the narrative’s aesthetic properties that provide 
uncommon experience in accessible form to help us sidestep our own experiential and 
perspectival shortcomings. We thereby gain subjective knowledge that increases our base 
of experience. It is this feature of drawing close attention to particular aspects of a 
situation, which explains the proverbial power of narrative to elicit empathy (see Sklar, 
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2008, p. 481). As Rorty (1989) explained, 
Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing our 
sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar 
sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize 
people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as we would,” or 
“There must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer? (p. xvi) 
Nevertheless, not all fictional works draw attention to the ethical dimension of situations, 
or are equally provocative of ethical inquiry. Even when they do, we want to discourage 
what James (1907) called “the sentimentalist fallacy”, i.e. the tendency “to shed tears 
over abstract justice and generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when 
you meet them in the street because the circumstances make them vulgar” (p. 229) and 
similarly prevent the “rationalist’s fallacy” on which James (1907) heaps scorn:  
Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason conceives that it ought to exist, but experience 
shows that it can not. . . . Truth which ought to be, can not be. . . . Reason is 
deformed by experience. As soon as reason enters experience it becomes contrary 
to reason. (p. 230) 
The ethics educator should therefore select works, according to the following three 
criteria. First, select a literary narrative because its transactive claim is its status as a work 
of art, “a mode of prediction not found in charts and statistics, . . . it insinuates 
possibilities of human relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and 
administration” (Dewey, LW 10: pp. 351-2, as cited in Garrison, 2004, p. 3). Second, 
identify a work that makes a transactive claim for ethical reflection because it requires a 
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capacity to live with the unknown, the underpinning of which is the belief that if we do 
not seek in the stranger some version of ourselves, we might be able to examine our 
complicity in systems of oppression (Chinnery, 2006, p. 335). The Joy Luck Club, for 
example, has been criticized for “the considerable interpretive task the novel presents to 
its readers,” (Souris, 1994, p. 121) and is appropriate. It is hard work “to unravel the 
literary tropes and [we will] do whatever it takes to conquer the text” (Chinnery, 2008, p. 
45). Third, select a work of fiction whose transactive claim is that it conveys the illusion 
of the “unfinalizable” self and where there is a multiplicity of perspectives engaged in 
deep intersubjectivity, characters perceiving their own initiating gestures to be mirrored 
in others’ responding movement or enunciation. “Attending consciousnesses perceive and 
misperceive embodiments in one another” (Butte, 2009, p. 130). Such processes 
problematized in inquiry allow students to exercise a theory of mind (Zunshine, 2007). 
Neurocognitive adaptations are expressed as mental states in fiction, thereby putting our 
own into play and pushing ours beyond their comfort zones when facing the Other 
(Zunshine, 2007, p. 276). This also opens up opportunities to examine the ways in which 
relationships lead to belief and moral judgment-making, being that the processes of belief 
formation in the minds of characters lends itself to philosophical analysis (Zamir, 2002, 
pp. 332). According to Zunshine (2007), Shakespeare waxed deeply intersubjective much 
earlier than his novel-writing counterparts  (pp. 287), hence the topical choice of Romeo 
and Juliet in the curriculum I have prepared (Chapter Five). 
Understanding the structure and content of certain narrative works enables us to 
make situations in our own lives morally intelligible and prods us toward meaning 
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making (Carroll, 2010, p. 378, 381). Meaning making begins with simulation in 
imagination, i.e. appraisals of truthfulness or applicability of the text for one’s own 
purposes (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002, p. 49; Stroud, 2008). Gregory (2008) has pointed 
out that adolescents are particularly susceptible to existential questions for it is the 
unfinished nature of their life experience that commands attention. In the adolescent’s 
personal growth is the activity of taking on the attitudes of those in her immediate social 
environment and responding to others in similar fashion. Part of the young person’s 
learning experience is developing the ability to accommodate another’s standpoint, an 
imaginative act informed by affective thought or emotion (Lipman, 1967). Adolescents, 
14-16 years old, have made the cognitive transition from immersion in story worlds as 
though they were true to having the capacity to reflect on stories as constructs (Applebee 
1978, pp.108–109, as cited in Sklar, 2008, pp. 492-493). Therefore, the child’s notion of 
‘what is’ is replaced with a sense of ‘what might be.’  
Engaging students in the ethical inquiries raised in fictional works requires a 
philosophical, open-ended, and problem-posing pedagogy that engages the kinds of 
critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented reasoning elaborated in the previous 
chapter. That pedagogy must strike a balance between eliciting the students’ own 
interests and concerns, and focusing their attention on the ethical meanings dramatized in 
the text. In each case, from one moment to the next there is indeterminateness in inquiry 
requiring that we reconstruct our understandings. We are moved to self-correct our 
habits, urges, purposes, needs, and beliefs until we can envision something that may 
restore equilibrium. Also, because our internalized social habits impinge on how we are 
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swayed by the demands of narrative situations (Fesmire, 1995, pp. 569-570), ethics 
pedagogy must include communal inquiry, specifically dialogue, to problematize those 
responses and fully explore the meaning of narrative texts (Stroud, 2008, p. 30). The arc 
of inquiry from the encounter of problematic ethical meanings to a reflective equilibrium, 
the interest and the flow of intelligent discourse, the balancing of personal and textual 
inquiry agendas, and the dissonances and harmonies of intersubjective concerns and 
propositions – if artfully managed by the classroom teacher – become elements of 
aesthetic form in the experience of the dialogue on the text: 
It is the business of the educator to see in what way the experience is heading. . . . 
Failure to take the moving force of the experience into account as to judge and 
direct it on the grounds of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle 
of the experience itself. (Dewey LW 13: EE, 21, as cited in Kosnoski 2005, p. 
666)  
Conversation can motivate participation in the face of such uncertainty and 
frustration if it manifests particular formal, aesthetic characteristics. (Kosnoski, 
2005, p. 655) 
Adequate as the narrative may be within the context of ethical inquiry, a pragmatist-
naturalist approach to learning warrants another type of transaction, i.e. a self-directed 
activity expressive of human “thought, imagination, and emotion” (Lekan, 2003, p. 85). 
To seek what is valuable in thought, feeling and action, Lekan (2003) suggests that we: 
Include explanation of the ways in which genuine human needs are satisfied 
through expressive activity. Such genuine needs might include the need to express 
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one’s identity in a social environment or the need to play and exercise 
imagination. . . . Like other kinds of general knowledge, knowledge of human 
needs would not deductively entail conclusions about what action plans to adopt. 
Rather, such knowledge would serve a useful instrumental purpose in framing  
action plans. (p. 85) 
According to Rosenblatt (1978), “The benefits of literature can emerge only from 
creative activity on the part of the reader [her]self” (p. 276, as cited in Wilhelm & 
Edmiston, 1998, p. 33). It goes without saying that we want our students engaged in 
critical inquiry regarding their values and cherished beliefs, forging new ethical 
understandings in dialogue, rather than merely reinforcing the ethical assumptions they 
bring to class. In that regard, a lingering concern noted by Lawrence-Lightfoot (2010) 
continues to manifest. In the 30 years since Gilligan’s seminal gender study In a Different 
Voice,
42
 notions of sexual identity have become more nuanced but her framework of 
gender differences persists in the cultural imagination (pp. 145-146).  
Enlightened sexism . . . [whose] components are anxiety about female achievement; 
a renewed and amplified objectification of young women’s bodies and faces; the 
dual exploitation and punishment of female sexuality; the dividing of women 
                                                 
42
 Gilligan does not view the different voices she describes as essentially or only related 
to gender. The chief aim in her book, as she described it, is to highlight the distinction 
between two modes of thought that have been culturally reproduced along (but not only) 
gender lines (Bordo, 1993, p. 336). 
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against each other by age, race and class; rampant branding and consumerism. 
(Douglas, 2010, p. 10), [thereby rendering] [f]eminists . . . as man-hating, child-
loathing, hairy, shrill, humorless, deliberately unattractive Ninjas from Hades. 
(Valenti, 2007, as cited in Douglas, 2010, p. 11) 
I would like to stress that making sound ethical judgments in the context of sexuality 
involves deliberative inquiry into issues of sexuality, e.g. options to heteronormativity, 
freedom, power, responsibility, trust, care, physical and mental health, and respect for 
others (Sharp & Splitter, 1995, p. 192). Sensitive questions are susceptible to exploration 
in the kinaesthetic plan of a dramatic rehearsal. Drama as a creative activity offers 
students a chance to take action as if they have been transformed into other people 
(Edmiston, 1998, p. 60). In identifying the ethical dimension of a situation, not only can 
students engage in ethical inquiry and make plans about what to do, but they can to some 
extent take action and open up powerful dialogic spaces to make their moral 
understandings “more multifaceted interwoven, and complex” (Edmiston, 1998, p. 61). In 
fact, “semblance can catalyse a change of heart. . . . can, in some cases, change inner 
states” (Sherman, 2005, p. 277). 
Educating the Moral Imagination through Dramatic Rehearsal 
   Invested with an understanding of embodied reasonableness, the notion of the 
“kinaesthetic plan” comes from a particular method of ethical inquiry prescribed by 
Dewey (1922) as that of a dramatic rehearsal. In Human Nature and Conduct, he wrote:  
We begin with a summary assertion that deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in 
imagination) of competing possible lines of action…Deliberation is an experiment 
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in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an 
experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and 
impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. 
But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by 
tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the body. 
Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes. . . ” (p. 190) 
The concept of the dramatic rehearsal provides a theoretical underpinning (Caspary, 
1991, p. 177) for students preparing a kinaesthetic plan, an action plan for use in dialogic 
dramatic inquiry. In this manner, using the body becomes an important part of learning 
through drama (Wilhelm, 1998, p. 42). A kinaesthetic plan is an extemporaneous 
improvisation putting an event, story, or other narrative into a dramatic scenario, 
constructed and acted out together by students and a teacher-facilitator (Winston, 1999, p. 
460). As process drama, participants use imagination to create a shared fictive world, one 
that does not replace the everyday classroom world, but runs parallel to it. Teacher and 
students interact in both worlds, the teacher speaking from the position of any character 
in the story and structuring the work from within the drama world (Edmiston & Wilhelm, 
1998, p. 19). As the teacher in the following example sequences tasks and shapes the 
drama, the classroom community members are all being engaged in the same enterprise 
(Wilhelm & Edmiston, 1997, as cited McCambridge & Sieger, 2004, p. 19). 
As a teacher, I want to establish a laboratory atmosphere [emphasis added] in 
which processes are learned as products are created, in which students’ interests 
are harnessed and extended, and in which knowledge and viewpoints of texts and 
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people are explored and juxtaposed to foster growth of students’ understandings. 
(Edmiston & Wilhelm, 1998, p. 14) 
The fictional context created with students is the imagined world of the literary 
narratives. Edmiston & Wilhelm (1998) write “Connections are made among the lives of 
the students and . . . histories, viewpoints, and cultures . . . separated from the classroom 
by time and space” (p. 14). Known as “performing at the edges of text,” it involves the 
whole or parts of, in this case, Romeo and Juliet and The Joy Luck Club, as a “narrative 
prop,” around which emerge the pertinent questions and imagined scenarios (Heath and 
Branscombe, 1986, as cited in Wolf, Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 494). 
The focal point is a disturbing problem – in this case, one involving ethical issues 
– which can provide insight unavailable through other means, by engaging the moral 
imagination (Probst, 2004, p. 98; Shusterman, 2001, p. 368). The situation, meant to 
activate students’ “background schemata” (Wilhelm, 1998, p. 31), skills and 
understanding, provides an initial dramatic frame – delineating the scenario, elevating its 
significance, and giving it a context – which the students may extend or reconstruct. 
Framed dramatic inquiry requires a classroom community with an experienced teacher-
facilitator, who structures learning in support of the dramatic and ethical context, 
including personal journal writing on the learning experience, historical research, 
interviews, press conferences, literary letters, and symbolic story representation 
(McCambridge & Sieger, 2004, pp. 19-20).  
The ideal scenario is one susceptible of being developed through multiple, 
“possible lines of action” (Caspary, 1991, p. 178), which the students must explore 
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through imaginative inquiry, considering the context, their inclination to act, possible 
moves, objectives, and outcomes. This method provides students opportunities to engage 
and develop authorship, expressing their perspectives by means of artistic language and 
gesture (Bouchard, 2002, p. 410). The activity combines the spirit of play, as “the 
unfolding of a subject of its own account,” (Dewey, 1997a/1910a, p. 219) with 
responsibility and commitment to a dramatic encounter.   
Unlike classic dramaturgy where we are accustomed to scripts assigning 
participants’ lines and roles, a kinaesthetic plan permits a student to take a position where 
she decides on her relationship to an unfolding narrative (Davies & Harré, 1990, pp. 12-
13). In the language of social psychology, Davies and Harré (1990) suggest the term 
position rather than role, to convey selfhood as fluid and multivocal.
43
 In exercising 
positionality, dramatic rehearsal can help a young person in identity formation by 
affirming a positive and empowering sense of self, especially when one is marginalized 
by class, race, gender, and sexual orientation (Carlson & Apple, 1998, p. 17). Immanent 
                                                 
43
 In the literature of critical pedagogy, histories of subjugation, marginalization, and 
oppression are located along a continuum ranging from positions of extreme visibility 
through invisibility (Cooks, 2003, p. 247). Laying bare a power differential, one can 
speak in relation to that continuum from a hegemonic position of power or the 
marginalized position of “other.” In so doing, education opens up for itself an 
emancipatory function, i.e. to create conditions of resistance and empowerment in 
opposition to hierarchy and privilege (McLaren, 1998, p.175). 
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as it is, “language exists only as concrete occasions of language in use” (Davis & Harré, 
1990, p. 1). Within discourse, an utterance yields a constitutive force rendering a radical 
discontinuity in being (Deutsch, 1992) or a continuity of multiple selves (Davies & 
Harré, 1990, p. 5). Nevertheless, because an interpretation of one’s world is invested with 
previously formed beliefs, understandings, and justifications, the student can still locate 
herself within a prevailing social structure. In role, “a subject position incorporates both a 
conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those 
that use that repertoire,” (Davis & Harré, 1990, p. 5). As a diversely positioned self, she 
will be able to invoke alternative ways of being in relation to others.  
Improvisation requires each actor to pay attention to minute details of the 
emerging plotline, to character traits, and the interaction of personalities, to actions taken 
and their foreseeable consequences. Each one must also exercise imagination in order to 
anticipate how others may respond to the scenario, and how she may respond herself. 
Students’ interpretation and creation of texts emerge from the improvised encounter, 
enabling them to explore the ambiguities and possibilities of the developing narrative 
(Wolf, Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 494). In the course of the improvisation, students 
are likely to come upon novel points – from fellow students and from themselves (Wolf, 
Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 493). As Dewey explained, in the course of dramatic 
rehearsal, “There is a continual appraising of both data and ideas. . . . Evolution of 
conceptions thus goes on simultaneously with determination of the facts; one possible 
meaning after another is held before the mind, considered in relation to the data” (Dewey, 
1933, pp. 124-125, as cited in Caspary 1991, p. 185). A student’s values and beliefs 
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emerge while she is making meaning, and upon subsequent reflection is faced with the 
ethical implications of her utterances (Gee, 1993b, as cited in Gee, 1996, p. 101). The 
problematized scenario supplies the material for reflective thinking regarding a more 
compassionate and respectful stance towards the oppressed or marginalized.  
One further aspect remains to be dealt with and that is the power of acting 
enlivening events from life, in large part because it makes the actors keenly aware of their 
own feelings. For Dewey, a dramatic rehearsal requires us “to discover the personal 
factors that now influence us unconsciously” (Dewey, 1916, p. 327, as cited in Caspary 
1991, p. 180). In order to respond intelligently to an improvised situation – in role play or 
in life – we must pay close attention to the emotional, somatic and other felt qualities it 
evokes, as clues about how to respond in order to lead the situation toward a 
consummatory outcome, representing the satisfaction of a number of needs in aesthetic – 
and in this case, ethical – equilibrium.  
After the improvisation, students are invited to reflect together about how it 
unfolded, and the outcome reached. The experience becomes meaningful from a process 
of careful intersubjective interpretation in community (Kaag, 2009 p. 67). As Edmiston 
shares, “Reflection is dialogic when students evaluate actions from the point of view of 
the person affected” (p. 60). This dialogical phase of the activity has essentially the same 
features as those of communal inquiry into the meaning of narrative texts. In this case, 
however, the text is the dramatic improvisation created by the students. On the one hand, 
this dialogue is an extension of the drama, in that the interactions among the participants 
constitute role-playing, or “philosophical dramaturgy,” (Cossutta, 2003, p. 70). On the 
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other hand, the dialogue serves the important function of conceptualizing meanings that 
may have only been felt or bodily enacted, bringing those meanings into what 
Shusterman (2003) terms the “discursive critical [which can] make our experiences more 
effectively communicable, durable and powerful by grounding them in socially 
legitimated practices” (p. 406). The goal of the dialogue, however, is to arrive at a 
reflective equilibrium on the ethical issues encountered, that is both cognitive and 
affective, a cognized and “felt harmony in a particular situation, [which can be] 
communicated and evaluated by a community of inquirers” (Peirce, 1958, p. 473, as cited 
in Kaag, 2007, p. 129).  
Educating the Moral Imagination in Philosophy for Children 
 While we offer students the opportunity to identify experientially salient features in 
moral judgment making through the fictional narrative and kinaesthetic plan, the ideal 
framework for dialogical inquiry into the contestable and problematic in lived experience 
is that of Philosophy for Children. Regarding their conception, Lipman & Sharp (1978) 
wrote: 
Ethical inquiry involves logical considerations such as consistency and identity, 
metaphysical considerations such as the concept of a person or a community, 
aesthetic considerations such as part-whole relationships [that can be appropriately 
addressed in Philosophy for Children]. . . .[The] moral imagination may be fired by 
tales, but if we are going to expect them to engage in moral conduct in a reflective 
and responsible fashion key concepts of ethics can no more be grasped by the 
[adolescent] without the assistance of philosophical interpretation than they can be 
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grasped at the adult level. (p. 90) 
We become susceptible to the artistry of imaginative visions in the classroom community 
of philosophical inquiry because it is the locus of the self-realization stipulated by Dewey 
as the highest moral end-in-view. There our incompleteness and foreignness to ourselves 
is foregrounded by our desire to connect with others. It has the character of a story-in-the-
making (Kennedy, 1999, p. 347). Indeed, we co-create meaning and co-create ourselves 
in the communal experience because we are drawn out of our habitual, unreflective 
nature (Garrison, 2004, p. 4). Kennedy (2004) has written that P4C in the dynamics of the 
classroom community of philosophical inquiry allows students to explore the 
implications and assumptions informing concrete experiences and connect it with others’, 
their assumptions, implications, and disparate differences, thereby constructing meaning. 
These experiences have made a transactive claim on one’s self and incorporate the 
puzzling and new, strange and mysterious, with the claims of other participants (p. 751). 
With its emphasis on learning to think for oneself (Kennedy 1999b, as cited in Kennedy, 
2004, p. 747), characterized by the questioning of fundamental beliefs and assumptions 
and continual self-correction of one’s process of judgment construction (p. 748), the 
processes of communication and cooperation are strengthened (Vansieleghem &  
Kennedy, 2011, p. 177). As a result, students come to understand that selfhood is always 
under reconstruction in relation to others (Kennedy, 2004, p. 748).  
This chapter has called attention to moral imagination and its role in ethical 
inquiry and aesthetic experience.  While its creative influence was first acknowledged 
during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, imagination continues to be appreciated in 
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the ethical amelioration of problematic situations. Through the work of neurocognitive 
scientists, we have come to understand it as the aesthetic aspect of our inner worlds. 
Imagination plays a pivotal role in permitting new ways to frame situations and is 
advantageous to learning, especially in its literary form which serves as an appropriate 
instructional tool in ethical inquiry. In dramatic dialogic inquiry, the kinaesthetic plan 
comprising insight, inference, and hypotheses exercises students’ ability to envision a 
plan of action in moral deliberation. The importance of the moral imagination in belief 
formation cannot be underestimated because its increasing development, calibration, and 
attunement as a psychological adaptation also enriches the aesthetic dimension in our 
day-to-day lives. In the chapter that follows, I shed light on emotions as judgments, a 
component in the theory of ethical inquiry. 
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Chapter Four: Emotions as Moral Judgments 
 
To be a poet is to have a soul so quick to discern, that no shade of quality escapes 
it, and so quick to feel, that discernment is but a hand playing with finely ordered 
variety on the chords of emotion – a soul in which knowledge passes 
instantaneously into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of 
knowledge. One may have that condition by fits only. (George Eliot, 1871-
2/1994, p. 256) 
The function of the artist is to express reality as felt. (Robert Motherwell, n.d., 
n.p., as cited in Innis, 2010, p. 198) 
The spectator’s imaginative capacities are deployed in their possibilizing power in 
experiencing works of art. (Casey, 2000, p. 206) 
 
As self-realization
44
 is the highest moral end-in-view, the educative purpose of 
                                                 
44
 Self-realization in Dewey’s early writings on ethics (1894) is consistent with his work 
of doing away with dualisms, the supernatural, and the transcendental (Rockefeller, 1991, 
p. 204). In his later, early 20th century output, the major unifying idea of growth appears 
in his writings, as the inclusive moral end and human good (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 401). In 
my understanding, there is no great overriding difference in the concepts. The same could 
be said in respect of growth and self-realization in moral deliberation because there the 
overriding concern is selfhood making itself. (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 412). 
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our project comes into sharper focus. This chapter is about the epistemic advantage that 
the emotions offer in serving as an evaluative medium in lived experience. Every single 
emotion relies on a narrative structure rendering it understandable through an “emotion-
history” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 236). “Pictorial imaginings, musical imaginings, the kinetic 
forms of imagining in the dance, and others,” bring inner worlds to our attention 
(Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 65-66)
45
. It has also been described as [the] “deep self expressing 
itself in the work of art, which is epitomized by the work’s affective quality” (Dufrenne, 
1953/1973, p. 480). In Narrative Emotions (2004a), Deslandes sheds light on the 
embodied experience of emotions and their narrative structure. She explains the raison 
d’être of emotions as being a form of intersubjective knowledge and that the hidden 
world of emotions pertains to the world of the impenetrable other (Deslandes, 2004b, p. 
367; Deslandes, 2004a, pp. 69-70). In the theory of ethical inquiry I have proposed, I 
have been able to describe two of four components, i.e. embodied reasonableness and 
moral imagination, accounting for Dewey’s influence and other Deweyan-inspired 
approaches to learning, such as Rosenblatt’s transactional theory, Greene’s aesthetic 
theory, and Lipman’s pedagogical model of philosophical inquiry, i.e. Philosophy for 
Children (P4C). Embodied reasonableness as critical, intersubjective, and outcome-
                                                 
45
 Cognitive appraisals need not be objects of reflexive self-awareness nor will emotions 
at all times register as felt experience (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 126). 
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oriented thinking, emerges from body-mind
46
 when cultivated through the dynamics of 
the classroom community of philosophical inquiry. P4C can provide the means for 
students to be able to reconstruct bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. 
In terms of the second component in the Language Arts, the typical instructional tools, 
i.e. the narrative and dramatic rehearsal, engage the moral imagination. Habituation in 
thinking dispositions, such as sensitivity to context in confronting the ethical questions 
raised in fictional works, requires a philosophical, open-ended, and problem-posing 
pedagogy. As we are swayed by the demands of narrative situations (Fesmire, 1995, p. 
569-70), it is the ethics pedagogy in P4C providing the means for exploring the 
implications of literature and for problematizing deeply held beliefs and values, in the 
procedures of communal inquiry and dialogue. The ethics educator should therefore 
select works of art, for their potential in ethical reflection and philosophical analysis 
(Zamir, 2002, pp. 332).  
 In this chapter, I claim that in making sound moral, as well as, practical judgments, 
we rely on our emotions. However, we cannot always count on the soundness and 
appropriateness of our emotions in the face of the unfamiliar and unusual. In respect of 
our emotions, as in art and artfulness, there are levels of sophistication in rectitude 
                                                 
46
 Dewey’s neologism, body-mind, points to the human organism as whole, the left hand 
term (body) making reference to an evolutionary process continuous with nature, carried 
forward as habit in the present, and the right hand term (mind) pointing to ongoing and 
forthcoming evolutionary growth (Hickman, 2004, p. 162). 
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(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 79). I argue that educating the emotions by incorporating narrative 
fiction and the arts in a process of ethical inquiry, serves pragmatic instrumentalism 
(Hamblen, 1993, pp. 27-33, as cited in Logsdon, 2011, p. 29) by: 1. Addressing the 
abiding human interest in enriching lived experience, 2. Enhancing growth by serving as 
preparation for a more satisfactory
47
 life, 3. Informing subsequent learning by providing 
provisional conclusions for future inquiries (Logsdon, 2011, pp. 65 & 92), 4. Making 
substantive connections across arts and non-arts domains (Logsdon, 2010, pp. 30-31), 5. 
                                                 
47
  In A Quest for Certainty (1929), Dewey made a distinction between that which is  
satisfying as opposed to satisfactory, i.e. satisfying being a static quality and satisfactory  
pertaining to judgment as the outcome of inquiry (p. 272). 
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Promoting equity in educational opportunity,
48
 6. Constructing understandings on which 
self-realization depends
49
 (Logsdon, 2010, p. 92), and 7. Promoting the integrative goal 
of body-mind. I reconceptualize ethical inquiry as aesthetic and also avail of a range of 
youthful human expressiveness. As has been stated in Mind the Gap (2010), that goal is 
possible “through a conception of ‘the human person as a mind-body system. . . produced 
                                                 
48
 In terms of educational equity, in particular apportioning knowledge in classical 
music, while many of its young patrons belong to affluent households, there are 
intellectual and emotional dimensions in the musical experience that constant exposure 
and familiarity to classical music would address (Szabo, 2001, p. 22), e.g. developing 
new perspectives on    music through the inner world of feeling (Swanwick, 1994, p. 20, 
as cited in Szabo, 2001, p. 30), developing neural pathways for processing music, and 
developing the ability to discern structure and form leading to the formation of taste 
(Levitin, 2006, p. 194). The implication, therefore, is that the benefits of listening to 
classical music should be made widely available to all students, as even the untrained 
know more than they can express about it (Szabo, 2001, p. 29). It is an immediate, 
visceral reaction that music brings about, so that students will stop to listen and wonder 
about classical music precisely because it is unfamiliar. 
49
 In the case of musical talent dependent on genetic structures, the following factors 
should be considered of paramount importance in self-realization: early and timely 
identification by trained personnel, the application of criteria predicting if one is likely to 
excel, and provision for early training of talent (Levitin, 2006, pp. 195). 
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by evolution’” (Slingerland, 2008, p. 13, as cited in Heywood, Garcia, and Wilson, 2010, 
p. 508).   
An integration . . . in which humanists start taking seriously discoveries about 
human cognition being provided by neuroscientists and psychologists, which 
have a constraining function to play in the formulation of humanistic 
theories… and as natural scientists begin poking their noses into areas 
traditionally studied by the humanities—the nature of ethics, literature, 
consciousness, emotions, or aesthetics—they are sorely in need of humanistic 
expertise if they are to effectively decide what sort of questions to ask, how to 
frame these questions, and what sorts of stories to tell in interpreting their 
data. (Slingerland, 2008, p. 9, as cited in Heywood, Garcia, and Wilson, 2010, 
p. 508)  
In support of my argument, Chapter Four has been organized to give an overview of how 
the emotions came to be regarded as judgments of value, beginning with the Stoics. Then, 
I explain Dewey’s theory of emotions and how he undermined the James-Lange concept 
of stimulus-response psychology (Dewey, 1896, p. 360). The arts are invaluable in 
educating emotions, so that a moral education could only be one that is primarily 
aesthetic. In due course, I explain why it is so. 
Emotion as Judgment  
 The Stoic model of a unified soul is one in which emotion is collapsed into  
judgment, so that emotions are regarded as judgments (James, 1997, n.p., as cited in 
Lloyd, 2000, p. 142). Stoics view emotions as cognitive (i.e. descriptive and evaluative) 
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and give philosophy a therapeutic role comprising a discursive method punctuated by 
self-watchfulness and comprehensive belief reform, with a view to obtaining well 
reasoned (eulogon) or enlightened eupatheia (good feeling
50
) (Sherman, 1997, pp. 55, 99-
100, 105 and 108), of which there are only three:  
They say there are three good feelings, joy [chara], watchfulness
51
 [eulabeia], 
wishing [boulēsis]. Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-
reasoned  [eulogon] swelling [elation]; and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, 
consisting in well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, 
but he will be watchful. They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, 
consisting in well-reasoned stretching [orexis – desire]. Just as certain passions 
fall under the primary ones, so too with the primary good feelings. Under 
wishing: kindness, generosity, warmth, affection. Under watchfulness: respect, 
cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness. [Diogenes Laertes 
7.1116 (SVF 3.431), as cited in Sherman, 1997, p. 117] 
As such, ethical inquiry is a practical matter involving philosophical analysis of beliefs 
both sincerely lived by and merely entertained (Sherman, 1997, p. 99). The cognitive 
element is important in identifying or forming a construal of the emotion and carries 
significant import for moral education because in this view, cognition is invested with a 
developmental dimension allowing reconstruction by reasonableness, rather than through 
                                                 
50
 Eupatheia is a wholesome state marked neither by total inertia nor emotional surges 
(Sherman, 1997, p. 112). 
51
 The terms mindfulness and watchfulness [eulabeia] are used interchangeably. 
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the exercise of mere strength of character or sheer willpower. This is in keeping with the 
neo-Stoic view espoused by Nussbaum (2001), wherein self-correction can effect a 
change in belief, (p. 232). The ethical cultivation of the emotions is the preserve of the 
young and is undertaken by engaging cognitive capacities in habituation, learning by 
doing, responding through reciprocal interaction in play, and fostering mutually strong 
friendships, instead of solely in self-reflection, discourse, persuasion, and argumentation 
(Sherman, 1997, p. 85-86). However, cognition and emotion are under the powerful 
influence of schema (see Chapter One) and any prognostication on the likelihood of 
success should be measured and should take this into account (Dattilio, 2011, p. 223).  
In the Stoic view, reason is the exclusive ground of morals (Sherman, 1997, p. 
99). We rely on emotions in deliberating particulars because affects can indicate urgency 
and moral salience. Emotions perform certain useful functions in moral life, such as a 
revelatory function in coming to know ourselves (Sherman, 1997, p. 45), assigning value 
to what matters, communicating those valuings to others, providing motivational force 
for action, and being valued for their own sake as meaningful experiences. On the other 
hand, emotions can also be problematic because they make us vulnerable, seizing on 
certain features of life to make them stand out, communicating questionable value, or 
expressing attitudes (Sherman, 1997, p. 50). In this connection, emotions can be 
excessive, capricious and unreliable; in determining salience, emotions may be partial, 
selective, restrictive, and wrong; involuntary emotions can overwhelm and spin out of 
control; and finally, when emotions attach value to objects and events over which we 
have no control, we are rendered hostage to fortune (Sherman, 1997, pp. 29-30). The 
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wise Stoic is concerned with how living emotionally could deprive one of eudaimonia, 
i.e. human flourishing, and will avail of Stoic emotional therapy or philosophical 
deliberation to perfect one’s nature.  
In like manner, Stoic therapy is ultimately grounded in reason. As bootstrapping, 
behavioral coping strategies are undergirded by philosophical instruction in what is of 
real and enduring value in the world, so that the deeper philosophical revision that occurs 
involves the foundational principle that the objects to which the passions attach have no 
worth and therefore, bring about suffering (Sherman, 1997, p. 111). In Stoic therapy, the 
patient is introduced to philosophical theory in the admonition that the responsibility for 
one’s condition and well-being lies in one’s hands. To this end, one must undertake the 
following measures: (1) Ward away false projections by observing mindfulness; (2) 
Undertake reflective meditation at each day’s end; (3) End each day with an apt question, 
e.g. “What bad habit have I relinquished today?” (4) Invoke a maxim, e.g. “Nothing is so 
difficult that it cannot be overcome by human intelligence;” (5) Ward against the rise of 
anger in your breast; (6) Choose friends who are placid and the mood will prevail; (6) 
Remember that nature is unpredictable and because anything can happen, have no fear; 
and (7) Strive for deeper understanding and redescribe emotional experience. It is an 
induced practical indifference culminating in deep character change that Stoic therapy 
envisions. 
In this regard, Sherman (1997) recommends Buddhism, as therapy, because like 
Stoicism, it views wisdom as a state of calm removed from desire. Its meditative practice 
engages the student in an attitude of detachment in order to still the mind and to distance 
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the self from goods of no inherent worth (pp. 114-115). In Meditation and the Brain: 
Attention, Control and Emotion, Mograbi (2011) suggests “one-pointed concentration,” 
involving concentration on one’s breath without hindrance from extraneous factors, 
feelings, and one’s own inner voice. It constitutes a healthful practice contributing to self-
control, attentiveness, and improved lifestyle (Mograbi, 2011, p. 281). This is one 
strategy to counter shortcomings equated with imperfect reasoning abilities that wax and 
wane in the course of a lifetime (Sherman, 1997, p. 115). The subject of meditation as a 
practical matter will be raised again in the next chapter. 
In an Aristotelian vein, cultivating emotions through music and tragedy has as its 
goal the development of strength and sensitivity in situations calling for generosity, 
kindness, fear, or pity. It involves habituation over time, in accordance with what is 
reasonable, developmentally appropriate, and can culminate in good judgment. Musical 
modes were understood to be expressive of character and evocative of corresponding 
emotion (e.g. the Dorian mode signified restraint, the Phyrgian enthusiasm, and the 
Mixolydian seriousness). Aristotle writes:  
Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of 
courage and temperance, and of all the qualities contrary to these, and of the other 
qualities of character, . . . as we know from our own experience, for in listening to 
such strains our souls undergo a change . . . Even in mere melodies there is an 
imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another, 
and those who hear them are differently affected by each . . . The same applies to 
rhythms. (Aristotle, Pol. 1340a19ff., as cited in Sherman, 1997, pp. 89-90) 
 132 
As instructional material in the education of emotions, the music one finds 
pleasure in listening is invested with personal identity because it reflects and 
communicates to herself something about who she is and the values she cherishes 
(Sloboda, 2010, p. 510). Furthermore, it is now being confirmed in neurocognitive 
studies that emotional stimulation from music yields growth in cognitive capacities 
(Sacks and Lockwood, 2009). The narrative structure of music (Kapilow, 2008, p. 10; 
Sherman, 1997, p. 91) involves emotional engagement with themes and objects 
representing cognitive gains (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Herewith is an illustration of 
what I have just stated: 
Take the opening of The Art of the Fugue—Johann Sebastian Bach’s . . . Though 
this theme does have some narrative drive . . . Its meaning lies not in what it is, 
but in what it will become. . . . Beginnings like these, in which the meaning of an 
opening becomes clear only over time, often over the entire piece, take 
extraordinary compositional courage and a deep belief in an audience’s 
intelligence. They ask the listener to do something that is almost inconceivable in 
today’s fast-paced, hyperkinetic world: they ask the listener to wait. . . . how 
central it is to so much of classical music. . . . [to] assume that the meaning of an 
idea is almost never immediately apparent. Only after a theme has been developed 
. . . can we begin to grasp its sense. . . .[A]sk the listener to wait for their full 
meanings to be understood [in] the ongoing narrative of the piece. (Kapilow, 
2008, p. 19) 
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Heraclitus said, “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same 
river and he’s not the same man.” Who we are is not who we were, nor who we 
will become. And so it is with a musical idea. . . . Meaning must be pieced 
together [from moment to] moment. (Kapilow, 2008, p. 65) 
 Aristotle’s interest in tragedy lies in the appropriate evocation of fear and pity and 
what it signifies for moral development (Aristotle, 1965, p. 48; Penwell, 2010, p. 10). 
Tragedy has the ability to expand our emotional resources for confronting chaos as it 
imposes order to situations where emotional conflict is paramount (Penwell, 2009, p. 25). 
In so doing, we are led to engender a fitting response, rehearsing in imagination how we 
might bring our intelligence to bear on a convergence of highly emotional events. It is the 
doing and undergoing within the narrative plot that calls our attention and serves to 
heighten a requirement to be brave and merciful. Such is the call of the epic, The 
Odyssey, which is drenched in longing, the joys of home and family life, and reunion. 
Like muscles that are strengthened with regular exercise, emotions that are purposefully 
stimulated by such art forms, are strengthened and habituated, their purposes internalized 
(Penwell, 2009, p. 13). Because many of our feelings and emotions are habits internalized 
precognitively (Penwell, 2009, p. 14), art that encourages problematizing as social 
criticism can lead to meaningful self-understanding and reconstruction. For instance, in 
Romeo and Juliet conflicts are brought on by the absence of a sense of proportion, poor 
judgment, and ill luck, and bring to our attention legitimate concerns such as emotional 
dishonesty (Moisan, 2000, p. 47; Zamir, 2007, pp. 116-117), gender roles and relations 
(Moisan, 2000, p. 47; Radel, 2000, p. 92) and the commodification of the body (Deats, 
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2000, p. 114). “The arts by generating pleasure in connection with acts of subversion and 
cultural reflection, produce an enduring and even attractive dialogue with the prejudices 
of the past,” writes Nussbaum (2010, p. 110), supporting moral education through the 
cultivation of emotion and imagination (p. 105). She is also intent on drawing attention to 
the following aspects of moral education, some of which I address in Chapter Five, 
describing Philosophy for Children pedagogy nurturing students as “active questioning 
beings whose capacity to probe and inspire [is] respected and further developed . . . in 
actively pondering the big questions of life . . .[paying] attention to logical structure . . 
.[and] countering ill-informed prejudices and stereotypes” (pp. 73-74). 
 Develop students’ capacity to see the world from the viewpoint of other people, 
particularly those whom their society tends to portray as lesser, as “mere objects” 
 Teach attitudes toward human weakness and helplessness that suggest that 
weakness is not shameful and the need for others not unmanly; teach children not 
to be ashamed of need and incompleteness but to see these as occasions for 
cooperation and reciprocity 
 Develop the capacity for genuine concern for others, both near and distant 
 Undermine the tendency to shrink from minorities of various kinds in disgust, 
thinking of them as “lower” and “contaminating” 
 Teach real and true things about other groups (racial, religious, and sexual 
minorities; people with disabilities), so as to counter stereotypes and the disgust 
that often goes with them 
 Promote accountability by treating each child as a responsible agent 
 135 
 Vigorously promote critical thinking, the skill and courage it requires to raise a 
dissenting voice. (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 45-46) 
The aforementioned proposed modes of conduct take into account that as social beings, 
morally problematic situations arise as a result of associated living. When difference 
leads to conflict, inclusive processes are disrupted and parties must work out a solution 
that all can agreeably partake of (Gouinlock, 1978, p. 225). Dewey himself stated:  
To cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves because of the 
belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other persons but is 
a means of enriching one's own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic 
personal way of life. (Dewey, 1939/1988, p. 228) 
 With its emphasis on awareness of the body, the story of emotion as judgment is 
incomplete without the account of emotion from Spinoza’s Ethics. It is that all emotion is 
grounded in bodily imaginings, and good and evil constructed from joy and sorrow—
from the satisfaction of, or frustration from longing. Emotions and imagination interact so 
that if, for instance, we imagine someone like us emotionally affected in certain ways, we 
are likewise emotionally influenced. To Spinoza, this translates as a concern for others 
because we wish for ourselves joy rather than sadness and the absence of pain and 
suffering, and we do the same for others, foremost among them, our loved ones (Lloyd, 
1996, p. 76). Emotions contribute to understanding and because the body exists in 
interconnectedness to other bodies, it is in our conative-affective engagement with other 
bodies that we find our affects supporting reason, leading to judgment, and exercising a 
role in collaborative morality. When we suspend judgment, Spinoza explains that we do 
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“not perceive the thing adequately,” (Spinoza, Ethics, IIP49SIIIB(ii), as cited in Lloyd, 
1996, p. 69) i.e. “our position [is] a part of Nature which cannot be perceived clearly and 
distinctly through itself, without the others” (Spinoza, Ethics, IIIP3S, as cited in Lloyd, 
1996, p. 73). Being in the midst of other bodies striving to persist in being, their corporeal 
traces (bodily modifications including imaginings and emotions) contribute to our having 
adequate ideas and our ability to act.  
Prop. X So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have 
the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to 
the intellectual order. (Spinoza, 1955, p. 252) 
An emotion is only bad or hurtful in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to 
think. (Spinoza, 1955, p. 250) 
According to Lloyd (1996), like the Stoics, Spinoza acknowledges the rational emotions. 
However, in his account, as irrational judgments they can be transformed through 
understanding, into active embodied reasonableness [emphasis added]. Unlike the Stoics, 
for whom they must be relinquished in order to obtain reason, for Spinoza, the passions 
“are themselves the subject matter for the transformative power of understanding” 
(Lloyd, 1996, p. 73). Conatus, our human strivings to persist in being are, for Spinoza, 
the very essence of humanity (Lloyd, 1996, p. 74). Therefore, our ideas of the good are 
constructed from what we have determined promote our strivings to exist in nature. 
Dewey’s naturalistic treatment of the emotions resonates with the preceding discussion of 
Spinoza. 
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Emotions arise in our sentient bodies concomitant with our continual striving to 
exist in unstable environments. “We feel the world with and through our bodies,” 
(Grange, 2004, p. 31). In Dewey’s theory of emotions, there is an organic unity of 
thought and emotion in the coordination of behavior, that only has meaning when we 
reflect on action (Stengel, 2010, p. 530), making reference to the reflex arc, a virtual 
sensorimotor circuit (Creighton, 1896, p. 649) which shares its contour with emotions. 
Dewey’s argument is in the conjoint essay The Theory of Emotion: I. Emotional Attitudes 
(1894) and II. The Significance of Emotions (1895), his reconstruction of Darwin’s The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1886) and the stimulus-response model 
in the James-Lange theory of emotion (1922/1967). It precedes The Reflex Arc Concept 
in Psychology (1896), widely reputed as “the single most important paper for 
understanding his entire system of thought” (Garrison, 2003, p. 405). A transaction 
between the live creature and the environment always results in a mediation of cognition, 
emotion, and action on the side of the creature, many qualities of which are 
underdetermined, i.e. “they can be ‘sensed,’ ‘felt’, or ‘had’ but not always thought or 
expressed definitively in words” (Gregory, 2006, p. 107). The cognitive and emotive 
merge with the sensorimotor in the live creature’s transactions, as in a functional 
coordination. Discussing the various dimensions of experience, Dewey gave emotion a 
special role in consummatory experience, that which warrants being named an 
experience. In the case of humans like us, “it takes possession of us altogether, and passes 
over into the aesthetic” (Dewey, 1894, p. 558). Therefore, consummation or fulfillment is 
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preceded by anticipation, preparation or premonition, a condition fraught with tension in 
light of indeterminate consequences.  
But does anyone suppose that, apart from our interpretation of values, there is one 
process in itself intellectual, and another process itself emotional? I cannot even 
frame an idea of what is meant. (Dewey, 1895, p. 21) 
The reality, the coordination of these partial activities, is that whole activity which 
may be described equally well as ‘that terrible bear,’ or  ‘Oh, how frightened I am.’ 
It is precisely and identically the same actual concrete experience . . . (Dewey 1895, 
p. 20-21) 
In fact, rather than merely reactive or passive, Dewey stipulated a functionalist model of 
observable behavior where the live organism selected and conditioned its own stimuli in 
interactive relationship with the environment (Hickman, 2004, p. 157). 
Sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as 
separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning 
factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc. (Dewey, 
1896, p. 358) 
Emotions are among the functional adaptations accompanying human attempts to render 
nature, including its constraints and its facilities, more stable and dependable (Hickman, 
2004, p. 161). In the course of evolution, humans accumulated a growing repertory of 
adaptations to address ecology and demographics. In turn, even as human manipulative 
power increased, it rendered the human environment ever more precarious, variable, and 
complex (J. Carroll, 2006, p. 39). In his attention to emotion, Dewey the moral 
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philosopher was pursuing a lifelong commitment to assist human beings in enriching 
lived experience.  
 In Dewey’s educational thought, emotion has a significant place. In Democracy and 
Education (1916), Dewey’s elaboration on the process of education is one involving the 
interplay of affect and emotion (Stengel, 2010, p. 531). In How We Think (1910a/1997a), 
he describes the cognitive function of reflective thought stimulated by affect. Citing “a 
felt difficulty” (p. 72), he echoes the proprioceptive52 aspect of emotion essentialized by 
James, an idea for which he has been recognized as progenitor.
53
 The reflex arc concept 
furnishes us with Dewey’s account of learning behavior, to which the supplement is the 
theory of emotions and its analysis of the role of emotion and expression in experience 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 137). In The Theory of Emotion ii. The Significance of Emotion 
(1894), Dewey identifies emotion as a disposition (p.16) with intellectual content and 
value distinctions indicative of “aesthetic appreciation,” its implications primarily ethical 
                                                 
52
 Counterintuitive as it may seem, in this view the physical expression of the emotion is  
the emotion itself (Richardson, 2006, p. 42). Even so, naming the emotion might not be a  
simple matter (Sherman, 1997, p. 54). 
53
 Having trained as a painter and physician, James takes inspiration from Bell’s (1806) 
Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting, meant to explain the process painters 
undertake to portray body language. Bell throws light on how emotion manifests as  
bodily changes: eyes widen when horrified, nostrils flare, mouth opens, fingers spread, 
head is thrown back, and back straightens (Richardson, 2006, p. 243). 
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(p. 17). As a synthetic process, emotion includes non-sequential features of cognition and 
disposition, conveying the sense of emotion as it takes hold of a person as “emotional 
seizure.” It is accompanied by an emotional surge, a felt process signifying the realization 
of ideas (p. 15) and a readiness to act in a particular manner (p. 17). Finally, as feeling, 
emotion has purpose, i.e. to represent a subjective evaluation or judgment. In so doing, 
Dewey’s theory is one that is balanced, clearly affirmative of the essential cognitive 
dimension in emotion and fully integrative of both cognitive and physiological phases in 
the larger behavioral unit (Shusterman, 2008, p.182). Emotions have a cognitive function 
which is the point of what follows. 
 The ascription of reasonableness to emotions presumes the cognitive function of 
emotion (De Sousa, 1980, p. 149). Damasio (1994) reports that in patients simultaneously 
experiencing cognitive deficits and emotional impairment, cognition and emotion appear 
to be interrelated (pp. 44-51, 69-70, 175, and 200-201, as cited in Furtak, 2010, p. 53). 
Understanding emotion as cognitive also highlights the embodied nature of emotions as 
thoughtful modes of intentional experience. Having the immediate felt quality of sense 
perception and somatic excitation, emotions reveal how the world appears to a particular 
subject. Nussbaum (2001) espouses a cognitivist view where emotions are judgments of 
value containing eudaimonistic import and being quick, inarticulable, and hard to control 
(p. 77). In situations where our welfare, interests, or projects are thwarted, the metaphor 
“upheavals of thought” captures the cognitive function of emotions, inducing reflective 
thought and corresponding action (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 4). In summary, the cognitive and 
the bodily are bound together as two aspects of a single, unified experience, 
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foregrounding Dewey’s concept of the reflex arc, the full circuit of perception and action 
(Buermeyer, 1975, p. 16). 
 From the standpoint of ethical valuation, the cognitive function of emotions allows 
for changes in the way we cope with the world. In the continuous ebb and flow of 
problematic experiences, cognitive and emotive sensitivity to the intricacies of ethical 
quandaries and potential outcomes is as necessary to sound ethical judgment as 
sensitivity to the material details of a situation is necessary to prudent practical judgment 
– and equally hypothetical and fallible. To Peirce (1900), this sensitivity inherent in 
emotions makes us vulnerable to the minds of others, willing to embrace the strange and 
new, and welcoming it with the warmest of emotions, love. Peirce writes:  
Reasonableness consists in association, assimilation, generalization, the bringing of 
items together into an organic whole—which are so many ways of regarding what 
is essentially the same thing. In the emotional sphere this tendency towards union 
appears as Love; so that the Law of Love, and the Law of Reason are quite at one 
(p. 621; as cited in Nubiola, 2009, p. 132). 
Unlike our sensory perception of a situation, which, through the formation of schemata 
indicates the material and cause-effect dimensions, our emotional response indicates its 
meaning, especially in terms of potential benefit and harm.  Part of this meaning – that 
which pertains to benefits such as compassion and fairness, and harms such as cruelty 
and addiction – is moral. As appraisals of salience or value regarding various aspects of 
the world, Dewey draws an analogy for the role of emotions in the creative act of artistic 
composition and synthesis: “Emotion is the moving and cementing force. It selects what 
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is congruous and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to 
materials externally disparate and dissimilar (1934, p. 42). In the following section, I 
argue that educating emotions is an aesthetic undertaking both akin to, and a necessary 
component of ethical inquiry. 
Educating Emotion  
Emotions play a key function in the intelligent awareness of current, ongoing, 
events and surrounding conditions. Our emotions indicate sensitivity, especially in 
problematic, i.e. potentially beneficial or harmful situations. They keep us alert and 
attuned. Emotions are part of a repertoire of affective appraisals, value judgments 
(including moral judgments), materializing in embodied acts, which are purposeful, 
intentional, and directed towards an object (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001; Robinson, 
2005, p. 74; Sherman, 1997; Solomon, 1993, 2001, and 2008).  
 As an aspect of moral imagination (see Chapter Two), image schemata have a 
crucial part in our experience of emotions, affecting our immediate reactions to things in 
our path. This understanding of emotion fits Palencik’s (2008) treatment of schemata as 
hypotheses for the way the world operates. Let us say your image schema for being at the 
beach includes an uncrowded stretch of beach, dazzlingly bright sun, miles of white sand, 
crystalline blue waters, a cool breeze, chilled drinks, and friends. Everything is right, both 
in terms of what your previous schema had led you to anticipate, and experienced as 
valuable, in part by positive emotional responses. Then, the ground underneath you 
trembles, and you cannot manage to stay upright. (This is a schema mismatch: an event 
invested with ambiguity; a search for meaning; an instance of problem-solving.) You 
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have not once in your life experienced an earthquake, which is what everyone else is 
saying is happening, but the conceptual meaning of that term is now imbued with 
dramatic somatic feeling and emotional response.  When the ground is once again stable, 
you are relieved. There is froth as the ocean pulls back, far, far away from the shoreline, 
making for absolute calm. Once again, reclining on the sand, you look at the sky above, 
concerned about the recent upheaval from the ground up. (Revise schema.) Then, barely a 
moment later, the tide rushes back in. “Tsunami!” There is absolutely nothing in the 
world that has prepared you for this event! (Your evaluation of relative peace fails to 
match expectations, i.e. another schema mismatch.) You run as fast as your legs can carry 
you, in fear, and with scant hope for escape. In those precise moments, there are no words 
to describe the terror you feel, as you flee toward uncertain safety. (How to escape 
imminent death is a moral problem.) The meaning of the terms ‘earthquake’ and 
‘tsunami,’ are now inseparable from this horrifying experience.  
The jump of fright becomes emotional fear when there is found or thought to exist  
a threatening object that must be dealt with or escaped from. (Dewey, 1934, p. 42)  
Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it. 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 42) 
The outcome of this coordination of activities constitutes, for the first time, the 
object with such and such an import—terrible, delightful, etc.—or constitutes an 
emotion referring to such and such an object. For…the frightful object and the 
emotion of fear are two names for the same experience. (Dewey, EW, p. 176, 
quoted in Garrison, 2003, p. 420)  
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As has been amply illustrated above, there is much automaticity in human emotional 
response. We execute emotional judgment effortlessly, most of the time instantaneously 
and in the absence of appreciable thought. Emotions such as fear and anxiety, and their 
underlying embodied processes, are not always available for us to consciously monitor. 
Nevertheless, the storing of non-conscious emotional memory about a threatening 
situation is critical for survival (Glannon, 2002, p. 266). Organisms of sufficient 
complexity, amongst them human beings, evidently receive through emotion very 
powerful feedback regarding events in the environment. They color our understanding of 
what is going on around us, our interpretation of the motives of people with whom we 
interact, and responses we deem to be appropriate. To us humans, emotion reveals what 
is important when words fail, and therefore have a communicative function (Nussbaum 
2001; Sherman, 1997). Recent research indicates that emotions course through us in a 
continuum and are ever present, even if largely imperceptible, and even those that 
crystallize as defining moments are relatively infrequent and far between (Dattilio, 2010, 
p. 225). Like nature, our emotional life is always in flux, recalibrating assessments, 
forming adaptations and altering bodily conditions. As felt intelligence, emotions are 
self-referential and by directing our thinking and action, can play a judgmental role in 
maintaining well-being. Regarding felt intelligence, Dewey argued that our judgments, 
however well reasoned, must be colored with personal feeling for them to be practicable. 
As we envision things to come, a “sense of peace, of fulfillment,54” would suggest 
                                                 
54
  “Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence 
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equilibrium (Dewey, 1908, pp. 323-4; 1932, pp. 302-303). In this way, emotions are vital 
to human learning and development (Levykh, 2008).  
 Because each emotion is experienced not only in the brain, but also throughout the 
organism, the interconnectedness of cognition and emotion blurs the two suggesting that 
memory processes could be emotion-driven (Cohen, 2005, Drevets & Raichle, 1998, and 
Pessoa, 2008, as cited in Dattilio, 2010, p. 226). At the deepest and most fundamental 
level of cognition, schemata are now generally regarded as memory structures comprising 
our underlying assumptions (Dattilio, 2010, p. 222). The patterns constructed from, and 
imposed back on experience by image schemata, are instantaneously imbued with 
emotional responses, psychosomatic judgments about the quality and value of the 
experience, thereby manifesting kinaesthetically through our bodies the judgmental 
nature of emotions. Evidence from classrooms worldwide highlights students’ symbolic 
gestures as embodying schemata indicative of concept formation (Roth & Lawless, 2002, 
p. 337). When they are established as maladaptive early in childhood, they can be 
resistive to change. This supports a previous statement in Chapter Two relating to 
awareness of the subtle functions of embodied cognition and its role in the judgments we 
unthinkingly make. When they are deeply entrenched, effecting change requires 
relentless effort in order to achieve sustained self-transformation and continued 
unlearning.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of any feeling of irrationality?” (James, 1905, p. 317). 
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As functional adaptations, emotions may be described as “associated habits” of 
two kinds: the first kind is our evolutionary genetic inheritance comprising bodily 
modifications (i.e. instinctive or hardwired) and the second kind we have learned 
socially, i.e. habitual and recently evolved, including those reconstructed (Garrison, 2003, 
p. 413; Filipic, 2001, p. 1). Dewey regarded all habits as affections, which would incline 
us to certain dispositions, biases, behaviors, and other judgments. “All habit-forming 
involves the beginning of an intellectual specialization which if unchecked ends in 
thoughtless action. Significantly enough this full blown result is called 
absentmindedness” (Dewey, 1922, p. 173). That suggests two parallel fields of 
intelligence: one relatively unconscious, including autonomic patterns of psycho-
emotive-motor response, and one of intervening critical reflection. A principle danger of 
the former field of unreflective, intelligent response is that it may become habitual, i.e. 
developing inertia and momentum irrespective of changing circumstances. Given the 
contingency of our interactions with the natural, social, and technological environment, 
inertia of habitual response may render us flatfooted, unprepared to do what is required. 
Unsurprisingly, “the blush becomes the emotion of shame when a person connects, in 
thought, an action he has performed with an unfavorable reaction to himself or some 
other person” (Dewey, 1934, p. 42). It is patterns of habitual response that call for 
reconstruction through critical inquiry. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey singled 
out fear, focusing on its influence in social relations. He analyzed fear as marked by 
‘‘contractions, withdrawals, evasions, [and] concealments,’’ and later the ‘‘organic 
shrinkage, gestures of hesitation and retreat in the context of actions toward particular 
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persons or things” (Stengel, 2010, p. 533). A reappraisal is required in this instance for 
reconstructed habits to come about, and for new understandings of problematic situations 
to emerge. What is it to be completely convinced that there is no reason to be afraid? If I 
am afraid, then I must find the world threatening in some respect. Without fear there 
would be no need for bravery (Wise, 2009, p. 201) rendering adequate a theory of 
emotion that assigns a cognitive role and intentional content for emotions (Furtak, 2010, 
p. 56). On closer examination, emotions fulfill that role. 
Evolutionary psychologists Tooby & Cosmides (2001) have determined what 
emotions do: 1. Rank our goals and motives 2. Attend our procedures of inference and 
verification. 3. Bring about construals of the world, 4. Heighten or hinder perception, 5. 
Stimulate memory and imagination, 6. Assign attention, 7. Manifest physiologically (e.g. 
shortness of breath) or make themselves felt (e.g. exhilaration), 8. Become expressions 
conveying meaning to others (e.g. giggles), and 9. Regulate learning. Tooby and 
Cosmides (2006) also provide for a class of recalibrational emotions, comprising guilt, 
shame, disgust, envy, and anger (p. 109), including stress or emotional strain. The 
recalibrational emotions are those susceptible to reconstruction, as they are as yet not 
recalcitrant (Dattilio, 2010). The “cool” system modulates phobic, anxious, fearful, and 
other primitive-dysfunctional “hot” system emotions and its development continues 
throughout middle and late childhood (Metcalfe and Jacobs, 2009, p. 101). Emotions 
have heat and urgency because they concern the most important transactions we have in 
nature (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 77). The hot cognition-cool cognition framework provides 
lenses through which the interaction of emotion and cognition can be better understood. 
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Two central constructs clarify the hot system: passions and fears; it is impulsive, rigid, 
simple, and fast. If unconstrained the hot system can give rise to an inability to delay 
gratification and to have an explosive temper. The contrasting cool system is cognitive, 
reflective, integrative, flexible, strategic, and offers a constraint to the hot system. In 
learning, the cool system influences metacognition, semantic processing, comprehension, 
problem-solving, and higher-level thinking. Excessive stress can disrupt either system. 
Maintaining balance between hot and cool systems is a function of a number of factors 
including, but not limited to, developmental level, stress-regulation, self-care, and 
learning. Both systems are necessary in enhancing a person’s vitality, well-being, and 
engagement with life. Students can learn to be aware of the emotions and their functions, 
including the hot cognition-cool cognition framework with a view to the education of 
emotion (see, Metcalfe and Jacobs, 2009, pp. 101, 207-208).  
Learning to become aware of our emotions is a refined skill that begins in 
childhood and persists throughout our lives. We initially learn to pay attention to the flow 
of our emotions in the form of attention paid to us by adults, until we come into knowing 
our own minds. Without this, life becomes devoid of the meaning shaped by appraisals, a 
continuous processing of experience as worthless or worthwhile. It is important to 
become receptive to the textured sense of significance that is monitored in our inner 
world by the feeling of meaning that only occurs when we are able to observe, objectify, 
and articulate the bases of our judgments (Siegel, 2010, pp. 129-130). “Words themselves 
are abstract representations that emerge like islands from a sea of associated meanings” 
(Siegel, 2010, p. 130). For example, the meaning of “mother” brings up the elements of 
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meaning in a wash of feelings cascading as associations, beliefs, concepts, developmental 
issues, and emotions, flooding mind and intruding into personal relationships. Schema as 
the “architecture of our feelings” (Siegel, 2010, p. 131) reveals a perfect alignment of 
beliefs and feelings. By exposing beliefs to the light of day, one begins the first of many 
steps in deconstructing a prejudicial emotion-cognition framework, thereby decreasing 
the belief’s potency (Wise, 2009, p. 181). Consider the case of latent homophobia, in 
which unexamined beliefs are perfectly aligned with feelings. Within our understanding 
of schema as underlying assumption and our emotion-cognition framework, it will come 
as no surprise that a person’s unacknowledged homophobic beliefs, when verbalized, 
expose claims that the same person may well reject upon examination. 
Educating our emotions rests on an embodied understanding, including being able 
to read one’s own body for instance when it gets a rise, identifying the belief or 
assumption which brings it on, its attendant communicative import and potential to 
influence others. We need to be able to learn how to experience emotions, both ours, as 
well as others’ in appropriate ways. Retrospection, the examination of one’s own bodily 
feelings, allows us to objectify and report on specific mental events immediately just 
passed yet fresh in memory, helping us understand those motives of which we are clearly 
unconscious (Shusterman, 2008, p. 59). One important outcome of this exercise is the 
embodied cognition of common space and inclusiveness, an aspect of the human 
organism’s environment, the society of other humans. James (1912/1976) described the 
conative-affective function accordingly:  
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When I see your body, I focus on a place and object that is also the focus of your 
experience, even though your experience of your body is from a different 
perspective. In the same way, bodies provide a common place for the meeting of 
minds, whose intentions, beliefs, desires, feelings are expressed in bodily 
demeanor and behavior. (RE, 38, 41, as cited in Shusterman, 2008, p. 145) 
Unreliable as retrospection might be, it is precious in the context of embodied cognition 
and social inclusion. Attention being a bodily disposition, it can be strengthened as 
muscularity of thought, projecting outward because greater somatic self-consciousness 
helps us monitor those bodily movements which are unnecessary, inelegant, or otherwise 
maladaptive. Insofar as clothing is concerned James ranks it highly, thereby implying that 
the sartorial aesthetic may be more important than body image. A person has as many 
social selves as there are people who know her and carry her image in imagination (e.g., 
the athletic spouse, the modish parent, the savvy banker, the green thumb, &c.) making 
the ability to project varying body images significant in supporting versatile social life 
(Shusterman, 2008, p. 146). Improved bodily awareness is a tool in recognizing emotions 
and in facilitating deliberation because it highlights some options and eliminates those 
that hinder embodied reasonableness. The following are some practical suggestions: 
1. Note that compared to the sharp throb of a toothache or a pin prick which are 
substantive and can be named, there are the subtly perceived sensations like a 
slight tilt of my head, a faint air of expectancy, a relaxed hip, adjustment in facial 
muscle tone. 
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2. Note that focusing is difficult to do in the context of “the beating of heart and 
arteries, breathing, and pervasive body pains,” and it may be impossible to single 
out “the contraction of the diaphragm, expansion of the lungs, shortening of 
certain muscles, and rotation of certain joints.” 
a.  Develop attention, discrimination, and perception by applying the key 
principles of change and interest. Change is best explained in the paradoxical 
instruction that in order to remain transfixed on an object of thought, change a 
factor, e.g. vantage point. Interest is applied by selecting an object of focus 
that can sustain one’s attention. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 160) 
b. Sustained attention. Ask a variety of  “new questions about the object”; “roll it 
over and over incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in 
turn.” Take breathing55 as an example.  
i. Is the breath deep or shallow, quick or slow? 
ii. Is the breath felt more in the chest or diaphragm? 
                                                 
55
 Breathing is a process linking the automatic and reflective parts of the brain and 
resulting in stress reduction. Inhaling activates the sympathetic nervous system and 
exhaling the parasympathetic, the latter accompanied by a decelerated heart rate inversely 
proportionate to parasympathetic activity. Rule of thumb: Increasing parasympathetic 
activity lowers one’s overall level of stress (Wise, 2009, p. 178). 
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iii. What does it feel like from the mouth or through the nostrils? 
iv. Is breathing easier from the moth or through the nostrils? 
Extend time period on subsequent occasion. Make finer discriminations each 
time. (Shusterman, 2008, pp. 161-2) 
c. Body scan. Systematically scan the body by subdividing it in awareness, 
directing the focused attention to one part first before shifting attention to   
another. Proprioceptively get a sense of ourselves as we stay still, typically 
with eyes shut or partially shut, breathing
56
. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 162) 
d. Preperception Prepare to discriminate a feeling by imagining where on one’s 
body the perception of it is situated. Even if the feeling may be nameless, the 
perception of it can stand improvement. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164) 
e. Linguistic tag. This stands for making a very vague feeling less difficult to 
distinguish by selecting a word with which to link it. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 
164) 
 The sensitive engagement described in the examples above highlights the 
                                                 
56
 Interoception is meant “to open one’s self up to emotion,” tapping into one’s somatic 
sense to render the self vulnerable by turning the scan inward onto the perception of 
internal body organs and internal bodily state. One gets better at this with practice 
(Siegel, 2010, p. 112). 
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transactive aspect of the body and the contribution of sensorimotor schemata to concept 
formation, embodied cognition, and proprioception. Beautiful thinking potentially comes 
about by educating our attentiveness to the nature of an embodied experience (Stokas, 
2010, p. 36). In the context of teaching and learning, Macintyre Latta and Buck (2008) 
describe a mindful embodiment and a receptivity oriented towards interpersonal and 
intrapersonal transactions involving teacher, student, and inquiry, to bring about 
becoming more receptive, and thereby gaining awareness and access to the student’s 
thinking (i.e. inner attention). “A teacher seeks ways to draw students into the depth and 
complexity of subject matter. . . [is sensitive to] the movement of thinking, the interplay 
of students’ thoughts, images, emotions, and focuses on recognizing pre-determined 
results and ways of responding” (Dewey, 1904, as cited in Macintyre Latta & Buck, 
2008, p. 325). Further putting this in context, Satina and Hultgren (2001) propose that 
embodiment become the central concern in inquiry. Knowledge of one’s body must be 
foregrounded for the self to be a successful learner.  
 One of the areas of ethical inquiry in which such embodied pedagogy is 
particularly important is inquiry into gender. A pedagogy of embodiment means, among 
other things, learning to accept one’s own body; yet, defying gendered assumptions that 
are iconic can be a formidable challenge for the teacher when they are usually deeply 
embedded in the culture. Like art and music, gender can be ambiguous because it is not a 
stable identity but rather “a stylized representation of acts” (Butler, 1990a, p. 140, as 
cited in Sullivan, 2000, p. 31) How can we reinvent our gendered habits for new ones? 
Promoting positive, holistic, and meaningful experiences of bodily development includes 
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having students lift the veil from lived experience. This requires students to have 
opportunities for critical reflection about the culturally embedded ways gender proscribes 
certain projects. One method of doing is “autobiographical writing,” in which the body of 
the young person, “who says ‘I’ [is] a site and source of written subjectivity, investing 
that individual body with the shifting ethics of a political, racial, and sexual 
consciousness” (Perrault, 1995, p. 2, as cited in Satina and Hultgren, 2001, p.532). As 
supplement to autobiographical writing, Fleckenstein (2003) specifies the body 
biography, an approach to somatic literacy comprising life-sized outlines of the human 
figure populated with images and words representing students’ perceptions of, in this 
case, autobiography (Fleckenstien, 2003, p. 113; Smagorinsky, 2008, p. 196). It is an 
immersive strategy to access personal experience. Originally conceived as a multimedia 
application of Rosenblatt’s transactive approach, it utilizes polyscopic57 literacy and 
spatial geographies
58
 in conjunction with lateral literacy, the latter comprising splintered 
narratives that disrupt notions of linear autobiography and gendered identity to bring 
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 From polyscope, an image multiplying device made of glass. Polyscopic literacy 
exposes the limits of our perceptions and offers multiple alternatives by accessing 
worldviews that are not universally shared (Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 84) 
58
 Spatial geography pertains to the mapping out of surveillance, hierarchy, gender, and 
other variables impinging on differentiation and marginalization within the confines of a 
given locale (Gordon & Lahelma, 1996). 
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about  transformation (Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 113). Students problematize aspects of 
differentiation and marginalization, carry out their inquiry on outsize sheets of paper, and 
subsequently put them up in the manner of an art gallery to display, critique, and discuss 
(see novella).  
Using the Arts to Educate and to Utilize the Emotions in Ethical Inquiry 
As beings that must thrive in the social environment where emotions are 
constructed, critical inquiry is our way to address its inherent instability. Inquiry as a 
recursive process mimics the experiential flow. It tests our cognitive and emotive abilities 
in being perceptive and sensitive to the uniqueness of situations and their ramifications. 
Just as thinking may be directed upon itself in critical and reconstructive metacognitive 
reflection, so too, in a process of inquiry, many autonomic and habitual emotional 
responses become the object of cognitive appraisal and reconstruction. Indeed, emotions 
of frustration or yearning are often the first indications that other, non-adaptive habits of 
emotional response have become inhibited by an incompatible situation, such that the 
regular rhythm of emotion is disturbed. To speak of “educating the emotions,” is to draw 
attention to the human capacity for emotional appraisal of the meaning of situations, and 
to exercise that capacity in ways that make it more sensitive, more nuanced, less biased, 
less given to schematic inertia, and a guide to more intelligent behavior – intelligent, 
meaning conducive of that which has been critically evaluated as valuable.  
Because it is from the ability of humans to reach exceptional emotional heights 
and depths that literature, music, and the arts are created (Zeki, 2009, p.2) one of the most 
effective pedagogical strategies for educating the emotions is encountering art. Painting 
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and sculpture, music, and film provide us with an important means to understand our 
lived experience, by holding up a mirror to ourselves, engaging emotion, and refining the 
judgments we make, “by critically representing [our] image or action” (Shusterman, 
2000, p. 163). Our emotional response to art enlivens our moral imagination by 
exercising reason, sympathy, and solidarity in virtual relationships with those who are at 
the periphery of our lives. “Works of art are means by which we enter, through 
imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relationship and 
participation than our own” (Dewey, 1934, p. 333). Espoused by Greene (see Chapter 
Two), painting, literature, and music have an innate ambiguity making them ideal for 
inquiry because the work of art is a world of its own making and initial encounters can be 
ineffable, making one feel some discomfort. Moments profoundly felt, cherished, and 
understood to be formative in a person’s experience of growth are those that are often 
kept private and have the nature of what we term aesthetic (De Bolla, 2001, p. 14). 
Dewey pointed out that the intimate nature of emotion is manifested when we attend to 
the unfolding of a plot (1934, p. 42). We experience it privately, yet it bears a binding 
force between my community and me (De Bolla, 2001, p. 15). The emotional responses 
are typically muted compared with the real thing, but at every level—physiological, 
neurological, psychological—the emotions are real, not pretend (Bloom, 2010). The 
safety garnered from our powers of control over art promotes reflection on the 
experiences themselves, providing cognitive pleasures from learning about our own 
emotional capacities. Furthermore, our ability to endure certain emotional extremes leads 
to an empowering self-knowledge regarding those capacities. For many of us, our richest 
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aesthetic experiences come from encounters with painful art since one is seldom as fully 
engaged intellectually, perceptually, and affectively as when experiencing unsettling 
emotional responses to art. Few, if any, pleasurable experiences match the intensity of 
our reactions to perturbing art. Hence, paradoxical sounding as it may be, it is not hard to 
see suffering as its own reward. Having said that, the reasons we feed imagination with 
painful experiences are complex, but that we would rather have them in response to art 
rather than real life makes sense (Smuts, 2005, p.72). Art makes our emotions available 
and intelligible to us and in the process, puts moral imagination and reason to work, 
directing our feelings accordingly. The profound significance of art as moral enterprise is 
especially cogent when it acquaints and familiarizes us with the Other, the socially 
marginalized, and invisible. It should in turn move us to act towards them with love and 
compassion when we encounter persons like them in the flesh. The ambiguity of meaning 
in works of art and the human ability to self-fictionalize recommend the use of art in 
ethical inquiry. Fictionalizing ourselves when we enter an imagined world, we experience 
emotions for others in the fictional world. We allow our emotions to mediate a change 
within us. In an empirical study, Djikic, Oatley, Zoeterman, & Petersen (2009) collected 
evidence that simulation, identification, and self-implication with narrative fiction 
influences cognitive and emotional re-schematization on a variety of social ability 
measures, including those relating to one’s self. They conclude “it seems reasonable to 
assume that this process can casually lead to a gradual change of oneself toward a better 
understanding of others as well” (p. 28).  
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Inquiry can accommodate a level of experimentation because it deals with 
evolving parts of experience, such as habits, interests, and desires where ends can be 
defined provisionally. Because we live forward in time, we must address changing 
circumstances if we are to act intelligently, exercising foresight and experimental 
problem solving in order to continue to flourish as human beings (Hickman, 1999, p. 
235). For example, the Victorian novelist George Eliot justified her experimental 
approach to life and her faith in humanity by affirming that her accomplishments and 
aspirations were grounded in experience and the nature of humans as relational beings, a 
requirement of which is to put aside self-centeredness; to free ourselves of religion, and 
to regulate the emotions and imagination by thought and fellow feeling (Gatens, 2009, p. 
81).  
Dewey’s view of the arts as instruments of good derives from his belief in their 
moral potency “resid[ing] in its imaginative vision of new possibilities transcending 
existing customs and moral traditions [emphasis added]” (Dewey, LW 10:349-51, as 
cited in Rockefeller, 1991, p. 415). However, art like philosophy requires the assistance 
of philosophical explanation to be understood (see Chapter Three). About art’s 
impenetrability, Danto (2003) has written the following: 
People have to be brought to understand the work, and then they will see the way 
in which it is excellent. . . . For it makes clear that artistic goodness often requires 
explanation if it is to be appreciated, something that Hume understood 
completely. “In many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts,” Hume 
writes in Section One of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “it is 
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requisite to employ reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false 
relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection” [emphasis added]. 
(p. 35). 
Danto also repudiates any facile connection between goodness and beauty in a 
work of art precisely because there is a category of artistic representations that, in its 
avowed repulsiveness and egregiousness, makes a play for the French taste / disgust 
binary (gout/dégoût) (p. 52). Take as an example one of the several self-portraits by Frida 
Kahlo, The Broken Column (Lomas, 1993, plate 4), or Kiki Smith’s sculpture Tale 
(Engberg, 2005, figure 47). Rather than beautiful, each is an example of sublime art, an 
assault on imagination with an impact directly proportional to the sublimity of the 
experience (Nead, 1992, p. 28). The perception of pain and fear these works compel 
forces recognition of the limits of reason (Nead, 1992, p. 26) and meaning is called into 
question and challenged (Nead, 1992, p. 32). “In its focus on the viewing subject, the 
discourse of the sublime can be seen, more generally, as a discourse on the subject and 
what is at stake in the sublime is precisely the ‘loss of power of human agency’” 
[emphasis added] (De Bolla, 1989 p. 37, as cited in Nead, 1992, p. 29). In its excess, the 
art is literally obscene, “a disturbing category, for in its promise of form without limit it 
shatters the form/matter duality and reminds us of the social nature of all categories and 
boundaries. Our goal is to trigger aversion to misogynistic, homophobic, xenophobic, and 
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racist norms (Nelson, 2011, loc. 220-223). 
59
 The postmodern sublime (see Nead, 1993, 
p. 29) is an aesthetic category for which meaning---however provisional---can be 
constructed because we establish an appreciation for a work of art when it has yielded 
insights on things whose meaning for us was previously non-existent or out of reach. We 
exercise a Deweyan orientation regarding art objects as part and parcel with ordinary 
experience, appreciating art even as it transforms life, when we are able to consider “what 
the product does with and in experience,” and take into account “the experiential 
conditions of their origin and the consequences of their appreciation, [so as to obtain] 
their general significance. (Dewey, AE, 1934, LW 10:9, as cited in Westbrook, 1991, p. 
390).  In doing so, we must invest imaginative insight and prior experience into our 
appreciation of a work of art, reaching back into personal history (Greene, 2001, p. 38).  
Furthermore, we must share experiences, worlds, beliefs, and differences relevant to the 
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  Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis (2005) report in a meta-analysis on the effects of 
media violence, indicating that among younger boys, media violence increases the 
likelihood of antisocial, aggressive, or fearful behavior. The contemporary Buddhist 
figure, Thich Nhat Hanh, is against any exposure whatsoever to cruelty and violence, the 
reason being that “meditating” on violence and cruelty does not stir compassion, but has 
rather the opposite effect on arousal, thoughts, and emotions (Nelson, 2011, loc. 175-78). 
In fact, the tendency to indifference, rather than feelings of outrage and objection to 
injustice, has been described as “troubling” (Sokol, 2005). In Sokol’s words: “A viewer’s 
moral compass may be deranged by each pointless stab in the head” (p. 2). 
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aesthetic experience with others (De Bolla, 2001, p. 15). On the one hand, the effort 
necessary to derive significant meaning from a significant work of art is no less than that 
of the artist herself (Westbrook, 1991, p. 395). Yet, on the other hand, that process of 
deriving meaning is the same we employ in working to understand and negotiate our 
everyday, ordinary experience.  
Among the kinds of meaning we derive from learning to appreciate art is insight 
into the destructive ways in which the body avenges itself on us in retaliation for our 
neglect of it. Even if suffering and cruelty are confined to the page or the gallery wall, 
they typify experiences of moral complexity and should help us make inroads into 
understanding what motivates us to cause suffering to others and to ourselves. (Nelson, 
2011, loc. 238-241/pp. 12-13). Why are we at turns denying ourselves food (inhibition), 
then gorging on it (compulsion), or fragmenting our bodies (idealization), and in other 
instances, inviting servitude (sadism) (Copjec, 2000, pp. 35-6)? When do our life-giving 
pursuits of sex and food become invidious activities? The replenishment activities of 
ingesting food (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 150) are, like dancing, singing, and music making, 
ways that “settle into the inner contours and recesses of our bodies—a secret topography 
folded away and hidden even from ourselves” (Krueger, 2008, p. 608).  This makes it 
imperative, for purposes of ethical inquiry, to find ways of becoming aware of these 
hidden experiences; and learning to understand certain art objects can help to broaden, 
reinvent, demolish, or signal such hidden aspects of reality to us (Nelson, 2011, loc. 478-
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85/p. 28)
60
. In appreciating art we are learning “to cultivate intuitive experience: to 
increase our susceptibility to, and awareness of sensory, erotic, emotive and other pre-
rational experiences (Gregory, 2001, p. 30). This is exceedingly important because moral 
complexity “more often is found by . . . getting intimate with discomfort, and developing 
an appetite for nuance (Nelson, 2011, loc. 265-72/p. 13). 
In this regard, the uses of art in ethical inquiry are not limited to artistic works 
with representational or narrative structure. For instance, we have emotional stirrings 
when we listen to music in a number of ways: in the manner that music mimics our pre-
reflective sensorimotor transactions with nature (Johnson, 2007, p. 247); by association 
with prior musical experience and in perceiving the metrical organization of sound and 
the sense of expectation its patterns create (Levitin, 2006, pp. 108 &192). Walton (1994) 
suggests that we approach the worlds that are in music and permit ourselves to be 
induced to imagine and feel. We can also follow the progressions in a musical plot and 
bear in mind that like experience, the meanings we derive are provisional and subject to 
change (Kapilow, 2008, pp. 2 &70). Critical reflection on our experiences with music can 
make us more fluent in discourse about other kinds of pre-conceptual meaning, such as 
the natural ties we have with other humans predisposing us to learn and understand what 
other humans have to say to us, irrespective of the usual differences in language, culture, 
and history.   
Music listening is a contemplative and receptive process, yet, like the perception 
of visual arts, it also involves active meaning construction that is jointly cognitive-
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 A case in point being our understanding of the gaze. 
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affective, the very nature of musical engagement (Elliott, 2005, pp. 95). Whatever 
intelligence music is capable of facilitating derives from the remarkable "genius for 
ambiguity" at the heart of embodied cognition (Bowman, 2004, p. 12). Like philosophical 
writing, a musical composition can bear meaning beyond itself. Musical engagement 
admits of little distraction, is corporeally and socially implicated in the worlds we inhabit 
as humans, and bears consequences for lived experience (Bowman, 2007, p. 18). Music 
education is extensively concerned with body management, the creation of appropriate 
dispositions and “tastes” (Bowman, 2004), and the construction of identity. Recognizing 
music as a potent means of individual and social influence and control has far reaching 
implications for ethics education, for embodied musical experience generates its own 
form of agency in terms of identity–whether such identity is racial, ethnic, gendered, or 
aesthetically related to musicianship (Bowman, 2007, p. 20).  
The preeminent task fulfilled by music education is that of the educating emotion 
(Reimer, 2004, p. 27). “A wide neglect of artistic education is a neglect in the education 
of feeling…the music we hear--actually form our emotive experience” (Langer, 1962, pp. 
81-82). Langer’s key claim is that the aesthetic qualities of the musical world capture and 
represent the general forms of human feelings (Elliott, 1995, p. 28). Music is also 
representational because it describes many topics, including people, places, and things. 
Mindful embodiment, a keen sense of the “doing and undergoing,” is crucial in this 
project whose objective is instilling better judgment in ethical inquiry. Because of our 
encounters with the “feeling content of music,” we are transformed from one music 
listening event to the next; in “learning” emotions, body-mind is changed (Reimer, 2004, 
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pp. 23 and 25). Music listening is a rich source of self-growth, self-knowledge, and 
enjoyment as it spirals upward in relation to the cognitive challenges inherent in a 
musical work (Elliott, 1995, p. 123). It is an exercise in carrying our emotions to the 
threshold of knowledge by giving expression to our process of self-realization. “To foster 
musical learning is to become more discriminative, widely situated, or musically 
intelligent (Reimer, 2004, p. 25). As meaningful feeling, music has the unparalleled 
capacity to engage us in significant affective experience. To become a competent listener, 
one must develop a refined emotional sense and feel for what is artistically significant in 
the music one listens to. Impressionistic musical knowledge requires cognitive emotions, 
including educated feelings for the original and appropriate in music (Ellott, 1995 p. 98). 
This occurs because musical performers are able to communicate emotions to listeners 
through a traditional acoustical code guiding musical performance and retaining 
influences of both nature and culture (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 225). Musical 
performers encode emotions by associating cues, such as variations of tempo, volume, 
and timbre, with extramusical aspects, such as motion and body language, through 
analogies. In turn, listeners decode (i.e. recognize) the emotions using the same 
probabilistic and redundant cues in order to infer meaning. Each cue is neither necessary 
nor sufficient, but the larger the number of cues used, the more reliable the 
communication
61
 (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 226). An important detail is obtaining a 
performer’s insight into a method of cue utilization because in fact, some performers 
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 Perfect accuracy of communication is not assured (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 227). 
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imagine themselves being embraced by particular emotions in performance. For instance, 
the violist Yuri Bashmet has been quoted suggesting: “Identify with the emotions and the 
notes—fearful as they are—will look after themselves” (Seckerson, 1991, p. 26, as cited 
in Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 224).  
Teachers ought to bestow centrality on music and its potential for emotionally 
laden listening experiences.
62
 Students can attend to the unfolding musical work as an 
emotional/pictorial/ literary narrative and (a) establish its sense of musical stability, (b) 
appreciate how stability is disturbed by means of various musical devices, and (c) reverse 
the process in reconstructing musical stability. Such ‘narrative’ composing and listening 
has unending possibilities (Elliott, 2001, p. 97). As a heuristic process, teachers and 
music students should keep in mind that there is not a single way to listen for all music 
everywhere. Drawing attention to instances of musical expressiveness provides 
opportunities for action projects developing awareness, ability, and sensitivity. Regular 
demonstrations of emotionally vibrant music-making and using ‘emotion words’ and 
emotional analogies helps to focus students’ attention to the emotion-laden aspects of 
patterns in music. 
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 An unfortunate legacy of dualistic thinking has been the false belief that to possess 
musical knowledge, one must be able to verbalize innumerable pieces of information on 
music (Elliott, 1995, p. 75). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the emotions are central to the process of 
inquiry and judgment making in general, and in particular are central to the process of 
ethical inquiry and judgment making – i.e. about matters of moral significance. Because 
emotions indicate valuations, attending to the affective dimension of experience is 
necessary to achieve embodied ethical judgments. I have also argued that it is both 
possible and important to educate the emotions so that they can play a more intelligent 
role in ethical inquiry. This can be done as a part of ethical inquiry – much like critical 
thinking is a tool of ethical inquiry that gets sharpened by its use in episodes of inquiry.   
I have argued further that because the narrative, visual and musical arts are such 
powerful means of encountering, studying, experimenting with, transforming and 
otherwise educating emotions, therefore, appreciative inquiry into art should be a central 
part of the pedagogy of ethics education. In Chapter 5 I will present a high school 
curriculum in which students encounter works of art in the process of conducting ethical 
inquiry into concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality, some of 
the most important ethical dimensions of students’ lives at this age.  
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  Chapter Five: A Curriculum for Ethical Inquiry 
 
The Americans then have not [sic] required to extract their philosophical method from 
books; they have found it in themselves. (De Tocqueville, 1835/2002, p. 513) 
Let us, however, follow the pragmatic rule, and in order to discover the meaning of the 
idea ask for its consequences. (Dewey, 1948, p. 162) 
Great leaps forward occur only when some imaginative genius puts a new interpretation 
on familiar facts. Only the imagination can break through the crust of convention. (Rorty, 
2007, p. 923) 
 
The Adolescent Body 
In preceding chapters, I have described a theory of ethical inquiry comprising 
embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, and emotions as judgments. In line with 
my proposal are arguments for an aesthetic education because the epistemic advantage 
offered by the narrative structure of emotion commends the arts as evaluative media in 
lived experience. Embodied reasonableness emerges from body-mind
 
when cultivated 
through the dynamics of the classroom community of philosophical inquiry. Therefore, I 
believe that Philosophy for Children provides an important means for students to be able 
to reconstruct bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. In the context of 
the Language Arts, I have chosen to be guided by learning theories previously described 
as operationalizing Dewey’s experiential philosophy. They are Rosenblatt’s transactional 
theory of learning, Greene’s aesthetic theory, and Lipman’s pedagogical model of 
philosophical inquiry, i.e. Philosophy for Children (P4C). The blending of their features 
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ought to provide the means for flexible habituation in thinking dispositions, including 
sensitivity to context and interrogating values and beliefs, for which learning to make 
good ethical judgments is our objective.  
In this chapter, I present the theoretical underpinnings for a high school 
curriculum in ethical inquiry through encounters with works of art. In the process, 
students grapple with concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality 
-- some of the most important ethical dimensions of students’ lives at this age and which 
bear import for the future conduct of their lives. Some historical background is in order 
because sexual and other bodily experiences and practices have been -- and continue to 
be -- subjected to scientific, moral, and religious problematizing, and categorized in 
relation to illness and sin. Public health concerns and Darwin’s theories of evolution and 
natural selection have contributed to sex becoming a scientific interest in medicine and 
the social sciences. Sexual behavior has been conceptualized throughout the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries as the outcome of natural, biological drives associated with the fulfillment of 
essential human reproductive instincts, determining sexual normalcy and deviancy 
(Mottier, 2008, p. 32). An important feature of this biological model was the 
biologization of gender difference, a departure from the ‘one-sex model’ with femaleness 
as inferior derivation of maleness. Henceforth, females and males have come to be 
viewed as biologically different creatures justifying their assignment to different social 
roles, sexual behavior, and needs (Mottier, 2008, p. 34). The biological model of 
sexuality includes the assumption that only heterosexual acts and desires constitute 
‘natural’ sexual behavior, thus lending heterosexuality normativity. The term 
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‘heterosexual’s’ earliest known appearance is recorded in the 1892-published medical 
journal defining as perverse any form of sexual activity for recreational rather than 
procreative purposes. In the biological model, homosexuals are neither sinners nor 
criminals, but rather invalids in need of a cure (Mottier, 2008, p. 39). Challenges to the 
biological model are traced most prominently to Foucault’s watershed History of 
Sexuality: an Introduction, urging a view of gender and sexuality as historically and 
culturally situated domains of experience, under the influence of power in social 
relations. In line with this view, sexuality and sexual identities are social and political 
constructs (Mottier, 2008, p. 47).  
The collective influence of such cultural activity makes the study of art a 
potentially powerful way to make adolescents better aware of cultural meanings 
associated with the body and sexuality.  Cornell (1995) rightly describes sex as the 
“emotionally fraught sphere of life” (p. 3):  
Sex is so basic to who we are that when we imagine ourselves, sex is always 
already in the picture.  . . . Sex and sexuality are unique and formative to human 
personality and should be treated as such. . . . (p. 6) Sex is the internalized identity 
(p. 7).  
In her defense of the private and the imaginary (e.g. self-image), Cornell argues from the 
standpoint of equality in public life and politics. Asserting that sex, sexuality, and gender 
are areas in which feminists have worked hard to garner adequate attention and serious 
consideration in law and in political philosophy, Cornell explains that despite making 
significant inroads, legal analysis of gender equality is often understood as gender 
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hierarchy. In fact, men, as well as women, have been harassed and violated.
63
 Therefore, 
sex, gender, and sexual difference are necessarily implicated in any construction of right 
and wrong, as it is perfectly possible for a [young] woman to take up the place of the 
masculine, and conversely, a [young] man to be placed on the side of the feminine 
(Cornell, 1995, p. 25). As virtually every adolescent has experienced first-hand, 
devaluation of one’s gender curtails freedom by imposing standards of behavior not in 
accord with the recognition of equal personhood (p. 172). She writes: 
To make the argument that the primary good of self-respect should be understood 
as part of the imaginary domain, we need to develop . . . insight into the tragic toll 
of the imposition of shame on person hood, and to . . . foreground self-respect as 
formative to the equivalent chance to become a person. I will also defend the 
proposition that we should give standing to gays and lesbians who suffer sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment. (Cornell, 1995, p. 172) 
Sexuality and its understanding is a long process beginning at age three (Ryan and 
Futterman, 1998, n.p., as cited in Huegel, 2011, p. 16), progressing to differentiation 
throughout childhood and adolescence. Entering puberty happens at least two years 
earlier than the previous generation, meaning youths are physically ready for sex earlier, 
but not emotionally nor cognitively (Ponton, 2000, p. 3). Visually with emerging 
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 Cornell claims that “gender” as the legal term of analysis rather than sex, has “put gays 
and lesbians outside the reach of discrimination law” (p. 6).  
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sexuality, we witness the rise of extreme stereotypes: waiflike females, hypermasculine 
males, and androgynous teens (Ponton, 2000, p. 3). 
Among GLBTQ youth, homosexual attraction for males likely occurs at age 9 and 
for females age 10, culminating in self-identification at 16 (Ryan and Futterman, 1998, 
n.p., as cited in Huegel, 2011, p. 17). Self-identification occurs in the following stages: 
(1) sensitization, i.e. pervasiveness of feelings of difference and isolation, (2) 
bewilderment, i.e. conflictual feelings of same-sex attraction in opposition to hetero-
normative beliefs, (3) equilibrium, i.e. accepting oneself as GLBTQ, and (4) self-
affirmation, a seamless transformation wherein sexual identity permeates every part of 
one’s life. One can only begin to imagine the turbulence of feeling “scared, isolated, 
depressed, angry, or just plain worn out” (Huegel, 2011, p. 35) accompanying the lifelong 
process. 
As previously noted, feeling
64
 is a matrix of ideas from whence flows the fusion 
of meaning and knowledge we have come to know as experience (Alexander, 1987, p. 
29). Emotion in its synoptic phase of intense feeling gives rise to the creative imagination 
(Alexander, 1987, p. 35). In Dewey’s theory of emotion, the role of feeling is one that is 
expository (Alexander, 1987, p. 37) hence discursive meaning is obtained through a sense 
or tacit awareness of context (Alexander, 1987, pp. 136-137). In my introduction, 
Overview of a Theory of Ethical Inquiry, I set out to draw attention to the adolescent’s 
heightened ability for higher order thinking as “a basis for aesthetic analysis within 
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 Including the erotic and sexual. 
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certain limits, for conscious attention to the best modes of communicating certain ideas, 
and of arousing certain emotions . . . [emphasis added]”. 65 (Dewey, 1899/1966, p. 280) 
Adolescence is the time of life in which our bodies become fully capable of sexual 
feeling, and our personhood becomes invested with sexual meaning. The intense, 
seemingly exaggerated emotional lives of adolescents are too often taken to be obstacles 
to their learning; however, in the context of embodied reasonableness, episodes of intense 
emotion characteristic of this time of life are utilized as rich resources for meaning and 
for judgment. 
Pedagogies like Rosenblatt’s reader response, Greene’s espousal of wide-
awakeness, and Lipman’s instilment of problematizing, enlist the critical participation of 
student-viewer and student-listener. This kind of learning can be transformational 
because they are premised on an “ethics of attention,”66 in which the works of art or 
music issue invitations to participate in a conative-affective way with the human strivings 
represented in them. Hence, the work of art in question must necessarily elicit a strong 
emotional response in order to help us negotiate the changed landscape of aesthetic 
appreciation, a landscape of “the exaggerated and distorted human form” (Kandel, 2012, 
pp. 107-108). 
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 See Introduction, p. 25 
66
 The ethics of attention are portrayed in Klimt’s Schubert at the Piano. See Kandel, 
2012, p. 107. 
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Components of an Aesthetic Pedagogy 
As I have argued in earlier chapters, reaching sound judgment brings confused 
circumstances into harmonious or efficacious reconstruction and is a lived experience of 
the body-mind, one following a narrative process where the power of the arts can be 
influential both in the process of awakening young people to morally salient dimensions 
of their own experiences, and also in practicing judgment making. According to Thiele 
(2006), exercising good judgment is a difficult task, it is in great demand, and it is in 
invested with a narrative structure (pp. viii-x). This is partly because human judgment 
takes place bodily below the threshold of awareness, while attending to facts, a coherent 
narrative, and meaningful patterns (Thiele, 2006, p. x). Harking back to forms that are 
aesthetic and consummatory, Dewey (1993) writes that judgment is “a sense of respective 
or proportionate values,” (p. 106, as cited in Thiele, 2006, p. 36), the practical ability to 
transform the disharmonious to harmony, move thought to action, and against which 
there is no higher ideal. It is the linchpin of Dewey’s pedagogy:  
The child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised 
in forming and testing judgment. He must have an opportunity to select for 
himself, and then to attempt to put his own selections into execution that he may 
submit them to the only final test, that of action. (Dewey, 1993, p. 108, as cited in 
Thiele, 2006, p. 37)  
Judgment does not result from instruction, but rather is the outcome of learning 
how to think and how to feel, additionally enriched by insight into the teacher’s 
embodied pedagogy (Thiele, 2006, p. 107).  Therefore, the primary considerations in 
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respect of teaching ethical inquiry can be reiterated under the criterion of embodied 
reasonableness, a point made by Dewey himself in The Resurrection of the Body, his 
introduction to a book by F.M. Alexander (Alexander, 1995, p. 174).
67
  Dewey states that 
the serious neglect of our sensorimotor awareness is due in large measure to the absence 
of criteria by which an appropriate educational plan might be judged, of which only two 
are of concern here: 1) concern for a curriculum that addresses mind and body as a unity 
and 2) concern for the reeducation of the whole person, a process of continuous striving 
towards ontological unity and harmony (Shusterman, 2008, p. 185). There is perhaps no 
other discipline that combines sensorimotor awareness with the exercise of critical 
inquiry, and additionally, the awareness of concepts and issues of deep human meaning, 
as intricately as the discipline of aesthetics. This makes aesthetics an ideal vehicle for a 
pedagogy of ethical inquiry. 
 One important component of a pedagogy that utilizes aesthetic experience is that 
students not only understand the meaning of embodiment encapsulated in Dewey’s term, 
body-mind, but that they experience their own minds-in-their-bodies and bodies-in-their-
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 The widely known Alexander Technique is an embodied educational practice and body 
therapeutic, originating in close collaborative work between its progenitor, F.M. 
Alexander and John Dewey. Central to it is the inseparability of posture, attitude, and 
movement; of thought, feeling, and gesture for pre-discursive corporeal development 
requisite to aesthetic experience  (De Alcantara, 1997, p. 275, as cited in Bowman, 2007, 
p. 11; Jay, 2002, p. 57). 
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minds. Turp (2000) has written that “bodymind unity implies that physical and verbal 
phenomena are simply coexisting facets of the one thinking, feeling, imagining embodied 
whole person” (p. 210, as cited in Lussier-Ley, 2010, p. 203). As teachers we should be 
encouraging attention and development of all the senses, representing the full measure of 
embodiment, one that is aesthetically pleasing and vital to growth in associated living. 
Reasonableness, on Dewey’s account is “in fact a quality of an effective relationship 
among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire. It signifies the order, perspective, 
and proportion achieved during deliberation” (Dewey, 1922/1983, p. 135, as cited in 
Garrison, 1997, p. 64).  This experience may be prompted by inviting students to closely 
examine a work of visual art.  Rather than just focusing on symbolic aspects of the piece, 
characteristic of the disembodied, iconographic, or disinterested approach
68
, the 
embodied aesthetic approach to art appreciation involves multi-sensory and subliminal 
responses. Seeing is a transaction, a “mating with form,” involving a unified engagement 
undertaken by body-mind, making aesthetic experience, one that is consummatory.  
 Suppose that all forms are, while they are perceived as pure form by the mind-  
 body, simultaneously perceived and enjoyed as images by the body-mind. . . I do  
 not mean that the body translates form, abstractly perceived, into pictures;  
 rather, that all form addresses itself no less to the body than the mind, the  
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 Maclagen (2001) gives the origins of the disembodied view as the Platonic conflict 
between intellectual and sensuous apprehension, the embodied view as Merleau-Ponty’s 
(p. 37). 
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 former perceiving it by virtue of its own formalizing tendencies and uniting with  
it. The body mates with forms no less than the mind does [emphasis added]. 
(Sewell, 1971, p. 38, as cited in Maclagen, 2001, p. 38) 
In the history of art in the sixteenth century Renaissance, embodied seeing in painting 
comes about through the method of geometric or artificial perspective providing for the 
inclusion of a corporeal subject in the visual field, and thereby enabling the spectator to 
position himself within the frame (Crary, 1987, p. 1).  In regard to having a certain 
perspective, consider the difference between viewing a landscape on canvas and seeing 
the actual place, which is its basis. Inherent in the artwork is concision invested with 
meaning. The concepts we form from aesthetic experience are potentially deeper and 
more textured. When our bodily nature informs our perception of a work of art and its 
aesthetic qualities, we gain insight through embodied reasonableness.  
 In the following example, we find a description of two works of art
69
 accounting for 
the embodied experience of the artist in recreating several female subjects’ counterpart 
experience. Note the body-based semantics constituting an instance of constructive and 
transformative thinking. 
Lived dailiness as well as lived bodiliness – everyday social/public life and 
private bodily/emotional life – constitute the reality of (the artist) Segal's 
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 For better understanding and appreciation, the art referenced in the example provided 
i.e. Nude on Couch (on her back) and Rush Hour, may be viewed in the George Segal 
Collection, Montclair State University, New Jersey.  
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memorable figures. In some works, such as Nude on Couch (on her back), 1985, 
the privately lived body is exposed. Clothes are cast off as beside the erotic point. 
The figure is literally in touch with her body ego. More frequently, the clothed 
body appears. But sometimes its nakedness is suggested, particularly in the case 
of women, proverbially more in touch with their bodies than men. Thus, in Rush 
Hour, the full breast of one of the women presses through her coat, suggesting her 
private reality – and the fullness of her being. She is no longer just another person 
rushing to work – a sort of animated robot moving briskly along – but 
unexpectedly vital: an organic body pressing for expression, her breast 
emotionally communicative as her clothing and silence – . . . however 
unwittingly, as participant observers of the sculpture. Segal's acute awareness of 
the "underlying" reality of the body, threatening to break through the boundary of 
clothing that separates secretive private from every day public existence, confirms 
his awareness of human complexity. One senses the animal body beneath the 
social façade of his figures, an ironical reminder of Aristotle's idea that human 
beings are social animals. Segal invariably evokes the unknown private person 
inhabiting a body while describing known public/social reality, which is more 
readily observed. . . . Segal's figures bridge the difference between being and 
behaving, making their reality unusually consummate
70
 [emphasis added]. 
(Kuspit, 2008, p. 5)  
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 The use of the word consummate coincides with Dewey’s consummatory meaning. 
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We seem to be feeling our way in the labyrinth of a preconscious and unconscious 
world of feelings. It is a highly ambivalent sensation, at once all too chaotic and 
exalted for Enlightenment reason. There is an underdetermined aspect
71
 
[emphasis added]. (Kuspit, 1993, p. 117, as cited in Maclagen, 2001, pp. 37-40)  
 Inviting adolescent students to experience and to inquire into such responses is an 
important aspect of any aesthetic pedagogy, but it has particular importance for an 
aesthetic pedagogy focused on ethical issues related to sexuality and other kinds of 
embodied experience.  For that purpose, works of art must be selected for the ethical 
meanings they may convey – both cultural-historical and radical-possible – relevant to 
those issues.  This is another vital component of this pedagogy.  A work of art conveys 
conceptual and somatic meaning in a triadic process of aesthetic symbiosis. In Cezanne’s 
Doubt, Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964) beautifully wrote that the relationship is one that 
affects and bestows benefits, effecting change in all that partake of the work of art: 
It is not enough for a painter like Cezanne, an artist, or a philosopher, to create and 
express an idea; they must also awaken the experiences which will make their idea 
take root in the consciousness of others. If a work is successful, it has the strange 
power of being self-teaching. The reader or spectator, by following the clues of the 
book or painting, by establishing the concurring points of internal evidence and 
being brought up short when straying too far to the left or right, guided by the 
confused clarity of style, will in the end find what was intended to be 
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 This metaphor stands for the aesthetic, the felt sense, or meaning. 
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communicated. The painter can do no more than construct an image; he must wait 
for this image to come to life for other people. When it does, the work of art will 
have united these separate lives; it will no longer exist in only one of them like a 
stubborn dream or a persistent delirium, nor will it exist only in space as a colored 
piece of canvas. It will dwell undivided in several minds, with a claim on every 
possible mind like a perennial acquisition. (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/1964, pp. 19-20) 
 One of the most important – both culturally and personally significant – kinds of 
meaning students will encounter in works of art related to the human body is the ‘gaze’ – 
the perspective from which one is “invited” to observe a work of art, typically that of the 
artist.  According to Paechter (1998), the concept of the ‘gaze’ in art is particularly 
important in the construction and objectification of the Other, as it lays bare a power 
differential whose asymmetry is internalized as a constraining force (pp. 9-10). It 
indicates “the triple bind,” a situation confronting contemporary young women [and 
young men] requiring them “to please . . . , to succeed . . . , and to make it all seem 
effortless . . .  or to be perpetually hot and sexually available . . . creat[ing] panic and 
depression . . . and[/or] tragedy” (Hinshaw, 2009, p. 90). Females and males need not do 
it all. Rather, they should seek to be in charge of what to choose to do and not be made to 
feel embarrassed or ashamed by being different (Shaffer & Gordon, 2005, p. 127).  
 The gaze enforces culture’s prescriptions for the appropriate body and wields a far-
reaching power. Holding as true a certain worldview provides a context for 
meaningfulness and self-worth. Thinness for females is only one manifestation of a 
worldview where standards are extreme, unattainable, and narrowly defined, leading to 
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shame and self-loathing. Primarily as artistic concept, the gaze in paintings by Degas has 
been described as intrusive, erotic, and voyeuristic (Massey, 1994, n.p., as cited in 
Paechter, 1998, p. 10). On the other hand, Cassatt’s paintings have “none of the 
voyeuristic gaze of those women washing themselves made by Degas” (Pollock, 1998, 
pp. 88-89, as cited in Paechter, 1998, p. 10). According to Paechter (1998), who endorses 
the study of past artistic tradition’s depiction of the human body, “The construction of 
women both as embodied, non-rational beings and as objects of the supposedly 
dispassionate power-relation of the gaze has important ramifications for the way girls and 
women [and boys and men] are able to function in educational institutions (Paechter, 
1998, p. 11).
72
  
As aesthetic symbiosis, music listening is another form of constructive and 
transformative thinking and thus a third important component of aesthetic pedagogy. 
Additionally, it can be regarded as a mode of action because it sometimes requires our 
active participation in the processes of interpreting and constructing auditory input 
against the background of our set of perceptions and insight. Kapilow (2008) believes 
that music is a story told in notes. When we perceive musical performance, we are 
simultaneously experiencing a multidimensional thought generator. Higher order 
thinking, such as concept-formation and inquiry, is analogous to the mental acts and 
states that comprise listening to music. Aesthetic properties are respondent-dependent. 
They may inhere in the musical work, but they must be experienced as sound, in order to 
attain meaning. There is dialogue occurring between the listener, who is engaged with the 
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music as it plays out, demanding judgment, measurement, discrimination, and memory 
(Morrison, p. 78 & p. 86).  In this regard, Lipman’s (2000) characterization of the 
complexity of higher-order thinking could be used to describe higher-order listening, 
substituting “listening” for “thinking” as the following description demonstrates:  
Some thinking [listening] is criterion-governed and some is governed by values that 
flood the entire context in which the thinking [listening] takes place. Some thinking 
[listening] moves smoothly and routinely . . .; some ranges at will . . .with the result 
that we see one kind of thinking [listening] as linear and explicative and the other 
as inventive and expansive. Some thinking [listening] seems to be purely  
computational; some seems conjectural, hypothetical, and imaginative. Some 
thinking [listening] is a mere collection of thoughts that are pressed together 
mechanically. . . ; in other cases, the thoughts are related to one another organically, 
each assuming a distinctive role but cooperating with the others in the overall 
division of labor to give us a more complete picture. Some thinking [listening] is 
quantitative, some qualitative; some expository, some narrative. (pp. 195-196, as 
cited in Morrison, 2009, pp. 87).  
 The input of a student’s personal experience is paramount in transactional learning. 
However, in this formulation we issue one caveat and that is for the reader-student to 
exercise a responsibility in honoring the narrative and its authorial agency, as outgrowths 
of personhood, and not mere constructs (Flynn, 2007, p. 55). Believing firmly that 
literary texts are tools in improving students’ lives, we follow Rosenblatt in her directive 
to name and question our values “because the implied moral attitudes and unvoiced 
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systems of social values are reinforced by the persuasiveness of art, [therefore] the 
teacher should bring them out into the open for careful scrutiny…How often have they 
[students, emphasis added] critically considered the ethical criteria implicit in their 
judgments on literature—and incidentally, on life?” (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 8). 
Furthermore, Rosenblatt espouses reflective thinking with a view to appreciating and 
understanding one’s emotional responses. Habituation in certain habits of mind cultivates 
skills in literary judgment. These mental habits, she argues contribute to well-grounded 
insight into lived experience (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 216). Rosenblatt has been especially 
concerned with adolescence and with the fact that through literature young persons could 
harness imaginative experimentation with lived experience, and emotional engagement 
with one’s growing self. Rosenblatt (2005) has written:  
Should not this process of reflection deal with such questions as: What happened, 
not simply in the story, but rather within me as I read the story? What things 
struck me forcibly? What were the “clues’’ in the story that “added up’’ to a 
meaning for me? What puzzled me? What meanings did others see in it—my 
classmates, my teacher, perhaps critics in published comments? Do they defend 
their interpretations by pointing to things in the story that I overlooked? Does this 
help me to see my blind spots? Or did they overlook some things that make my 
interpretation at least equally possible? How can I make this reflection the means 
of arriving at a more complete response to this and other works?  
Raising such questions will inevitably lead to analysis of the work, but the basic 
question will be: What in this book, and in me, caused this response? . . . The 
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primary concern, after all, should not be the counting of different kinds of images 
in Keats’ poem, but the savoring of a particular way of thinking and feeling 
evoked by it. (Rosenblatt, 2005, p. 70) 
Influenced by Dewey, James, and Peirce, who highlighted the transactional nature of our 
relations with people and ethical choices, Rosenblatt’s theory has been recognized as a 
successful response to Dewey’s educational theory based on the organic nature of 
experience. To reiterate, her method begins in the student’s personal experience in a 
process of meaning making (Connell, 2008, p. 104; Flynn, 2007, p. 53).  
Having summarized the theoretical underpinnings of arts-based curricula in 
ethical inquiry, I will present a detailed description of the kinds of works of art – 
including several specific pieces – that may be used in the curriculum I have designed for 
ethical inquiry.  My purpose in describing these works in such detail is to highlight the 
rich philosophical meaning that may become accessible to students in a classroom 
devoted to embodied thinking, and to demonstrate how that meaning is relevant to the 
broad ethical issues that constitute the themes of my curriculum. 
Art, the Body, and Ethical Meaning  
In order to highlight embodied reasonableness, I have proposed a form of 
aesthetic education that is transformative because it pays critical attention to, and seeks to 
address the ethical and social aspects of experience highlighted in specific, notable works 
of art. In the acquisition of insightful propositions about moral life that we consider 
education to be, the capacity for finer perceptual discrimination, the imagination, and 
emotions are better served by fiction, visual art, music, and dance engaging students in a 
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constant process of ethical judgment and helping to habituate our skills in ethical 
judgment. As a primary objective, we are presenting the measure of our ethical concerns 
to shape more aesthetically pleasing lives, the aesthetic being the desired ethical ideal. In 
the private realm, this conveys itself in composing, creating, or shaping one’s life with a 
view to growth, self-realization, and fulfillment, and in public, the aspiration of an 
aesthetically satisfying life for all persons in society (Shusterman, 2000, pp. 237-238)
73
.   
Even if conceptions of body have changed over time, the task still remains for us 
– and for our students - to question both current and longstanding assumptions of how 
persons are viewed and regarded, how we as persons are to be in the world, and how 
seemingly distant others enter into our purview. Djikstra (1986) is concerned that “We 
can dialogue . . . but [not with] those works whose narrative content we privilege or try to 
ignore because they have become cultural icons [and] are allowed to continue to 
disseminate, without serious challenge, their often quite inhumane proposals concerning 
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 Shusterman (2000) notes:  
Kant saw beauty as a symbol of morality; Schiller saw an aesthetic education as a 
means to morality; and Kierkegaard saw an aesthetic attitude to life as an inferior 
alternative to the ethical life. Postmodernism’s ethics of taste is perhaps 
distinctive only in its attempt at really merging the two spheres. . . , so that the 
aesthetic is neither a symbol of, means to or surrogate for an ethic, but rather the 
constitutive substance of one. (p. 330) 
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the nature of human interaction” (p. ix). The key concepts in the following discussion are: 
the nude, body image, and objectification of persons.  
One important function of art in relation to ethics and the human body is that 
artists in nearly every time and place have constructed idealized representations of the 
body that have both reflected and informed social constructions. In conjecturing how 
such aesthetic standards came about, Clark (1956), in The Nude quotes the poet William 
Blake:  
“All forms are Perfect in the Poet’s Mind but these are not abstracted or 
compounded from Nature, but are from the Imagination” . . . [making reference 
to] . . . that peculiar physical type developed in Greece between the years 480 and 
440 B.C., which in varying degrees of intensity and consciousness furnished the 
mind of Western man with a pattern of perfection from the Renaissance until the 
present century. (p. 14) 
It is impossible to exaggerate what this simple-looking proposition meant to the 
men of the Renaissance. To them it was more than a convenient rule: it was the 
foundation of a whole philosophy. (p. 15)  
The muscular male body has had a long aesthetic history marked with the 
exemplifications of adolescent male beauty at its peak, known as puer aeternus, in the 
sculptural figures of kouroi, c. 615-590 B.C.E., (see Fleming, Arts and Ideas, 1974; 
Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 18 & 22). Nude, the kouros is openly displayed in public for 
all to admire, legs in mid-step, mouth slightly agape, radiating kallos (beauty) and charis 
(grace). Arousing desire and yearning for a place where such beauty reigns, the kouroi 
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are esteemed as agalmata, “objects that through their high quality and craftsmanship 
inspire delight in the viewer” (Steiner, 2001, p. 116, as cited in Voss, 2006, pp. 8-9). The 
suggestion of male homosexuality in the Odyssey by Homer, as from 630 B.C.E., leads 
one to believe that in the period there is no condemnation of intimacy between males nor 
is there any reservation among males to comment on one another’s bodily loveliness74 
(Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 18). This notion is often shocking to contemporary adolescent 
males who consume media that idolizes the hyper-masculine body while, at the same 
time, eschewing any suggestions of homoeroticism. 
 A one-sex ideal of the human body emerges from historical records of the Greeks
75
 
through the Renaissance with both men and women in possession of strong erotic 
impulses and vital heat, though less in women, so that an important project of male 
sexual activity is raising feminine levels of pleasure, which is believed to be a 
contributing factor in conception. It is this less intense vital heat in women that 
contributes to the concealed nature of women’s sexual organs. Male bodies are closer to 
perfection as evidenced by clearly visible sexual organs, the result of a very high level of 
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 The Homeric ideal of male beauty tends to be ephebophilic or focused on the love of 
young men. Note also that there are no exclusive homosexuals that appear in any Greek 
epic or myth (Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 20). 
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 The mutually shared level of erotic desire is illustrated by the metaphor of the thrush 
appearing on the occasion of the hanging of twelve unfaithful servant girls, who sleep 
with Penelope’s suitors, as Odysseus’ return is awaited (Fulkerson, 2002, p. 335, p. 339). 
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vital heat. Right through Shakespeare’s time, women were believed to have indiscernible, 
inverted penises, accounting for the transvestite theater, female cross-dressing in 
Shakespeare’s comedies, and homoerotic desire of the period (Belsey, 1993, p. 128). In 
the Odyssey, Odysseus is met on Circe’s island by the god Hermes, who is described as 
ephebe, “in the likeness of a young man with the first down upon his lip, in whom the 
charm of youth is fairest (Od., 10.276ff., Trans. A.T. Murray, as cited in Armstrong 
Percy, 2005, p. 19). As Bordo (1999) suggests, 
[We] need a course in art history. It’s true that in classical art, the naked human 
body was often presented as a messenger of spiritual themes . . . . But the male 
bodies sculpted by the Greeks and Michelangelo were not exactly non-erotic. . . . 
(p. 180)
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 “Calvin Klein had his epiphany, according to one biography. . .: ‘ [Klein]  realized that 
what he was watching was the freedom of a new generation, unashamed, in-the-flesh 
embodiments of Calvin’s ideals: straight-looking, masculine men, with chiseled bodies, 
young Greek gods come to life [emphasis added] (Gaines and Churcher, 1994, n.p.). In 
America . . . only gay culture unashamedly sexualized the lean, fit body that everyone, 
gay and straight, now aspires to. . . Klein knew just the kind of clothing to show that body 
off in too . . .’ Calvin sent his assistants out for several pairs of jeans, including the five-
button Levi’s, and cut them apart to see how they were made. Then he cut the ‘rise,’ or 
area from the waistband to under the groin, much shorter to accentuate the crotch and pull 
the seam up between the buttocks, giving the behind more shape and prominence. The 
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 Understanding contemporary culture’s unhappy obsession with oppressive norms of 
attractive external body appearance (Shusterman, 2009, p. 8.) as deriving, at least in part, 
from origins in the classical world and the oppressed status of the Greek female would be 
an important achievement of adolescent ethical inquiry. Dewey himself made plain his 
reservations about Platonic metaphysics and epistemology that could only have emerged 
from oppression (Garrison, 1997, p. 14) and a culture where masculinity serves as the 
wellspring of absolute beauty (Singer, 1984, p. 77, as cited in Garrison, 1997 p. 13). 
Envisioning in due course a reversal for philosophy, Dewey (1919/1982) writes: “But 
when women who are not mere students of other persons’ philosophy set out to write it, 
we cannot conceive that it will be the same viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the 
standpoint of the different masculine experience of things” (p. 45, as cited in Garrison, 
1997, p. 14). 
 Another function of art in relation to ethics is that many works of art convey the 
notion that selfhood is inextricably body-bound. Brooks (1993) finds this notion 
prevalent in the Odyssey, as when Odysseus, disguised, executes his Ithaka homebound 
plan of attack on Penelope’s hordes, but first nanny Eurykleia recognizes him based on 
the body itself: 
  But the Lord Odysseus 
 Whirled suddenly from the fire to face the dark. 
                                                                                                                                                 
result was instant sex appeal—and a look that Calvin just knew was going to sell.” 
(Gaines and Churcher, 1994, n.p. as cited in Bordo, p. 180-181). 
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 The sacred he had forgotten that. She must not 
 Handle his scarred thigh, or the game was up. 
 But when he bared her lord’s leg, bending near, 
 She knew the groove at once
77
. . . . 
 This was the scar the old nurse recognized; 
 She traced it under her spread hands, then let go, 
 And into the basin fell the lower leg 
 Making the bronze clang, sloshing the water out. 
 Then joy and anguish seized her heart; her eyes 
Filled up with tears; her throat closed, and she whispered, 
 With hand held out to touch his chin: 
  “Oh yes! 
 You are Odysseus! Ah dear child! I could not 
 See you until now – not till I knew 
 My master’s very body with my hands!” 
The moment of recognition is a melodramatic climax, inclusive of a hidden identity and 
latent possibility, a coming out. Recognition in a bodily sign facilitates narrativity of the 
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  There is a break of a hundred lines, a narrative retelling of Odysseus’ wound inflicted 
on his youthful body by a boar’s tusk and healed into a decades-old scar to serve as a 
reminder of that special relationship of protective care from nanny Eurykleia. Afterwards, 
we are flung back to the present ongoing action. 
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body itself (Brooks, 1997, p. 8). Many adolescents tell the story of their bodies, marking 
signs such as scars and muscles; and many take active part in that story by marking their 
own bodies with piercings and tattoos. These narrations individuate the self and facilitate 
creative possibilities at the same time they make the body the most significant aspect of 
selfhood – both of which are consequences calling for ethical inquiry. 
 A third function of art in relation to bodily ethics moves in a direction opposite to 
the second: that many works of art reflect the decline of the body from a prelapsarian 
state when bodily functions, sexuality, and death are natural to life, to a state of 
problematicity, in which one’s own body is regarded as foreign and strange. Concomitant 
with Cartesian dualism--a thinking essence distinct from corporeality—the body is now 
theorized as our foreign body. According to Brooks (1993),  
The body appears alien to the very constructs derived from it. However much it 
may belong to the process of socialization, and preside at the birth of intellectual 
curiosity, it nonetheless often appears to be on the far side of the divide between 
nature and culture, where culture ultimately has no control. (Brooks, 1993, p. 8) 
Narrative in which the body becomes a central preoccupation can be especially 
revelatory of the effort to . . .dramatize ways in which the body . . . how, we 
might say, it embodies meaning. (Brooks, 1993, p. 8) 
Vitruvian man, drawn by Leonardo Da Vinci, is perhaps the best-known 
illustration of the foreignness-to-ourselves concept (see Nead, 1992, plate 4). In it, Greek 
faith in harmonious numbers and geometrical forms, the square and the circle, form the 
basis of ideal human proportions. In an obscure statement embedded in rules for building 
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sacred edifices, Vitruvius states that these buildings should have the proportions of man. 
Clark (1956) asserts that even if this and other aesthetic concepts were invented for the 
male figure, a greater and lasting impact has been on the representation of the female 
body (p. 71, as cited in Nead, 1992, p. 20). In either case, the body in art and architecture 
has lost its individual corporeality and is contained in ideal form, thereby making our 
phenomenal bodies its replicas (Perniola, 1989, p. 239). The depiction of the female 
naked figure symbolizes the transformation of nature’s base matter into culture’s elevated 
forms: “the classical forms of art perform a kind of magical regulation of the female 
body, containing it and momentarily repairing the orifices and tears” (Nead, 1992, p. 7), 
making it a proper subject for contemplative viewing worthy of aesthetic discourse.  
 The foreignness of the body is intensified and complicated by the phemonemon of 
inter-corporeality, as explained by Paul Schilder (1950): 
A body-image is in some way always the sum of the body images of the 
community according to the various relations in the community. Relations to the 
body images of others are determined by the factor of nearness and farness and by 
the factor of emotional nearness and farness. (p. 302) 
Weiss (1999) points out that notions of “the body” and “the body image” are problematic 
insofar as the expressions seem to imply discrete phenomena that can be studied 
independently from the existences to which they are intrinsic. Weiss espouses the notion 
of a multiplicity of unstable body images co-present in individuals and constructed 
through corporeal exchanges. The notion of corporeal exchange, as previously 
established in Chapter Three, is at work in the Spinozistic notion of imagination: 
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“Imagination involves awareness of other bodies at the same time as our own. Our bodies 
retain traces of the changes brought about in them by the impinging of other bodies” 
(Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, p. 23).  
Our embodied imaginings involving our own and the bodies of others bear on 
emotion and the conduct of caring relations with others. It begins in our ability to 
recognize another body to be sufficiently like ourselves. Thus, it is involved in judgments 
about how the Other should be treated and can be adversely present in relations of 
reciprocity involving someone who is Other.  Shaping our perception and imagination of 
the Other, especially in regard to her corporeality, is a fourth function of art related to 
ethics and the body. 
  Nussbaum’s (1999) extensive scholarship on the objectification of persons also 
informs this discussion. In this view, persons are treated as objects based on 
instrumentality (The person is treated like a tool.); denial of autonomy (The person is 
treated as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.); inertness (The person is treated 
as lacking in agency and activity.); fungibility (The person is treated as interchangeable 
with other objects of another, or the same, type.); violability (The person is treated as 
lacking in boundary integrity, able to be broken up or into, or crushed.); ownership (The 
person is treated as though one can be bought, owned, or sold);  denial of subjectivity 
(The person is treated as someone whose experience and feelings need not be taken into 
account). These notions will have some bearing on the ensuing discussion, as I attempt to 
identify meanings with which the nude is imbued. Of the paintings I describe herein 
(Chapter Five) only a handful are intended for presentation to 9th grade students. 
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Selected works, in fact, from the oeuvre of Kahlo and Smith find themselves in the 
novella (see Appendix). Rather than the idealized interpretations and objectified 
depictions of the nude, the works by Kahlo and Smith are noteworthy for presenting the 
human body amidst the rawness of lived experience.  
 In Chapter Four, I located our mutual conative-affective function in embodied 
cognition within shared common space. This selfsame force prevails in our practices of 
customary social habits or procedures. Despite the apparent automaticity of bodily 
gestures in Chapter Two, I duly noted Rietveld’s (2008) recognition of the element of 
agency in custom and ritual observance, such that in the given example, keeping proper 
distance in a confined space is a judgment call when we have come up against the Other. 
Among the bodies comprising a space of inclusivity is that of the stranger. According to 
Springgay (2008), "A stranger is somebody we recognize as strange. . . as not belonging, 
as being out of place” (p. 26), i.e.  a figure so painfully familiar in their strangerliness. It 
is the moment we sense the need to enforce boundaries. Springgay (2008) believes that 
“Bodied encounters in and through touch, produce intercorporeal understandings and in 
doing so imagine an intimate curriculum premised on difference” (p. 25), hence her 
curriculum has body image conceived as emotion, rather than representation (p. 50). 
A transformative curriculum in ethical inquiry, such as I propose, would be concerned in 
engendering embodied reasonableness regarding how to live, act, and think through the 
concrete habits and practices comprising our systems of oppression. An aesthetic 
experience – particularly with works of art related to the human body – gives us 
opportunities to reflect on our reactions to the body as both intimate and strange.  
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Encountering art gives adolescent students a unique opportunity to engage not 
only their discursive thinking but also their senses, their emotions, and their (moral) 
imaginations in specific issues relating the ethics of Otherness. The precursors of current 
discourses regarding homophobia,
78
 misogyny, xenophobia, and racism, to name a few, 
appear to be present in the work of Manet, Degas, Gauguin, and have been taken up in 
retaliation for the most part, by women artists (in this case, Frida Kahlo and Kiki Smith). 
 Manet’s Déjeuner sur L’herbe (1863) was rejected from Paris’ official salon in 
1863 because of its contemporaneous subject, a nude in the forest staring at her viewer 
outside the picture frame, whilst in the company of two fully clothed men, while a second 
scantily dressed woman washes in a pool behind (see Forty, 1998, p. 345). The remains 
of a picnic are strewn in the foreground, the woman’s clothes are scattered amidst food, 
and partly underneath her buttocks, a flask lies on its side empty. Horrors! Her body is 
unflatteringly depicted as creased and flabby. Manet’s depiction is atypical. More in 
keeping with the times is the idealized, Cabanel’s Birth of Venus, a voluptuously smooth 
Venus atop a wave, surrounded by putti (see Brooks,1993, plate 4)
79
. In 1865, Manet’s 
Olympia is yet another scandal. From atop a disheveled bed with her shawl underneath 
her, a naked woman again looks directly out the canvas, while a bouquet of flowers is 
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 In my novella, I include a raw videoclip depicting homophobia wherein a Senior 
Cambridge University academic instantaneously descends in his young students’ esteem 
as he reveals to them during an ‘in class’ lesson that he is gay. 
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presented to her by a black servant (see Brooks, 1993, plate 12), its prototype, Titian’s 
Venus of Urbino (see Brooks, 1993, plate 34). Both nudes are noteworthy for their 
countenance as their gaze deliberately engages the viewer. Over and above the nude, 
what also disturb are the settings Manet has chosen: the forest far away from civilized 
society, and the courtesan’s heretofore undisclosed bedroom. The nudes in Manet’s work 
are thought to be symbols of females who are violable, fungible, and chattel.  
 Contrast the Manet paintings with the following group of “wanting” women, 
whom Dijkstra (1986) in Idols of Perversity classifies in his iconography of misogyny, as 
the nymph with the broken back, woman in supine position of erotic abandonment, 
pleading to be raped, e.g. Cabanel’s Venus (mentioned in the previous paragraph) which 
was the most celebrated painting (succes de scandale) in the 1863 Salon that rejected 
Dejeuner sur l’herbe, Spring (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate IV, 26), and Autumn (see Dijkstra, 
1986, plate IV, 27), the last two following a fashion set by Cabanel’s tremendous success 
(p. 105).  Take these pictures side-by-side with Kahlo’s broken spine depicting human 
suffering and the contrast in context and meanings is stark. A second popular subject of 
the time is woman-as-nature, e.g. depictions of Daphne and Phyllis, who in their 
helplessness turn into trees, such as John William Waterhouse’s Phyllis and 
Demophoon
80
 (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate IV, 18). In Segantini’s The Evil Mothers (see 
Adler & Pointon, 1993, plate 26), the woman-as-nature is one who refuses to bear 
children in order to indulge in lascivious pleasure. These, I believe, sufficiently illustrate 
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 See Kiki Smith, Daphne (see Engberg, 2005, figure 3). 
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the belief in negativity borne by woman’s body, which according to Bordo (1993) is 
interpreted as “distraction from Knowledge, seduction away from God, capitulation to 
sexual desire, violence or aggression, failure of will or even death” (p. 5). It has been my 
experience, working with adolescents, that many of them initially resist the suggestion 
that such negativity has shaped any of their own experiences, until their study of 
particular works of art opens up feelings and narratives associated with this negativity, 
that they then admit it is familiar. 
 Objecthood marks the nudes in Degas’ Woman Drying Herself (see Forty, 1998, 
p. 414), The Bather (see Armstrong, 1985 & 1986, figure 4), and The Tub  (see Dijkstra, 
1986, plate V, 7). Engaged in reflexive activity (drying oneself and bathing oneself) the 
nudes are different from previous examples in the denial of their subjectivity. They are 
objects of a gaze, presumably masculine, and they do not return the gaze. The gaze of the 
bather is in fact covered by herself, as she is the object of a voyeuristic scopophilic gaze
81
 
(Armstrong, 1986, p. 240). Thus far, the examples of the nude in art have all shown 
woman’s body as a site for man’s domination and women’s subordination. In this regard, 
a certain perfectionist-idealist notion of female body has enjoyed visibility leaving out 
much of woman’s lived experience. Turning our attention to women artists closer to our 
own time, we see firstly a blurring of the public-private distinction, an approach to self-
healing, and the objectification of pain, altogether the emergence of distinctive images of 
the nude in art. Nead (1992) asserts that:  “Historically, there has been a powerful 
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alliance between the discourses of art and medicine in the definition of femininity which 
has continued to exercise power within contemporary society.” Two female artists in 
whose work the nude in medical contexts figures prominently are Frida Kahlo and Kiki 
Smith. 
 Lomas (1993) has interpreted the bath water of What the Water Gave Me to stand 
for amniotic fluid. Henry Ford Hospital and My Birth are about miscarriage; in the first 
we see the nude Kahlo grieving as she lies on a hospital bed, soiled linen underneath her, 
with six umbilical cord-like attachments connecting her to symbols of the pelvic bone, a 
slug, a fetus, and an anatomical model of the pelvic organs. An industrial city lines the 
horizon. My Birth shows the head of the adult Kahlo emanating from the birth canal of a 
shrouded nude on a bed, a picture of the Mater Dolorosa against the adjacent wall. Kahlo 
paints this after her mother’s death, and it may be that the two incidents: the miscarriage 
and her mother’s passing have contributed to a kind of death for Kahlo herself, hence the 
depiction. Physical pain, according to Elaine Scarry (1985), in The Body in Pain is: 
Unlike any other state of consciousness-has no referential content. It is not of or 
for anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other 
phenomenon, resists objectification in language . . .the human attempt to reverse 
the de-objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself into avenues of 
objectification is a project laden with practical and ethical consequence.  
Because the person in pain is ordinarily so bereft of the resources of speech, it is 
not surprising that the language for pain should sometimes be brought into being 
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by those who are not themselves in pain but who speak on behalf of those who 
are. (pp. 5-6) 
Viewing and discussing works of art like these provide an opportunity in 
Philosophy for Children to educate in a manner that not only allows us to question 
existing practices and underlying philosophies pertaining to body, but also how we can 
care more and respect our bodies, others, and distant others (e.g. female genital 
mutilation victims and child abuse victims). In her work, Kiki Smith raises a concern for 
technological procedures that alter the body. Among young people in East Asia, there is a 
burgeoning demand for cosmetic surgery to “westernize” one’s looks, particularly to 
widen eyes, emphasize brows, raise noses, and sculpt lips, a demand that must be 
examined for its grounding and consequences. While in this country, there has been an 
uptick in bariatric surgery to slenderize. Philosophy being the particular discipline that 
educates in thinking and judgment, I believe that it is also the specific discipline that 
educates for ethically guided, well-explained, articulate, and precise communication. In 
the community of inquiry, we are able to reexamine prevailing and unquestioned beliefs 
about the body -- ours, and others’. We might learn not only to stand for ourselves, but to 
advocate for others who may be in unjust situations or in great pain. One way by which 
we can prevent child abuse and other kinds of physical abuse inflicted on young females 
is to understand care as it relates to body and intercorporeality (i.e. Schilder’s notion of 
body image in community). In my curriculum, I explore cultivating bodily beauty, 
sensory acuity, and experiential awareness through philosophy in a classroom community 
of ethical inquiry. In such a community, philosophy is embodied practice. Thus, care for 
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another’s welfare and well-being would emanate from personal self-knowledge and 
active self-care, extending into the conduct of our lives. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have explained and defended key components of a pedagogical 
approach to an arts-based curriculum for ethical inquiry. The greater part of Chapter Five 
has been devoted to explaining the concept of the gaze and the nude in specific works of 
the visual arts covering a lengthy period of its history in the western tradition. I have also 
provided art theory in such detail, even if only a handful of the art works find their way to 
my novella in order to justify depicting the human body as generally disturbing and 
painful to look at, rather than beautiful and picture perfect. I have made the case for high 
school ethical inquiry to focus on concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, and 
gender and sexuality with a view to strengthening students’ reasoning and judgment 
while learning to do ethical inquiry. As the naked human body, both female and male, 
continues to play a pivotal role in the understanding and problematizing of selfhood, 
body, gender, and sexuality, I have developed a pedagogical framework and a novella for 
ethical inquiry in the classroom (see Appendix) that incorporates the four components of 
sound ethical judgment: embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotion as 
judgment, and ethical content throwing light on those primary areas of ethical concern 
already described as being central to adolescence (Kagan, 1972; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 
1972).  
My outline of an arts-based curriculum in ethical inquiry relies on the arguments I 
made in the previous chapters. In Chapter Two I argued that Dewey’s conception of 
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body-mind addresses the inherent tensions in body/mind dualism. I proposed applying 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry in particular, its sensitivity to context and ability to self-
correct (Ralston, 2011) because they are everyday skills serving as guideposts for 
learning how to do ethical inquiry. I made several pedagogical recommendations 
highlighting in particular, Philosophy for Children (P4C) with a view to reaching the 
objective of teaching how to do ethical inquiry. In Chapter Three, I shed light on 
Dewey’s theory of moral imagination and education. As an instructional tool, I proposed 
dramatic rehearsal, both as a deliberative event and a kinaesthetic process, in order to 
create a fictional context for dialogic dramatic inquiry, adult-mediated dramatic play to 
promote dialogue among participants (Edmiston, 2000 & 2011).  
In Chapter Four, I explained Dewey’s theory of emotions and why the arts are 
appropriate in educating for the four components of ethical inquiry. I have been guided 
by Lipman’s (1995) concept that educating emotions by attending to the aesthetic 
dimension of experience corresponds with a moral education, as emotions indicate 
valuations bringing about actions that embody judgments. “This is moral education in the 
sense that if students could perceive for themselves the inappropriateness of their 
judgments and their emotions, they might be less ready to act in the ways those 
judgments of emotions called for” (Lipman, 1995, p. 8). Relying on its deep connections 
to emotional life (Nussbaum, 2001), I highlighted music as embodied experience and 
ethical encounter, a means by which appropriate habits and dispositions are imparted, 
nurturing character for contingency and particularity on one hand, and on the other, 
fostering mutuality, openness, and attributes, such as cooperation, respect, and fairness. 
 201 
Using music, painting, and sculpture to demonstrate the nature of emotion, I highlighted 
the emotions of fear, disgust and shame, and related them to philosophical/real world 
problems that afflict us and are related to personhood, body, sexuality and gender. This is 
in keeping with my belief that the act of investing oneself in collective social practices 
has positive consequences extending well beyond the classroom community of 
philosophical inquiry.  
The curriculum that follows is concerned, as I have previously stated, with ethical 
content that strives to be common to all, central to the way we make sense of experience, 
and contestable or problematic, i.e. something that is arguable (Sharp & Splitter, 1995). I 
have been guided by Lipman’s instructional model that utilizes a P4C reader, which is a 
trigger text described as “an inquiry-fostering environment” (Lipman, 2003, p. 156), and 
is meant to nurture reflection and dialogue in a classroom community of ethical inquiry, a 
cooperative learning methodology comprising a group and its teacher-facilitator, who 
have a shared commitment to engage in inquiry (Sprod, 2001). The P4C reader, in this 
case, is a narrative text that aims to model in a very modest way, instances where students 
are faced with discrepancies that bewilder them and are enjoined to consider their 
underlying principles. The fictional narrative is meant to dramatize attempts at doing 
philosophy. The exercises provide practice in making judgments. This pedagogical 
approach incorporating works of art is in the Appendix of the dissertation. As will be 
obvious to those familiar with Philosophy for Children, the model of instruction in my 
curriculum is based on that program for teaching philosophical inquiry to students in K-
12. The program’s principal parts are the classroom community of inquiry, an 
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instructional narrative where students model the discursive patterns of philosophical 
inquiry, i.e. posing questions, offering arguments and counter-arguments, making logical 
inferences, giving reasons, making analogies, identifying and justifying assumptions, 
offering evidence, generalizing and evaluating, and a teacher-facilitator.  
I invite educators and philosophers to apply this curriculum and modify it for 
particular classroom communities of philosophical inquiry. Make it useful, productive, 
and meaningful in particular contexts, sensitizing for the right reasons and objects of our 
emotions. Furthermore, it is my hope that it will encourage other teachers to be 
committed to engage in creative and imaginative projects in the midst of ongoing ethical 
inquiry. Perhaps one day, the creative and moral imagination will have gained as much 
importance as that of critical and analytical thinking, the focus of the greater part of the 
high school language arts classroom. I hope students will be encouraged to express their 
feelings in dramatic rehearsal and to personalize their work with thick descriptions, 
elaborate plots, complex character developments, and extended dialogue. I would like 
teachers to become comfortable as teacher-facilitators encouraging dialogue that is 
imbued with embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotion as judgment, and 
ethical content.  
Curriculum should develop out of the interaction of students with one another and 
with their teacher because it helps in creating a well knit classroom community, one that 
embraces broad diversity and a wider range of abilities. Students bringing different 
strengths and talents will have come together to advance the group’s educational 
objectives because “[b]ehind Dewey’s ideology and his approach to education is a view 
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of human nature starkly different from the one often shared by both right- and left-wing 
theorists. . . primarily self-interested, rational agents, acting to maximize personal 
advantage” (Fishman & McCarthy, 1998, p. 221). Rather, his approach stresses 
cooperation as the satisfaction of a deep seated human need “to give out, to do, and to 
serve” (Dewey, 1897/1964, p. 55; Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 55, as cited in Fishman & 
McCarthy, 1997, p. 221). Therefore, in this classroom community of philosophical 
inquiry in the language arts, I urge teacher-facilitators to keep close watch over the 
multidimensional developmental progress of students, so that individual needs are met in 
that communal setting (Freedman, 1994, p. 104). Learning to practice ethical inquiry 
while encountering art, and to make and to act on sound ethical judgments, is an 
experience in growth: transforming meaning, engaging in self-discovery, and making a 
contribution to the world. 
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Appendix:  Reimagining Ourselves: A Curriculum for Ethical Inquiry 
Introduction  
Presumably you are a 9
th
 grade Language Arts teacher about to conduct 
philosophical inquiry in connection with literary themes that resonate with your students’ 
everyday lives. Reimagining Ourselves is a curriculum designed for facilitating ethical 
inquiry with adolescent students in a community of philosophical inquiry. The aim of this 
course is to encourage students to consider and reflect on their moral values in the branch 
of philosophy attempting to understand moral conduct or Ethics. The approach to ethical 
inquiry espoused in this curriculum patterned after IAPC curricula (including 
philosophical exercises) features the arts and literature because their subject matter opens 
horizons of feeling and imaginative vistas that are known to shed light on the meaning of 
social practices and cherished values. It is also designed to make inroads to some of the 
ethical concerns of normal adolescence: negotiating the changes in one’s body, emerging 
and sometimes overwhelming feelings of sexuality, changes in self-identity and 
relationships, academic demands, uncertainty about the future, and stresses in family 
life
82
. Reimagining ourselves is an apt metaphor encapsulating the tasks we have set for 
ourselves in this curriculum, i.e. engaging students through appropriate ethical content 
with a view to refining their inherent skills of embodied reasonableness, moral 
imagination, and emotions as judgments. In this regard, we invest our imaginings of 
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ourselves presciently, as romantic partners, parents, political activists, travelers, spiritual 
adepts, and true friends
83
.  
 
How to use this curriculum  
 
1. Exercises in Bodily Awareness 
Improved bodily awareness is a tool in recognizing emotions and in enhancing 
embodied reasonableness. The following exercises are designed to develop attention, 
discrimination, and perception by applying the key principles of change and interest 
to the observation of an object. Please engage in one exercise of choice from among 
the following specifically introduced in this curriculum, prior to a class session.  
a. Sustained attention. Remain transfixed on an object of thought for five minutes. 
Ask a variety of “new questions about the object”; “roll it over and over 
incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in turn.” Take 
breathing
84
 as an example.  
i.  Is the breath deep or shallow, quick or slow? 
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 M.R. Gregory (personal communication, January 13, 2012) 
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 Breathing can lead to stress reduction because inhaling activates the sympathetic 
nervous system and exhaling the parasympathetic, the latter accompanied by a 
decelerated heart rate inversely proportionate to parasympathetic activity. Rule of thumb:  
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ii. Is the breath felt more in the chest or diaphragm? 
iii.  What does it feel like from the mouth or through the nostrils? 
iv.  Is breathing easier from the mouth or through the nostrils? 
Extend time period on subsequent occasions. Make finer discriminations each 
time. (Shusterman, 2008, 161-2) 
b. Body scan. Systematically scan the body by subdividing it in awareness, 
directing the focused attention to one part first before shifting attention to   
another. Proprioceptively get a sense of ourselves as we stay still, typically with 
eyes shut or partially shut, breathing
85
 (Shusterman, 2008, p. 162). Note that 
focusing is difficult to do in the context of “the beating of heart and arteries, 
breathing, and pervasive body pains,” and it may be impossible to single out “the 
contraction of the diaphragm, expansion of the lungs, shortening of certain 
muscles, and rotation of certain joints.” 
i. Linguistic tag. Make vague feelings less difficult to distinguish by 
selecting a word with which to link it. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164) 
ii. Preperception. Prepare to discriminate a feeling by imagining where on 
one’s body the perception of it is situated. Even if the feeling may be 
                                                 
Exhale more. 
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nameless, the perception of it can stand improvement. (Shusterman, 
2008, p. 164) 
 
2. Guidelines for An Art Viewing
86
. 
 
 In the novella and activities that follow, there are several works of art for students 
to study. Help them to inquire into their experiences with these pieces applying the 
following guidelines. 
a. Think with your body --- Identify and make known to all of us the layers of detail 
in the art object by engaging in sustained interaction with it. 
b.   Let us know the feeling of meaning – Experience the art object through a 
keenness of senses and emotion and make it bodily known to us, as in 
saying/telling, singing, moving, or making something to convey our meaning 
(what are we getting out of it?) to us.  
c.  Do a Schema Formation – Throughout the process of doing and undergoing in 
which we are engaged, tag your observations with the queries “Why?” and “What 
if?” 
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d.  Say, Who cares? – This is about making associations and grouping. What you do 
when you have determined relationships among details is group them into 
patterns. 
e.  Make the Web of Meaning – Draw linkages between what you and the 
community already know beforehand (prior knowledge), personal experience, and 
what is currently unfolding. 
f.  Say, do I care? – How do you/I/we know that you have an understanding of the 
experiences and beliefs of others and articulate an explication of the level of 
respect you may have for them and the beliefs and values you know they hold 
dear. 
g.  Make Meaning – Blend the different perspectives we encounter and create an 
interpretative synthesis of them. 
h.  Take action – Involve ourselves in a project that activates our learning. 
i.  Backward Glance – Ask ourselves what struggles remain and ways to learn anew.  
 
3. Reading, Discussion and Philosophical Exercises 
Drawn on the model of the IAPC curricula, Reimagining Ourselves is a novella with 
corresponding philosophical exercises. The Community of Inquiry should read the text 
one episode at a time. Students should then be encouraged to write out their own 
questions and discuss, as is the practice in Philosophy for Children. In between 
discussion sessions, the teacher-facilitator is urged to look at the corresponding 
philosophical exercises for that episode, select, and/or adapt one that she believes will 
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help the students deepen or advance their inquiry. 
 
4.  Teacher Self-Evaluation 
Periodically (at least every few weeks), take a few minutes to reflect on your own 
practice of facilitating the students’ ethical inquiry, using the following questions87 as 
guides: 
 Are my students expressing their own ideas in poetry, prose, dance, or art? 
 Does each of my students understand part-whole relationships? 
 Are my students more open with each other? With me? 
 Do my students understand what is meant by time relationships and space 
relationships?  
 Does each of my students appear to be drawing correct inferences from what is 
being said by each and one another? 
 Do my students understand analogies? How do I know that?  
 Am I monopolizing the class with my teacher talk? 
 Am I becoming better in the practice of the method of inquiry? 
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 Adapted from Lipman & Sharp, 1984, p.160. 
 
 248 
Reimagining Ourselves: Novella and Exercises 
Prologue 
The teachers were on their way to a film screening. “This is philosophical inquiry not 
poetry,” Mrs. Robson, the senior teacher said. “Just read the cheat sheet88, will you.” Mr. 
Kendall looked at the sheet he was holding and silently read:  
Philosophy is distinguished from other sorts of inquiry by particular kinds of goals, 
emphases, and strategies. Philosophers weave thought patterns using several kinds of 
threads, among which are the following: 
 Philosophical inquiry is typically concerned with the “big picture.”  
 Philosophers tackle the reasons and methods for formulating claims and beliefs. 
In so doing, they attempt to clarify past and present understandings and to find 
ways of integrating knowledge acquired in different fields. 
 Philosophers develop methods of logical argument to make new connections, 
expose false assumptions, and refine specific problems over time. The products of 
good philosophizing are new perspectives on the assumptions, beliefs, meanings, 
and definitions that inhabit our thoughts and actions. 
 Philosophers demonstrate the inadequacy of previous discussions by exposing the 
flaws in a thinker’s basic assumptions; locating logical weaknesses in structured 
arguments; explaining a theory’s omissions, oversights, or lack of 
comprehensiveness; and finding unjustified lapses in common sense. 
 
                                                 
88
 Adapted from Elliott, 1995, p. 8. 
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Herewith is an excerpt of the film they saw:  
Videoclip: The beginnings of gendered roles (Jamie's dream school | David Starkey on 
Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon)(2011) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bX3p9D9B1rc&feature=youtu.be  
 
Prologue
89
: Exercises 
1. Perception 
 Learning Objective: Students will challenge their own perceptions and reflect on 
the nature of perception and its relationship to thinking. 
This exercise is designed to help students look beyond the distractions of content 
and to uncover deeper meanings. Looking at optical illusions can help students 
understand how something can exist without their being able to see it immediately.  
Project some examples of double-image illusions (a picture that contains more 
than one image, such as the famous "Two faces and a vase" illusion). (Some optical 
illusions are available on-line at http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/.) Students will describe 
what they see. They should help each other to see what others have not. After perhaps ten 
minutes of observation, stop the projection and ask the students to discuss the experience, 
using questions such as:  
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 Adapted from Media Education Foundation, 2010. 
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 What does this activity tell you about our perceptions of images?  
 Did both images exist before you could see them?  
 Which image was the real image? The one you saw first or the one that it took 
some help to see?  
 If you needed someone else to show you the second image, do you think they 
created the image? Or did it always exist?  
 How might this apply to symbolism and literature? Poetry and subtext? 
Advertising and underlying messages?  
2. What does it mean to be male or female?  
Learning Objectives:  
 Students will develop and refine their ability to write narratives.  
 Students will encounter the diversity of narratives about females and males in our 
culture. 
 Students will recognize that they have the ability to conceptualize and frame their 
own stories about femaleness and maleness and what it means to be female or 
male.  
 Students will begin to think about the power stories have to shape our perceptions 
of reality. 
This multi-day exercise encourages students first to think critically about the 
different stories told in our culture about female and male, then to invent their own. 
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When students are encouraged to look around, and listen, they are likely to find a wide 
variety of stories told in our culture about what it means to be a female or male. They are 
likely to find stories of limitation, repression, and shame, but also stories of liberation, 
power, and strength. Before looking with them at the specific stories media and 
advertising tell, this assignment asks that students answer with their own stories the 
general question: What does it mean to be female or a male?  
1. Read some examples from stories or novels answering the question, What does it 
mean to be a female or a male?  
2. Then have students bring in a published story or section of a novel answering the 
same question: What does it mean to be female or a male? The story need not 
answer the question directly or completely; rather it should provide a window into 
the experience of being female or male, and how female or male experience is 
constructed.  
3. Students will share the stories they selected with the class.  
4. After discussing the major ideas and themes, students will write a journal entry in 
response to the following: Based on the stories you heard in class, how would you 
answer the question, What does it mean to be female or male in our culture?  
5. Assignment: Students will write a story of their own, inspired by the question, 
What does it mean to be a female or a male? The story should be short and 
concise and should make use of figurative language and narrative voice. It doesn’t 
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have to be true to their personal experience (although it can be), but it should be 
realistic. 
6. Students will share their stories with their classmates, either in small groups or as 
a whole class.  
7. Finally, revisit your earlier discussions. Now that they have read the stories of 
others, and considered the diversity of possibilities, ask them to think again about 
what it means to be a woman or a man in our culture 
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Episode One: Planning 
The Language Arts-Philosophy Planning Team teachers had been making 
instructional decisions about Romeo & Juliet, body image, and gender. Mrs. Robson, 
looked up from the sheaf of papers she was marking, and said “So, is it settled; we’ll 
have a listening exercise featuring Tchaikovsky’s symphonic poem Romeo and Juliet?”   
Mr. Parker replied, “Here’s the Prokofiev ballet excerpt. Use that as a pre-lesson 
warm-up because I think it is lovely.  Let’s just be clear on this. Why, in addition, 
Prokofiev’s ballet? With it we can touch on the subject of the body image of female ballet 
dancers and the gender of male dancers.”  
“Telling the kids how to listen to this music is key; remember,” added Mrs. 
Robson.  
Making sure he got his idea across, Mr. Parker added: “The key is letting students 
know that all grownup female roles in ballet and theater were originally played by an all-
male cast. . . and young male roles played by females in what are known as “trouser” 
roles. Here’s an excerpt from Stage Beauty (2005). Let them chew on that. It’s your 
choice:”  
Annoyed, Mt. Kendall said, “You digress.”  
“I imagine there might be several in your classes with strong musical upbringing, 
who would be able to talk about the music or have a passing interest in classical music, 
but not having either experience comprises the majority. Therefore, one learner outcome 
is that by the end of the lesson, students can appreciate and speak about the classical 
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music surrounding Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. I’ve outlined a sample activity and I 
show an attempt to draw parallels between Russian classical music and current popular 
music (and there are parallels!)” laughed Mrs. Robson.  
Eagerly, Mr. Kendall added, “I agree. Any opportunity for students to see how 
music of a century past influenced what is popular today makes this worthwhile.” 
Picking up the thread, Mrs. Robson suggested, “Bobby, ask students to bring 
something to discuss in the form of a one-and-a-half to two-page research paper. Can you 
please provide possible topics for the students to research for this paper and bring to the 
class.” 
Instantly, Mr. Parker suggested, “I’d like you to consider the following research 
topics
90: The Petersburg conservatory, the Bolshoi Ballet, Tchaikovsky’s marriage, and 
his relationship with his teacher Nicholas Rubinstein, and the ideal balletic body. 
(Distributes handout.) Here’s preparatory material on the composer’s life and Romeo and 
Juliet. If you can locate a videoclip, so much the better. I couldn’t. They read in silence: 
 In late 1869, Piotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky attended the opera Romeo and Juliet 
with his brother. Immediately, he fell hopelessly in love with the Belgian soprano 
Désirée Artôt, who played Desdemona. (This was before he realized he was 
homosexual.) His hot infatuation was the quintessential romantic response, having 
nothing whatsoever to do with reality. The star-crossed lovers of Shakespeare’s 
play were perfect subjects for Tchaikovsky’s emotional catharsis. His consistent 
advisor on the musical score was the composer Mily Balakirev (who had suggested 
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the idea of a musical rendition of the story to him in 1869), and the young 
Tchaikovsky was grateful for this attention and help. On October 6, 1869, 
Balakirev not only wrote about literary points of the story, but dictated four 
measures of music to open the work. The idea gestated for 10 years. When 
completed, Tchaikovsky incorporated many of Balakirev’s ideas, of course, making 
Balakirev admire the music. The writing was not easy. At one point, Tchaikovsky 
wrote, “I am beginning to fear that my muse has flown off.”   
   Romeo and Juliet premiered on March 16, 1870. It was not met with wild 
acclaim, and Tchaikovsky rewrote the original. His new version, which was 
performed in February 1872, now boasted a chorale theme and greater emphasis on 
the fighting families, more sharply delineated with rushing strings and percussive 
interruptions. In 1880, Romeo and Juliet was still on the composer’s mind and he 
rewrote the ending. This ultimately became his first masterpiece.   
 The Overture highlights selected major themes and literary sections. Capulets 
and Montagues (the two families) fight in chaotic music; Friar Laurence [sic] is 
depicted by church-like music; the potency and determinism of love overarches 
everything in a breathtaking theme. To be sure, outstanding elements are described 
before the “love theme,” but eventually this pervades the whole Overture. It appears 
in different areas of the orchestra and is presented in varying styles. After hearing 
this theme, Balakirev wrote, “I play it often, and I want very much to kiss you for 
it.” Tchaikovsky teases us by delaying its fullest articulation. The tune begins 
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modestly in muted violas and English horn, but quickly vanishes. Sometimes the 
theme emerges in the winds, sometimes in the strings, sometimes it is partially 
drawn out and only suggested. Finally, all delay aside, Tchaikovsky gratifies us 
with a climactic letting-go as all of the strings surge with a complete opulent 
statement. The Overture ends with a coda citing major elements of the Overture, 
and it includes the famous death music of Romeo and Juliet. His death is marked by 
a sharp, loud chord, hers by a vicious roll in the timpani. At the close, the love 
theme is sounded one last time, but it has become pitiful and small, moving quietly 
over a dark, chromatic bass before four sharp chords nail the coffins shut.   
  Most of us would agree with the reviewer Kern Holomon, who wrote: “It (the 
overture) is quite simply, the best love music there is.” The metaphorical climax, 
lush sensuality, and shameless, extravagant sentimentality make for an excessive, 
unforgettable, powerful experience. 
91
 Tchaikovsky is the composer most noted for 
his sense of “pull-out-all-the-stops” Romanticism. 
“Some find his style moving, while others find it too obvious and forced; it would 
be interesting to see which side our students fall on,” said Mrs. Robson.  
Mr. Kendall told them “Let’s add another research assignment, shall we? Bring in 
a piece of modern popular music that you feel “goes for broke” with emotion. I’m 
thinking of harder rock (metal), or pop songs that really pull at the heartstrings. Is this 
effective music on you? What do you like or not like about it?”  
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Episode One: Exercises 
A.  Discussion Plan: Imagination
92
 
1. Can you imagine “in general,” or must you imagine some particular thing? 
2. Can you imagine at the same time that you perceive? 
3. Is it easier to imagine something real that is really not present (like imagining a gecko 
on your desk right now), or something not real (like imagining a dragon on your desk 
right now)? 
4. When is your imagination likely to be most active, when you have everything you 
want, or when you have few things you want? 
5. Can you imagine whatever it is you want to? 
6. Is it possible for people to predict what they will imagine next? 
7. Can you imagine a round square if you try hard enough? 
8. Do you have to imagine something before you can write a poem or a story about it? 
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 Lipman & Sharp, 1980, p. 39. 
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Episode Two:  Experience (Poetry) 
 
Belle reads aloud from her book, “’Poems are not read like novels. Poems are 
physical, sensual, textural, tactile meaning you find pleasure in feeling the sounds of 
poetry evolve on your lips, tongue, teeth, and vocal chords. Past poetry requires knowing 
Greek mythology, Christian liturgy or classic literature, other poets, science, or 
philosophy.’93”      
“Would you know the source of this poem? I’ve found a torso sculpture and it 
could be it. What do you think?,’” Belle asked Anica. 
 
Archaic Torso of Apollo
94
  
We cannot know his legendary head 
with eyes like ripening fruit.  
 
And yet his torso is still suffused  
with brilliance from inside, like a  
lamp, in which his gaze, now turned  
to low gleams in all its power.  
 
Otherwise the curved breast could  
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 Commentary on poetry has been excerpted &/or adapted from Fry, 2005.  
94
 Source: Voss, 2006; see illustration. 
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not dazzle you so, nor could a smile  
run through the placid hips and  
thighs to that dark center where  
procreation flared. 
 
Otherwise this stone would seem  
defaced  beneath the translucent  
cascade of the shoulders and would  
not glisten like a wild beast’s fur: 
 
would not, from all the borders of  
itself, burst like a star: for here there  
is no place that does not see you.  
You must change your life.  
Rainer Maria Rilke 
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She looks over to her friend, Anica. “The assignment includes writing one open- 
ended question to bring to class, Anica.” 
“Are there body parts that are “placid” like hips?” Anica said uncertainly. “Or for 
that matter: Are hips placid?” 
“Not yours, you wiggly worm, keep still. Anica, listen to me. Supposedly the head 
has ‘ripening fruit-like’ eyes.” 
“Oh, I think I get it,” Anica continued, “even without the head, the torso has a life 
shining from within and makes the poet imagine ‘translucent cascade of the shoulders’. . 
.long, lovely golden hair? Sorry, just making my imagination work overtime here.” 
“Ok, I know, my question: ‘What is life-changing?”, Belle said confidently. 
Anica was quick. “Mine is, ‘Is this male or female?’ It’s not an open-ended 
question, but it’s a valid one.” 
“Come on, the torso has a flat chest and that’s obviously a penis,” Belle was 
adamant. 
“Yeah-uh, but the statue could be male or female. It’s not really all there, you 
know. Can we interpret the statue the way we wish?” Anica asked. 
Belle demanded, “You’d better make a list of questions because—enough 
already--the second part of the assignment is to write a short, original poem.” 
“You can’t make me write a poem!” Anica screamed indignantly. She couldn’t 
understand why she couldn’t do it now, when it seemed so easy last year. She wished she 
could remember the different patterns Mrs. Longbottom taught her. 
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Belle continued: “’What then is the solution? Greeting-card verse? Pastiche? For 
some the answer lies in the street poetry of rap, hip-hop, reggae, and other musically 
derived discourses, what may suit one’s upbringing, talents, and temperament, or cultural 
heritage and linguistic taste. Between lazy indiscipline and frozen traditionalism, between 
the authentic and the fraudulent, lies a thrilling space. Since human beings first sang, 
recited and wrote, they have been developing ways of structuring and presenting their 
verse. Most readers of poetry, whether they are aware of it or not, are instinctively 
familiar with its basic forms.’” 
“You can’t make me draw then!” Belle loved looking at art. “I love art!” she told 
herself in silence. “I love watching my aunt paint. It seems so easy! But I was so 
embarrassed when Ms. Marcello raised my drawing in front of class, and I only heard the 
last words ‘and so, you shouldn’t try to do it this way’.” 
“I fully expected her to say something good, you know, Anica. and my mind had 
drifted away, thinking: ‘She liked my abstract still life because it’s different…’”  
“Uh-m, so you were shocked to hear us all laughing at you, when Sunny’s perfect 
still life was put side by side on the chalkboard rail…I’m so sorry. I hadn’t meant to hurt 
your feelings, but why did you have to do something so-o-o-o different???” 
 “Oh, I don’t know. You know me . . . who’s to say what possessed me?, Belle 
replied. 
Suddenly, Anica uttered: “That’s what friends are for.” 
Surprised, Belle queried: “Where did that come from?” 
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Anica reads her notes, “Three-part Form: thesis, antithesis, synthesis; OR 
proposal, counterproposal and vote; OR prosecution, defense, verdict; OR presentation, 
exploration and return. This is the pattern, as in a dialectic structure in philosophy, 
although this is poetic form we are talking about. The assignment is to ‘subvert’ it. That’s 
why I did something different.” 
Belle retorts, “Why? What’s the difference between philosophy and poetry?  
Anica replies, “Okay, many people think in ways they never bother to examine. A 
philosophically minded person takes belief x and asks, ‘What grounds are there for 
holding this belief?’” 
“Thanks, can friends argue? If we could, what would we argue about? I know. I 
can’t write poetry and you can’t draw…and you encourage me and I scream. You can’t 
draw, although, you l-o-v-e pictures. How you l-o-v-e  p-i-c-t-u-r-e-s! We don’t even 
have an Art subject, and you keep magazine cuttings of paintings, cover your books with 
them, paste them on cards, blow them up on photocopies, and…” 
In turn, Belle’s right hand now moved over to Anica’s mouth.  
“Ah!,” she gasped. “Can’t breathe” Anica muttered with great difficulty. Belle’s 
right hand moved to cover Anica’s mouth.  
“I thought we were going to talk about what friends are for?” Belle said, keeping 
Anica’s mouth covered. “Ok, enough,” removing her hand. 
“You’re so impatient! All I wanted to say is that we can tell each other stuff that 
might hurt other people’s feelings ‘cause they aren’t friends. But because we’re friends, I 
understand perfectly what you’re saying.” Rapping her own kind of rhythm, “Often, we 
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don’t even need words. That’s how we pull things off. So quickly. Not a word.  Rustle, 
rustle. Twitch here. Nudge there. Kick, kick. Wink, wink. You’re it. We’re home! We got 
it! You get what I mean, don’t you, Belle?” 
Exasperated, Belle retorted: “And you say you can’t write poetry. But you are 
sounding like a poem! The point, Anica, is that I have got to pass this art class, and I 
can’t draw!” 
“I can’t go back into sewing because I’ve had seven years’ experience sewing, 
and I certainly know from experience that I can’t do any sewing! I struggle with needle 
and thread. My fingers are constantly pricked. It’s tough!” 
“And don’t encourage me, okay?” she added, raising both palms. 
“Ok, friend,” giving each other a “high five”. Unable to control herself, Anica 
resumed, “but obviously, you just need a little experience. This is our first art class, our 
first drawing, surely you’ll get better with practice.” 
“Maybe, I just don’t have this crafty-ness in me…”, Belle said in resignation. 
“What’s the good of experience anyway, if it’s only to find out after seven years that I’m 
not good at it. And, in the first place, why do we have to learn sewing? Nothing is sewn 
by hand these days anymore, and there are people paid to repair things. This is so… 
backward.” 
“Hey, just because YOU aren’t good at sewing. I love sewing. I wouldn’t have 
left the sewing class, if it weren’t for you needing company in the art class,” was Anica’s 
response. 
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“Yeah, but you’ll agree with me, won’t you? That’s a pit of vipers in there! The 
meanest, toughest girls in school. I can’t get past the volleyball court without getting my 
ponytail pulled or my skirt tugged, never mind the gym. Remember how I was hurled 
into the pool fully clothed when I passed by and those girls heard I couldn’t swim?” 
“Oh, you poor thing. You caught the flu from that incident didn’t you? You must 
have been very thirsty when you were dunked.” 
“You’re being unkind. The girls who aren’t good at sewing are so not like me! 
What to do!!!, Belle pulled her hair in frustration. “I am so weird.” 
Anica agreed. “Yeah, you bet you are! That’s why you’re my best friend!” 
“Listen, but sewing’s old fashioned. It’s a girl thing, not like drawing. I hate girlie 
stuff. I won’t need to sew when I go to work,” Belle mused unconvincingly. 
Irritated, Anica said, “You are so bizarre. You’re so sure about what you’re going 
to be!” 
“Well, can you imagine yourself being a housewife, staying at home, waiting for 
your husband’s phone call at lunchtime, planting a kiss on your husband’s cheek, and so 
on and so forth? Huh?” she emphatically inquired. 
Feeling exceedingly aggravated, Anica remarked, “Ok, now, that’s really ‘in your 
face’ sort of!” 
“Well…?”, Belle said, awaiting some response. 
Timidly Anica answered: “Oh, is that why we’ve been taught how to sew? To 
prepare us for marriage? Is that so bad? We’ll fall in love one day,” she said tentatively. 
“And it will happen to us. The real thing. We’ll fall in love,” this time with some 
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conviction. “We’ll get married, and have children…and we’ll still be friends…good 
friends.” 
And, Belle, suddenly added, “And I’ll talk to you from across the fence with a 
mouthful of laundry pins as you and I hang out sheets and nappies to dry.” 
“Fat Chance! In fact, no one does that anymore,” they yelled in resounding 
unison.  
Wisely, Belle declared, “Ok, so let’s review that! What sort of experience do we 
need to have?” 
“Well, that’s why we’re in college prep, right? We’re not sewing anymore. We’re 
drawing! We’re not cooking. We’re doing Chemistry, Trigonometry, and Philosophy!” 
“But, why can’t we just do as we please?” Belle ended, imploringly. 
Episode Two: Exercises 
Note To Teacher: The following is an introductory video clip about how one 
female artist incorporates sewing in her art: http://youtu.be/J5ENzbfYIDo (Kiki Smith 
Sewing). 
1. Homework: Read the poem below with another person (ideally, pairs should be male 
and female). Read the poem reflectively. Allow it to evoke feelings and images of past 
experience. As you reminisce, make an effort to recall the experience as completely as 
you can. Then, write briefly about it. 
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Pockets 
The point of clothes was line, 
A shallow fall of cotton over childish hips most amazing things 
Or a coat rules sharply, shoulder to hem, 
 
But that line was marred by hands 
And all the most amazing things 
That traveled in them to one’s pockets 
Goitering the shape of grace with gifts 
 
A puffball only slightly burst 
Five links of watch chain passed secretly in class 
A scrap of fur almost as soft as one’s own skin. 
 
Offended at my pouching of her Singer stitch 
My mother sewed my pockets up 
With an overcast tight as her mouth 
Forbidding all but the line. 
 
I’ve lived for years in her seams— 
Falls of fabric smooth as slide rules 
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My hands exposed and folded from all the gifts. 
 
And it is only recently, with raw fingers 
Which still recall the warmth and texture of presents, 
That I’ve plucked out stitches sharp as urchin spines 
To find both hands and pockets empty. 
Karen Swenson
95
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Episode Three: Reimagining Ourselves   
 
Anica and Belle each grabbed a seat to join their community of inquiry when they 
got to Mrs. Longbottom’s class. “Phew! Barely made it.” Both of them said, each with an 
audible sigh of relief. 
Already in the circle were Andrew, Millie, Peter Faithfull, Tyrone, John, 
Samantha, Cristina, Antonio, Mei-ling, and Roshan. Anica and Belle had to catch up and 
quickly pulled out their journals to do a “quick-write,” On the board, Mrs. Longbottom 
had written:  
 
 
 
It took only five minutes and then everyone looked up from their journals and put 
their pencils down. After glancing around, Roshan spoke, “Can I start?” Picking up his 
journal, he said, “Well, I think that (reading from his journal) ‘Reimagining ourselves’ 
refers to concepts of what we want to become.” 
 “That’s what I wrote, too,” Andrew chimed in. Other hands went up. 
 “But, I don’t completely agree,” Millie retorted, “because sometimes when I think 
of what I want to be, I can’t help being afraid of not becoming what I want to be.” 
“It’s also possible that you can become someone you don’t want to become,” John said 
doubtfully. 
Reimagining 
Ourselves 
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“There are times when I am filled with hope, when I see that I’ve done well 
writing a poem that I’ve worked on very hard.” 
            “Can you explain what you mean by ‘filled with hope,’ Samantha,” urged Mrs. 
Longbottom. 
 “Well, you know how one can never be sure if one will succeed after so much 
trial and error. I never thought I could ever write a poem, but then we all did. Some of our 
stuff was really good, and I was encouraged when my work was put up on the board and 
some of you said it was quite outstanding. Before that I was afraid of what all of you 
would say.” 
Many others nodded in agreement and shifted in their seats. 
“I believe ‘filled with hope’ means that we can do better things, and Samantha, 
correct me if I am wrong, “ Peter added. “I think being afraid and being hopeful are 
feelings that are part of becoming what you want to . . . be. Perhaps, it’s like this: you set 
a goal for yourself and you really, truly want to reach that goal, but because you’ve never 
done the thing before, you’re not too sure, even afraid . . . apprehensive . . . you won’t 
reach it.”  
“In my case, writing a poem wasn’t anything new to me,” Andrew said almost 
angrily. “But in all the lower grades, I wrote only one really brilliant poem in 
kindergarten published in the school magazine. After that, it was downhill. All the poems 
I wrote were no good, and I’ve been going through school with this baggage of bad 
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poems I’ve written and brought home to my mom over the years. Frankly, I didn’t even 
want to try this time around, but you were all into it, and I didn’t want to make a fuss.” 
 “Oh, Andrew, that’s really nice of you to say,” Mei-ling remarked, “I didn’t 
realize that you and I share that in common. I never thought I could write anything, until I 
got to this class. In fact, after I realized I could write well, uh, with some effort I thought 
that (reading from her journal) ‘we see what we can possibly be and our success becomes 
an incentive. That the right word, Mrs. Longbottom?” (Mrs. Longbottom silently agreed: 
“. . .  for doing well in future.” 
 “Listen, sometimes, you can try your best, but if everyone thinks that your work is 
generally lousy, you’ll never get a good grade,” Antonio commented. “I think that’s what 
happened to me, and I think that’s what Andrew meant. Because I hardly spoke in class 
and my handwriting was really poor, even if I read well and had good vocabulary, I never 
got good marks. You know, constant failure can become a threat to what you want to be. 
Like you said, Andrew, all your bad poems become a lot of baggage.”’ 
 “That’s a great metaphor,” Mrs Longbottom remarked. “How did you arrive at 
calling your bad poems ‘baggage’?”  
 Andrew replied, “I was imagining what it was I was carrying around with me to 
all my writing classes. I developed a reputation for being a ‘one-shot’ poet, you know 
when I was in kindergarten, and I was carrying that reputation around with me all through 
grade school. I wanted to get rid of it, but it was just like this backpack that got heavier 
over the years.” 
 271 
 
 
 
 “There are so many things we are expected to be even now, that I can’t say 
‘possible self’ is accurate. I say we are ‘works of art in progress.’ That’s my idea, my 
metaphor, of possible selves because there are so may parts to us, child, student, older 
sibling, younger sibling, best friend, team leader, club member. Everyday, I think we are 
growing in each of those parts, don’t you think?” Belle queried.  
 “But, if we can go back to the previous subject, you don’t mind – or do you, 
Belle?” She did not look pleased.  
 “How do you rid people of assumptions they have made about you, that baggage, 
you and Andrew just described?” John asked. “There’s the saying, ‘If you can dream it, 
you can become it.’ How true is that? We read biographies of people whose dreams of 
being somebody famous and important are true. What about stories of those who didn’t?” 
 Mrs. Longbottom stepped in: “Let me read to you an excerpt written by Amy Tan, 
the author of The Joy Luck Club (1989).  
I enjoy the challenge of disproving assumptions made about me. I became an 
English major my first year in college after being enrolled as pre-med. I started 
writing non-fiction as a freelancer the week after I was told by my boss at the time 
that writing was my worst skill and I should hone my talents toward account 
management.
96
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 Mei-ling was so excited to say something she was literally falling off her seat. 
“She’s talking about the Asian stereotype, who is good with numbers. Not all of us are 
good with numbers.” 
 “Shush!”  
 Mrs. Longbottom continued reading:   
Around this time, I discovered a book at home that was useful to me. It was a 
medical textbook . . . that concerned medical anomalies, and on its pages were 
descriptions and photographs of people with . . . deformities that vied with 
Ripley’s Believe it or not. I tried to imagine the lives of those people, how they 
felt, their thoughts as they stared back at me through photographs. I imagined 
them before they had their disease. I imagined them cured. I imagined my taking 
them to school . . . I imagined I might become like them, plagued and miserable, 
but soon to be transformed into someone else. These people are my imaginary 
playmates. Their consciousness, I believed was mine. And these notions were 
among the first stories I made up for myself.
97
 
 
Amy Tan-Writing from Personal Experience (2008):  
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QishhWj5S10&feature=youtu.be 
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 Tan, 2003, p. 341. 
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Episode Three: Exercises 
A. Discussion Plan: Feelings
98
 
After viewing the videoclip, allow students to express their feelings. 
 
Tsunami scene from Tsunami the Aftermath (2007) 
 
1. Which of the following words refer to feelings, and which don’t? 
sadness.happiness.calmness.moodiness.heaviness.gracefulness.toughness.melancholy. 
gentleness.despair.joy.pleasure.disgust.distaste.freedom.wildness.satisfaction.dryness. 
green.hope 
2. What are the most dreadful words you know? The most magnificent? The happiest? 
The most sincere? 
3. Can you feel rich and poor at the same time? 
4. Are there good feelings and bad feelings? 
5. Can you be both sad and happy at the same time? 
6. Are there good feelings and bad feelings? 
7. Are there right feelings and wrong feelings? 
8. Are good feelings also right, and bad feelings wrong? 
9. When your feelings change, do your thoughts change? 
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10. When your thoughts change, do your feelings change? 
11.Are there ways you can think by which you can control what you feel? 
12. Are there times when you trust your feelings more than you do your thoughts? 
13. Is it possible for you and someone else to share the same feeling? 
14. Can you tell how people feel by looking at them? 
15. Can you tell how people feel by listening to them? 
16. Can you tell how someone feels by reading what he has written? 
17. Is it possible that you really don’t know how you feel sometimes? 
18. Is it possible that you may only find out how you feel by trying to express it in 
words? 
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Episode Four: Why Shakespeare Matters 
 
Anica (reading): “’About English, it is such a flexible language…more than just a 
situation where a thousand more words are available to us. It also involves numberless 
styles, modes, jargons and slangs we have recourse to. If by poetry we mean something 
more than the decorative, noble, and refined, then English is a perfect language for 
poetry. So be alert to it at all times.’99” 
In the library, Anica approached Belle, who was looking through art books. “Hey, 
Belle. Take a look at this poem. Think I can write one like it? Have a look.” 
“Sudden change of heart? I thought you’d given up. We’re not doing poetry in Lit 
or Comp class! Why bother? Why don’t you just help me look for a painting that I can 
copy?!?! Everything I’ve looked at is so complicated, if it’s realistic. The only things I 
can copy are abstract. And Marcello-jello hates abstract work. C’mon, help me!,” she 
said plaintively. 
“Please, Belle,” pleaded Anica, “just have a look. This time, I really need to learn 
how to write something. Don just sent me a poem, and I want to send him one, too. 
“Oh, it’s Don, then. It’s not just a poem. Okay, my friend. Let’s have a look,” 
Belle complied. 
 
                                                 
99
 Fry, 2005, p. 319 
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A Mystery 
 
People say, ‘What are you doing these days? What are 
 you working on?” 
I think for a moment or two. 
 
The question interests me. What am I doing these 
 days? 
How odd that I haven’t a clue. 
 
Right now, of course, I’m working on this poem, 
With just a few more lines to go. 
  
But tomorrow someone will ask me “What are you up 
 to these days? What are you working on? 
And I still won’t know. 
Wendy Cope
100
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Episode Four: Exercises 
A. Discussion Plan: What makes you think?
101
 
1. Do your thoughts come very slowly sometimes, while at other times they tumble 
over one another? 
2.  Do you sometimes allow your thoughts to go where they like, but at other times you 
try to steer or control them? 
3.  Do you think only when you’re asked questions? 
4.  Do you think only when you have a problem? 
5.  Are there times when you seem to be very happy, and you wonder if you’re happy? 
6.  Are there times when you seem to be miserable, and you wonder if in fact you’re 
really happy? 
7.  Do you think a lot about your moods and feelings? 
8.  Do you think a lot about people? 
9.  Do you think a lot about places? 
10.  Do you think a lot about food? 
11. Do you think a lot about clothes? 
12.  Do you think more about what you have or about what you want? 
13.  Do you think more about things you’ve done or things you want to do? 
14.  Do you think more about things you did to other people, or about things other 
people did to you? 
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15.  Do you think more about how bad you have it or about how good you have it? 
16.  Does thinking make you want to write? 
17.  Does writing make you think? 
18.  Does the hardest thinking you do come when you’re trying to write? 
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Episode Five: Ethical Inquiry 
“Well,” Anica diffidently waited. “What do you think, Belle?” 
“It certainly is a different sort of poem. I should say, very different. So?” Belle sat 
impatiently. 
  “When we were discussing Act II, Scene 2 of Romeo and Juliet, remember how 
Juliet says…Look here, it’s that part where Romeo says “O, wilt thou leave me so 
unsatisfied?” 
“Yeah? I know you liked that line…it’s bizarre!” 
“But, Romeo is impulsive and is shifting to high gear. He wants Juliet more than 
anything now. Remember how madly in love, supposedly, he was with Rosaline? And 
then, when he saw Juliet, how quickly he put Rosaline aside, and Juliet took her place in 
his heart? That’s Romeo, he falls in love fast, and hard”, opined Anica. 
Stage Beauty (2005) Videoclip: When males played female roles. 
“He needs experience. Or should I say he wants experience. He wants to 
experience love. Romantic love. That’s what we concluded in class: that just like there 
are different kinds of talk…Discourse…, Ms. Longbottom called it” 
“Such as monologue, friendly chat, conversation, dialogue, and lover’s talk…,” 
added Anica, looking into her notebook.  
“And, silly Juliet, says something about after giving him love, the more love she 
has for him? Isn’t she hot?!?!” screams Belle, repulsed. “And nothing has even happened 
between them. How can she sound so knowing? It must be that nurse of hers kicking 
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things up a notch. ‘One sphere in which Shakespeare’s women are perfectly equal to men 
is their capacity to experience sexual desire,’102” she reads from her notebook. “No 
wonder, they married early back then. And now, pay attention,” as Belle begins reading 
from her copy of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. 
Capulet: But saying o’er what I have said before: 
    My child is yet a stranger in the world, 
    She hath not seen the change of fourteen years; 
    Let two more summers wither in their pride 
    Ere we may think her ripe to be a bride. 
Paris: Younger than she are happy mothers made.  
Capulet: And too soon marred are those so early made’  
1.2.7-13 
At least, you know things haven’t really changed. Early marriage is NOT a good 
thing!” 
Anica opened another notebook and said, “You know, Belle, what I told you 
about falling in love and all that ‘stuff’. I always wanted to fall in love. I mean, Really. I 
don’t think I’m like you, just a bit, but not entirely. And I’ve been with Don now six 
months and we’re getting…., uhm, you…, y’know,… pretty heavy,… kind of deep… so 
here’s my poem,” she hurriedly thrust  the open notebook under Belle’s chin. 
Enigma 
By Anica Mendez 
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I wish you would ask “Why are you feeling this way? Why are 
  you complicating life? 
My body can’t take it. 
The question should concern you. “Why am I feeling this 
 way?” 
  Strange, I can’t explain.  
This may not look like a love poem, but it is. 
Trust me. 
Later, when you see me, I still hope you’ll ask me “Why are 
  you feeling this way? Why are you complicating life?” 
Even if I can’t say why. 
  “What made you choose the first poem, Anica?” worriedly asked Belle. “It seems 
to me you had a poem in mind already, and you just found it convenient to fit it into the 
pattern of that poem which you found, A Mystery, by Wendy Cope.” 
“No, not really, it’s this poem from Don, which I can’t show you. That’s what 
started it all. He sent me a poem about kissing. Three Degrees, it’s called. You know how 
I like being kissed,” Anica confided. 
“Not Three strikes, you’re out?”, Belle quipped. 
“Stop it.” 
“Well, you said, you wanted lots of kissing experience : love bites, french-ing, 
and what-have-you.”  
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“Quite enviable, I should say,” Belle added. 
“Everyone but me was out yesterday afternoon because of my dad’s car accident 
which turned out to be minor, but I was alone. So, I asked Don to come over and we had 
more than just a few kisses, stopping short of what you and I said we wouldn’t do, 
because you and I just couldn’t face the consequences…remember? Our discussion?” 
Anica tried to refresh Belle’s memory. 
“But, Anica,” Belle wanted to clarify, “why did you do that? Didn’t you go over 
in your mind and try to imagine what would happen? You wouldn’t be able to run away 
from your feelings, would you? Wasn’t this what we talked about before?” 
“Yeah, but what is love, Belle? Don and I never fight. We love being in each 
other’s company. I know what he likes and so does he know what I like. We’ve had a lot 
of experiences together. My parents have met his, and they seem to like each other. He 
cares about me, and so do I care about him. Why do we have to abstain?” 
“Is it a political campaign or a religious thing, Anica? Don’t you think it’s a body 
issue? It’s your body, and… maybe, you should try to take care of your self, and 
understand your self. Isn’t that what your poem is about?” Belle demanded. 
“It’s really not about abstinence per se. You can make love, but must you?” 
questioned Belle. 
“You know, I found a poem here. Just for you. I’m so mad at you this moment, 
but you’re my best friend. But I tell you, when I marry, my husband will be my best 
friend!” Anica declared abruptly and walked away. 
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The Sorrow of Socks 
Some socks are loners – 
They can’t live in pairs. 
On washdays they’ve shown us 
They want to be loners. 
They puzzle their owners, 
They hide in dark lairs. 
Some socks are loners- 
They won’t live in pairs. 
Wendy Cope
103
 
Returning to her art books, Belle asked herself: “Why can’t I be original?” 
 
Videoclip Jamie’s Dream School: Simon Callow On Death and Love in Shakespeare 
(2011)  
http://youtu.be/RDACbsRPMwA 
“Let’s summarize. Which lines have we read in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
that indicate gender roles?” asked Mrs. Longbottom. 
Going round the circle of the community of inquiry,  
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Samantha read:  
Capulet: But saying o’er what I have said before: 
    My child is yet a stranger in the world, 
    She hath not seen the change of fourteen years; 
    Let two more summers wither in their pride 
    Ere we may think her ripe to be a bride. 
Paris: Younger than she are happy mothers made.  
Capulet: And too soon marred are those so early made’ 
1.2,7-13 
She explained: “Capulet is being protective of his daughter, Juliet, who, he thinks, 
is too young to be married. He asks Paris, her suitor, to wait a couple of years when Juliet 
would be more mature—which I don’t agree with. I think she would still be too young, 
and Capulet does, too in the last line because he thinks that they’re ‘marred’ which 
implies that something goes wrong. Maybe, having to face responsibility sooner, they age 
faster. But Paris disagrees. I think that there must be a lot of pressure on both sides for 
Paris to prove his manhood, start a family, and have children. We read in the historical 
background that childbirth was risky and was a major cause of death. It was believed that 
to bear children when young was less of a risk. Also, for a daughter to be engaged early 
relieved the pressure to see her married well—an obligation that parents had. 
Andrew spoke. “Speaking of proving manhood, Friar Lawrence tells Romeo: 
Art thou a man? Thy form cries out thou art: 
Thy tears are womanish, thy wild acts denote 
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The unreasonable fury of a beast. 
Unseemly woman in a seeming man! 
And ill-beseeming beast in seeming both! 
Thou hast amazed me. By my holy order, 
I thought thy disposition better tempered. 
3.3 109-15 
He explained:  “Friar Lawrence questions Romeo’s masculinity. His form is male, 
but he cries like a female. Romeo acts wildly like an animal which Friar Lawrence 
equates with being female. In other words, females aren’t always able to exercise self-
control. Romeo is acting like a female and like an animal—twice beast-like, according to 
Friar Lawrence.” 
“May I say something?” Belle could not contain herself. “That’s really sexist. So, 
the implication is that Romeo is behaving badly just like a woman. It’s just like 
describing woman as hysterical, and saying that men don’t get hysterical.”   
“Well, there was a time that hysteria was a mental disorder exclusively associated 
with females,” Antonio knowingly informed the class. “and besides, ‘hysterical’ is one 
particular word that isn’t used to describe males.” 
“As I was saying,” Belle would not be deterred. “It’s species-ist. Specie-ism 
makes one look down on animals just because we’re human. In this case, is he saying that 
women are lesser persons because they lose control? Does that make women objects? 
How would you know that? What if you were the one involved? But, all the young 
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Montague and the Capulet men lose control much more often, and their violence, as we 
saw in the film is truly animal-like, savage even.” 
Videoclip : Jamie's Dream School | Simon Callow on Stage Fighting Choreography 
(2011)  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZYU91Ol3zA&feature=youtu.be  
“But all these happened during another time, not our own, and long ago. They 
didn’t have the scientific knowledge and advancement we have now.” Roshan 
emphasized. 
Videoclip: Jamie's Dream School | Simon Callow on Why Does Shakespeare Matter? 
(2011) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hC1YLvUyKv8&feature=youtu.be 
  “So, why do we then still study Shakespeare?” Belle asked. Is it only in earlier 
times that sexism occurred? Or is only in other societies and cultures, not our own, as in 
The Joy Luck Club, that women can be devalued? 
“Talking about beastly behavior,” Roshan read, redeeming himself, here is a 
passage where women are spoken of rudely, as sex objects, I believe: 
And here is a passage where, I believe, Romeo is ambivalent about the change in 
his character that love has brought about 
O sweet Juliet, 
Thy beauty hath made me effeminate 
And in my temper softened valor’s steel. 
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Note To Teacher:  
Videoclip: Juliet and Paris dance, an aspect of the love story that has a less significant 
part in the stage play offers an aesthetic contrast for students to examine and critique. 
Episode Five: Exercises 
A. Discussion Plan: Sex and Romance 
104
 
1.  Sex is a matter of the body, originating in the flesh and motivated by it. 
2.  People deceive themselves with fantasies about romance.  
3.  Love is a marriage of true minds. Sex is (or ought to be) the bodily expression of 
this ideal relationship.  
4.   Our models of love take for granted a dualist account of what it is to be a person, a 
mind on the one hand, and a body on the other, one of them privileged, the two 
either in harmony or in conflict.   
5.  In practice, desire deconstructs the opposition between mind and body.  
6.  Desire generates songs and poetry and stories.  
7.  Talking about desire is pleasurable.  
8.  Desire palpably inhabits the flesh and seeks satisfaction there.  
9.  Desire undoes the dualism common sense seems so often to take for granted.  
10.  The human body is subject to the imperatives of nature, but at the same time it does 
not exist outside culture.  
11.  Romeo and Juliet is a play about desire.  
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12.  Romeo and Juliet’s account of love displays a longing to escape the constraints of 
the symbolic order and reveals in practice precisely the degree to which it is culture 
that enables love to make sense.  
13.  In Romeo and Juliet desire imagines a metaphysical (supernatural) body that cannot 
be realized.  
14.   Juliet breaks the convention that women should appear aloof in order to intensify 
male desire when she declares her love at her window. She alludes to the proprieties 
of female behaviour: Fain would I dwell on form, fain, fain deny/ What I have 
spoke, but farewell compliment (II.2.88-89) 
15.  Juliet who speaks most eloquently and urgently to define, perhaps on behalf of both 
lovers, the desire experienced in the secret life of the body:  
Gallop apace, you fiery-footed steeds,  
Towards Phoebus'  
lodging; such a waggoner  
As Phaeton would  
whip you to the west,  
And bring in cloudy night immediately.  
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Episode Six: Dramatic Rehearsal and Body Mapping  
 
Trigger Videoclip: Dramatic Rehearsal (Discovering Voice: Mantle of the Expert and 
Stranger in Role) (2011) – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5E6D-
S6Q68&feature=youtu.be
105
 
  
In the teachers’ staff room, Melinda, a Junior Teacher confers with her mentor, “I 
found out that one of the reasons The Joy Luck Club is quite a teachable text is that it 
matches the reading styles of many students and is ideally suited to a reading installment 
plan. The novel’s sixteen interlocking narrative framework is divided into four sections, 
each with four stories and prefaced with a short fable. The emotional structure is plain; 
the sixteen stories are linked by a small fable.
106
 We have unpacked the emotional 
structure in each and reinforced learning with our dialectic journals
107
 and students have 
problematized every situation representing a moral or ethical problem that can be 
dramatized.” 
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 Note to teacher: View in conjunction with Edmiston (2011), Shakespeare, rehearsal 
approaches, and dramatic inquiry: Literacy education for life English in Education. 
106
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 “Let’s go over your plan for your exercise on moral deliberation as dramatic 
rehearsal,”108 Edward, her mentor teacher continued. 
“In philosophical terms, here is our set of procedural guidelines:  
First, we discern the ethical dimensions of experience. Compassion, justice, and 
friendship are a few things will need to consider here. In opposition, you’ll have: cruelty, 
avarice, and oppression, qualities anyone will recognize in experience as problematic, 
and opportunities to turn them around.”  
 “May I suggest, you get a bunch of smooth stone tchotchkes carved with the exact 
words in contrastive colors. Put them on your desk. If you have a bonsai plant
109
, or a 
healthy tree-like indoor plant; nothing messy, say an aerophyte
110
, surround it with those 
pebbles/stones. See what happens when the kids notice how those concepts relate to our 
philosophical concept of flourishing.” 
“Secondly, we inquire into what threatens, hinders, or diminishes those qualities 
we value; determine what might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, stabilize, or 
otherwise improve them; as well as, figure out what accounts for actual and possible 
negative qualities; how they might be avoided, reduced, or mitigated; and thirdly, we 
arrive at the condition of reflective ethical equilibrium or the condition inquiry seeks to 
attain. At this point in the lesson, interject the notion of moral deliberation as dramatic 
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rehearsal. Have your students refer to their dialectic journals. You want them to focus on 
the questions that are the problematized versions of those moments the narrative conveys 
a sense of imbalance, i.e. a feeling that something or someone is/was missing.
111” 
Have this sign in your class clearly displayed: 
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM  
…involves the imagination in constructing knowledge 
 categorizing qualities of similar kind  
 relating parts of experience in cause/effect narratives  
 forming images  
 constructing counterfactuals  
 considering alternative realities  
 articulating  
o possibilities  
o consequences 
o repercussions112  
 take in the full measure of a situation  
o what it implies  
o what it signifies  
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 bring forth something new 
Melinda glanced at her trusty notebook: “(Insight + Inferences) (hypotheses)/ 
Moral imagination  = Plan of Action.” 
Episode Six: Exercises 
A. Dramatic Rehearsal 
1.  Use one of the assigned stories in The Joy Luck Club (such as Scar, The Red Candle, 
Two Kinds Rules of the Game, &c.). 
2.  Work in small groups on one story. Draft a dramatic script (a collaborative effort) that 
captures the moral or ethical problem that you think can be resolved in your dramatic 
rehearsal. You may need to condense the story, but stay true to the characters and 
their relationships to one another. You can add a narrator if you need to, but be sure 
to include enough characters to keep the entire group involved. Remember that your 
central characters will need to consider the following questions: Who am I? How am I 
supposed to act? What do I want? 
3.  After completing your script, get your acting troupe ready. Prepare to present your 
moral deliberation in dramatic rehearsal to your classmates. Plan and practice 
entrances, exits, and positions. Think about how characters will deliver their lines and 
how the relationships among them unfold as you bring your dramatic rehearsal of 
moral deliberation to life. Add any props or costumes that you think will bring the 
drama to life. Your presentation should be ten to fifteen minutes. 
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4.  After staging your production, be prepared to answer any questions the audience may 
have about your dramatic rendering, the moral and ethical problems, &/or the 
judgment itself. 
B. Supplementary Video 
Here’s what Amy Tan and some of her friends have done:  
The Journey of the Bonesetter’s Daughter (2011) 
http://www.itvs.org/films/journey-of-the-bonesetters-daughter  
http://youtu.be/g6QDnMMuK_c 
C. Exercise: Body Maps
113
 
Body maps are a type of personal portrait, the cursive equivalent of which would 
be the autobiography. Each student draws a life size outline of her body on an outsize 
sheet of paper. 
A body map must contain the following: 
 A review of significant happenings in one’s life story, visual symbols, an 
original text, three most important lines from one’s life story. 
 Placement: Carefully choose the placement of your text and artwork.  
 Spine: Actors often discuss a character’s spine. This is your objective/s 
within your life story. 
                                                 
113
 Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 113; See Smagorinsky, 2008 pp. 196-197. 
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 Goods and bads: Goods are the best things about you; bads are those parts 
that need working on. 
 Color Scheme: A color scheme can signify harmony. Work in a color 
scheme and what it means in your life story. 
 Symbols: Like colors, draw in your favorite objects because they carry 
special meaning for you. 
 Formula Poem: Include a haiku, cinquian, diamante, or pattern poem to 
reveal something about your character. 
 Mirror, mirror. . . : Consider how you appear to others and what your inner 
self is. 
 Changes: Is there anything different about you now than, say last year? 
 An alternative is the body image map. In this activity, a student will work 
with a partner to draw the outline of one another’s body as they lie on the 
outsize paper
114
.  
 Describe your body map, then take a bow, & exit. 
2. Gendered Spatial Geography:
115
 With your students, map out a geography of your 
school’s use of space according to gendered embodiment. First, draw up a few survey 
questions to gather information for the project, as in the following:  
                                                 
114
 Menassa, 2004, p. 51. As a supplementary activity, their body image maps can be 
compared to those of Miss Universe, 1952 and 1960. 
www.pageant.com/universe97/index.html 
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A. Draw up a list of gendered spaces in school. 
 B. As a female/male, which spaces in school do you feel most comfortable entering, 
spending time at, &/or alone/with a friend/in a group? State your reasons.  
C. Do you feel the need to act, look, or dress a certain way to be in these places? Explain 
your answers.  
  
1. Gender Bender Party116 Organize a gender bender party and instruct all your 
students to dress as a caricature of his or her own gender. Ask them to describe 
the ongoing experience. 
    
     
  
                                                                                                                                                 
115
 Gordon & Lahelma, 1996. 
 
116
 See Bordo, 1999, p. 103. 
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Episode Seven: Feeling 
 
“I like the way we are encouraged to examine our feelings.” “Let’s see what 
pictures you brought,” Tyrone eagerly demanded.  
“I tried hard to look for pictures that said something about our roles as young men 
and women.” Antonio replied. “And I found a lot of it in the form of advertising.” 
“Let’s lay what we have on our desks, suggested Mrs. Longbottom, “and examine 
what you brought. Remember the assignment was to bring a combination of five pictures 
and/or articles on the topic.” 
“I found an article on females continuing to shy away from careers in science and 
mathematics,” Belle said helpfully. “The rest of the pictures I have are advertisements 
that show females in different careers. Here’s one of a teacher, a soldier, and a 
homemaker. I also have one on sportswear, and another on make-up. I chose the article 
because I am interested in breaking out of the ‘Juliet’ mold. It was common in Juliet’s 
time for girls like her to marry early, have children, and raise families, but if you’re not 
wealthy or educated, it’s no less a practice today. I selected the advertisements because 
they are about female career choices. The ones on sportswear and make-up, I think, are 
still about what are expected of females: to be attractive and fit.” 
“I found an article on gay marriage.” Samantha contributed. “I also selected 
advertisements on toys for boys, and toys for girls. I believe they suggest roles that are 
suitable for males and females. Here’s a pertinent news item.” 
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Forty years ago, tired of the constraints of sexism and stereotypes, the Bems, a 
couple of married psychologists determined they wanted to raise their young son 
and daughter in a gender neutral way, at least until they were old enough to be 
able to make relevant valuations. They removed from their children’s immediate 
environment everything that might indicate the dimorphic gender paradigm, 
including every single item that might convey information of a gendered nature. 
That covered mannerisms, attitudes, habits, jobs, pastimes, smells, and sounds. 
They were careful to show their children male and female workers performing 
cross-gender occupations. They doctored picture books to remove all information 
that referred to the sexes. Though, they went as far as feigning ignorance 
regarding a person’s sex and saying that because someone was clothed there was 
no way to tell, they reinforced the concept that anatomical features and 
reproductive functions distinguished one sex from another. Most children by the 
age of four are advanced gender theorists and know that female is Other. When 
boys and girls at that age are asked to show a martian what people are like, 
females pick a combination of girl and boy items, whereas boys select mostly boy 
items. The son of the Bems picked a pair of hairclips to wear and was told that he 
must be a girl. Frustrated, he pulled down his pants to make his point. The other 
child simply retorted: “Everyone has a penis; only girls wear clips in their 
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hair.”117 By the time children are in high school, they have a very complicated 
relationship with their bodies complicated by the messages in visual culture.
118
  
As this illustration conveys, the body has cultural and social  
significance where values and ideals, similarity and difference are inscribed.
119
 
 “Here is an advertisement that presents bodies of males and females. I am not sure 
what its message is. I also brought ads of exercise programs and diet products.” John 
added. “They carry messages, too, about body image, and ideal male and female bodies, 
don’t they?” 
“I’ve got an idea. I’ll make a body map120 showing what all these ads and articles 
target. I think we’ll get a picture of what this material portrays as the ideal male or 
female,” volunteered Antonio. 
                                                 
117
  Fine, 2010, pp. 214-225. 
 
118
 Visual culture comprises the fine arts, tribal arts, advertising, popular film and video, 
folk art, television and other performance, housing and apparel design, computer game 
and toy design, and other forms of visual production and communication (Freedman, 
2003, p. 1). 
119
 Fine, 2010, pp. 214-215. 
 
120
 Note to teacher: The first instance in which a body map may be introduced as an 
instructional strategy would be as an illustration of Odysseus’ journey of selfhood. Refer 
to an explanation of the selfhood concept: Lowery (1970), The Odyssey as Archetype. 
Invest yourself in making a body map to serve as a model, its purpose initially being that 
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On the whiteboard remained the discussion plan drawn up earlier in class. 
A. Modifying the Body
121
 
1. Why would someone want to have an operation to have smaller breasts? (Anica) 
2. Why would someone want to have an operation to change one’s nose? (Mei-ling) 
3. Why would someone want to have an operation to change the shape of one’s 
eyes? (Andrew) 
4. Why would someone want to wear a piece of jewelry in her lip? (Samantha) 
5. Why would someone want to wear an earring in his right ear? (Peter) 
6. Why would someone like to wear a piece of jewelry on her ankle? (Roshan) 
7. Why would someone like to have his hair shaved off completely? (Antonio) 
8. Why would someone like to wear a mask? (Roshan) 
9. Why would someone like to change the color of his eyes? (Belle) 
10. Why would someone like to wear a mustache? A beard? (Tyrone) 
“We had great questions. I’ll make a collage to illustrate our summative responses 
to one of the questions.”  
“Right, I think I want to do that, too.”  
                                                                                                                                                 
as a principal character map for Odysseus in The Odyssey. It can subsequently be used as 
a body image map. 
 
121
 Sharp, Hannah (unpublished manuscript). 
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“In fact, why don’t we all do that? I have an ad about deodorant, a diet product, 
hair gel, mouthwash, and lipstick. I’ve also have the article about women choosing not to 
enter scientific and mathematical careers. I think, for now, I’ll give my body map the title 
Do I look like a mathematician? What I’ll do is identify the body parts that the ads are 
targeting. Then, I’ll indicate both the positive and negative messages,” added Anica. 
“Do you mean by ‘positive and negative’ messages…like if the ad is about 
deodorant, you’ll put next to the armpits Tells us: To be attractive we must smell clean  
(positive) and B.O. keeps potential friends away (negative)?” queried Cristina. 
“Maybe,” replied Anica, “but I was thinking for the negative, I would put I’m too 
ashamed to mix with people when I smell this bad.” 
Hygiene 
I’m filthy  
On the outside I stink. 
But, 
There are people 
So cleansed of dirt it makes you think 
Unhygienic 
Thoughts 
Of them. I’d much rather 
Stay filthy. 
Their lather 
Can’t reach where they reel 
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Suds 
Can’t Soap inside. 
All hosed, scrubbed and oilily sleek 
They’re still deep dyed 
They 
Can stand all day and drench 
They still stench
122
. 
“Oh, Anica!” Belle responded sympathetically and gave her a hug. “Can an ad 
make anyone feel so bad about herself?” 
“ In the last novel we read, The Joy Luck Club, one of the younger characters, 
Lena St. Clair, confided that at 13, she became an anorexic, to become fashionably thin. 
Is anorexia an ailment that plagues females exclusively?” Anica added. 
“You mean, like hysteria was exclusively female?” Mei-ling asked. 
“Maybe an ad won’t make anyone feel so bad but, I guess, you can feel bad 
enough about your body to… to… become sick.” Millie spoke suddenly, “my neighbors 
from New Zealand had to leave because their daughter became anorexic while she was 
here. Her parents didn’t understand what was going on. She just ate less and less, and 
became so thin. She even stopped having periods. Seriously, I think they were afraid she 
was slowly approaching death. During the summer break, the whole family had to go 
back home because they couldn’t cope with her illness here, and thought that it would be 
                                                 
122
 Fry, 2005, pp. 117-118  
 302 
better there where all their relatives were and they could get support from friends as well. 
It raised a lot of questions for me about how we feel about ourselves, our bodies, feelings 
in general and their power to influence our judgments…oh!”  
“Some of us aren’t overweight, yet in our body schema we perceive ourselves as 
fat. That’s known as BIDS—Body Image Distortion Syndrome. Do you think there’s any 
evidence out there that advertising pushes some people to diet to the point of illness?” 
asked Cristina.  
Videoclip: Thin 
(2006)
123
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS4dMX65ZF0&feature=youtu.be 
 
Anorexic
124
  
Flesh is heretic.    
My body is a witch.    
I am burning it.      
                                                 
123
 Thin is the centerpiece of a multi-faceted campaign designed to explore issues 
surrounding body image and eating disorders, including a companion book, traveling 
exhibition of Greenfield's work and a website. 
124
 Boland, 2008. pp.75-76. 
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Yes I am torching    
her curves and paps and wiles.    
They scorch in my self denials.  
     How she meshed my head    
in the half-truths  
   of her fevers      
 till I renounced     
milk and honey  
   and the taste of lunch.      
I vomited   her hungers.  
   Now the bitch is burning.      
I am starved and curveless.    
I am skin and bone.  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She has learned her lesson.      
Thin as a rib    
I turn in sleep.    
My dreams probe  
 a claustrophobia    
a sensuous enclosure.    
How warm it was and wide  
     once by a warm drum,    
once by the song of his breath  
   and in his sleeping side.      
Only a little more,    
only a few more days    
sinless, foodless. 
      I will slip  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back into him again    
as if I had never been away.  
     Caged so    
I will grow    
angular and holy      
past pain,  
   keeping his heart    
  company      
as will make me forget    
in a small space    
the fall  
     into forked dark,    
into python needs  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heaving to hips and breasts  
  and lips and heat  
   and sweat and fat and greed. 
Eavan Boland 
Mrs. Longbottom comments, “This is an age-old problem, one that plagued even 
St. Augustine, who wrote in his Confessions that food is more of a temptation for him 
than sex”: “In the midst of these temptations I struggle daily against greed for food and 
drink. This is not an evil I can decide once and for all to repudiate and never embrace 
again, as I was able to do with fornication
125
. 
“Food temptations, let’s name the times and places,” then, Andrew says. 
In circle, Peter speaks, “Cider doughnuts. When they’re fresh and hot.” 
“Going to Seventh and Federal and picking up a hot pretzel,” Tyrone mentions.  
“My turn, says Belle, “I’m having a dialogue with myself and one part of me is 
trying to fool the other part. What I mean is Ok, I’m having a conversation with myself 
‘Gee, I really could go for some ice cream. No, it’s not good for you. It’s just a short-term 
thing, a short-term pleasure’. Two minutes later, I am saying to myself, ‘I really want 
some damn ice cream,’ End of conversation.” 
                                                 
125
 Kolata, 2007, pp. 127-129 
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“May I say something, Belle?” Anica retorts. “It is one thing to resist Krispy 
Kreme doughnuts while you are losing weight, or to tell yourself that celery—celery—is 
a snack. But how can I live this way for the rest of my life?” 
John talks, “This is what I don’t get about weight loss and dieting. How do you 
get the reasons why you want to lose weight to be important enough to maintain that self-
control forever?” 
Andrew follows up, “It’s a paradox. I know from my own experience that it’s 
impossible to refuse food, to be totally uninterested in it, for religious reasons. But not for 
reasons of staying thin. Ours is a kosher home, and you can put the most delicious-
looking lobster and crab cakes on the table and I’m not going to eat them. It’s because I 
don’t eat that food.” 
“I just stop that internal dialogue and go get the food I crave.” Belle admits. “I can 
go for a walk, call Anica, or get out of the house to take my mind off food, but they don’t 
make much difference. What I want is food, and for whatever reason, I’ll eat.” 
  Andrew confesses, “I promised myself on our family’s last winter cruise that this 
is the last time in my life I won’t be eating kosher. I had lobster and escargot both of 
which are forbidden on kosher diets. After that, that kind of food lost its appeal, no matter 
how hungry I was. Then, I went to an uncle’s house to sit shiva and he had catered food. I 
was able to spend three hours there, and there was never a doubt in my mind that I was 
not going to eat that food.”  
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“I can’t make myself not want snacks that I know are forbidden on my diet. Last 
night, I was watching TV and I wanted chips. I could not resist the urge. The more I tried 
not to think about it or tell myself that my goal was to be thin, the more I had to have it. 
Finally, I just caved in and ate through the bag,” Mei-ling finally opens up. 
“The reasons I want to lose weight are not powerful enough.” 
“Eating without thinking—That’s my habit.” 
“Look up! These women in Big Beautiful Women are really fat. No amount of 
pretending that they are fine is going to let them pass in our society.” Anica raises a 
magazine. “You know what? In some societies, obesity is considered a sign of wealth and 
good health.” 
“Oh, yeah? We don’t live there.” 
Everyone had their eyes on the exercise written on the board.  
A. Exercise: Indicate whether you think you can control the following
126
: 
1. Your dreams 
2. Your digestions 
3. Your hunger 
4. Your fears 
5. Your circulation 
6. Your hates 
7. Your jealousy 
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8. Your decisions 
9. Your resentment 
10. Your sadness 
11. Your energy 
12. Your dislikes 
“Which one do we pick?”  
  
B. Discussion Plan: Objectification
127
 
Seven Ways to Treat a Person as a Thing 
 Instrumentality. The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her 
purposes. 
 Denial of Autonomy. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
autonomy and self-determination. 
 Inertness. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and 
perhaps also in activity. 
 Fungibility. The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with 
other objects of the same type and/or (b) with objects of other types. 
 Violability. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary 
integrity, as something that is permissible to break up, smash, break into 
                                                 
127
 Nussbaum, 1999. 
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 Ownership. The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by 
another, can be bought or sold, etc. 
 Denial of subjectivity. The objectifier treats the object as something whose 
experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account. 
C. EXERCISE: Women as Objects 
Learning Objective: Students will critically engage the argument that women’s bodies 
are turned into objects in order to sell products, and will discuss the potential 
consequences of objectification in advertising. 
Below are two advertisements that turn women’s bodies into objects. (Handouts)  
1. Look through popular magazines (Cosmopolitan, Mademoiselle, Elle, Marie 
Claire, RedBook, Jane, Seventeen, Shape, SELF, Vogue, Vanity Fair, Maxim, etc.) 
and see if you can find advertisements that objectify women in order to sell a 
product.  
2. Discussion Plan 
 What effect(s), if any, do you think the objectification of women’s 
bodies has on the culture?  
 Some people would argue that depicting a woman’s body as an 
object is a form of art. What is your opinion of this point of view? 
Explain your reasoning.  
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 Why do you think that women are objectified more often than men 
are? 
 
D. Exercise: The Dismembering of Women  
Look through popular fashion magazines and find images that dismember women, that 
focus on only one body part. Create a woman made of the different body parts you’ve 
found. 
E. Journal Entry: 
Look at the collage of images you have just created.  
How do you feel when you look at it?  
Were you able to create a sense of the woman’s subjectivity, her humanity? Why or why 
not?  
What are your thoughts on dismembering women in advertising? 
F. Exercise: The Obsession With Thinness 
Trigger Text: "...the omnipresent media consistently portrays desirable women as 
thin....even as real women grow heavier, models and beautiful women are portrayed as 
thinner. In the last two decades we have developed a national cult of thinness. What is 
considered beautiful has become slimmer and slimmer. For example, in 1950 the White 
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Rock mineral water girl was 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 140 pounds. Today she is 5 
feet 10 inches and weighs 110 pounds. Girls compare their own bodies to our cultural 
ideals and find them wanting. Dieting and dissatisfaction with bodies have become 
normal reactions to puberty. Girls developed eating disorders when our culture developed 
a standard of beauty that they couldn’t obtain by being healthy. When unnatural thinness 
became attractive, girls did unnatural things to be thin."  
– Mary Pipher, Reviving Ophelia 
 
G. Exercise: Advertising & Body Image 
Learning Objective: Students will recognize that the standard of thinness presented by 
the media is unrealistic and potentially harmful. 
Encouraging the media to present more diverse and real images of people with positive 
messages about health and self-esteem may not eliminate eating disorders entirely, but it 
will help reduce the pressures many people feel to make their bodies conform to one 
ideal, and in the process, reduce feelings of body dissatisfaction and ultimately decrease 
the potential for eating disorders
128
. 
 1. Watch an hour of prime-time television and record what commercials, music videos, 
or shows come on. As you watch, count (and record) how many thin and non-thin women 
you see. In addition, make a chart of the clothes worn and roles played by the thin women 
versus the non-thin women. (You could also do this activity by looking through fashion 
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magazines.) Then go to a public place (a mall, a grocery store, a coffee shop, etc.) and 
count the number of thin and non-thin women you see. 
1. How do the numbers compare? Compare and contrast the world on television 
versus the world you live in every day. Do you see evidence that the world on 
television influences the way people act in their own lives? Explain.  
2. What did you notice about the differences between how thin women were 
portrayed on television versus the way non-thin women were portrayed? Who was 
more likeable – the thin women or the non-thin women? What effect might this 
have on the way that young girls and women see themselves and others? The way 
that young boys and men see girls and women?  
3. Eating disorder specialists cite the influence of the media as one influential factor 
in the development of eating disorders in young women. In what ways do you 
think the media supports eating-disordered attitudes and behaviors? 
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Episode Eight: Painting and Musicing
129
 to Reimagine Selves 
 
On the board: No art worth the striving is without its complexities – Stephen Fry 
 
Videoclip: Kiki Smith (excerpt, ART/new york no. 40) (2009)  
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cVn6YzOuGE&feature=youtu.be 
 
Art Work: Kiki Smith: Prints, Books, and Things (2003) 
 
http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2003/kikismith/ 
 
Kiki Smith Artist Interview: One on 1: Kiki Smith Displays Artistic Discipline (2010)  
 
http://www.ny1.com/content/features/one_on_1_archives_qz/129380/one-on-1--kiki-
smith-displays-artistic-discipline 
 
 “From what we’ve seen, artists have a treasure trove of images,” Belle began. 
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Samantha, slightly puzzled, asked, “I thought artists were original and creative. What you 
are implying now is that all along, they have a great store of images or a store of great 
images. Now, I am confused.” 
 “Perhaps, I can help,” Mei-ling joined in. “Remember our activity in guided 
imagery. We came up with wonderful images as we went on an imaginary flight? 
130
 
Tyrone, you traveled to a land where tribal life was real, and you learned a new language. 
Belle, you imagined the destruction of a building, and Samantha, you focused on the 
beauty of autumn leaves in the fall. Would you say that your work was original?” 
“Yes, it was,” responded Mrs. Longbottom. 
“Well, yes and no,” Belle said hesitantly. 
“Yes, because I had never really been to such a place, and yes, because I had 
never written about such a place,” added Tyrone, “but I’ve read of tribes and always 
wondered what it would be like to ‘discover’ and live with a tribe, as an anthropologist 
might. I used those thoughts and then, tried to construct a story.” 
“So, you actually were onto ‘a new world’ of your own?” Antonio queried. 
“Yes, definitely,” Tyrone asserted. “Like you did. We certainly didn’t discuss 
with each other what we would be writing about beforehand. We worked independently. I 
invented a world with people and I narrated a story.” 
“Your story really was quite a surprise, Tyrone,” praised Roshan. 
                                                 
130
 Hicks, Davis, & Pugh, 1997, pp. 54-55 
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“Also, I think we were experimenting. After reading what Amy Tan had said 
about where she took material for her first stories, we tried to approximate what she said 
she had done, digging up old memories and the feelings associated with them,” Roshan 
explained. 
 “You can imagine yourself travelling through life, and you can imagine yourself 
in all sorts of situations. You can also imagine yourself making good and bad judgments 
as you travel through life. One of the ways you have expressed this ability of yours is 
through writing. What if you could not write about what you imagined? What if you 
could not speak about what you felt? 
There was a pregnant silence. 
“What do you mean, Ms. Marcello?” Tyrone asked. “Is what you’re talking about 
not having hands to write?” 
“I imagine if I didn’t have hands and couldn’t write, I’d use one of my feet to 
write?” 
Samantha said uncertainly. 
Ms. Marcello joined in the discussion. “Let’s examine a few examples of artists in 
their imaginings and how they and others appear in those imaginings. Take one of the 
several self-portraits by Frida Kahlo, The Broken Column (Lomas, 1993, p. 15), or Kiki 
Smith’s sculpture Tale.” 
Kiki Smith’s visual language similarly contains much medical imagery apparently 
brought about by lived experience. Her father, sculptor Tony Smith, says Kiki, kept  
“‘dead things in the dead parts of the house,’ including the skeletons her father kept for 
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anatomical drawings”131. She also trained as an emergency medical technician. She 
admits that some of her work is done for self-healing, as during the period after the death 
of her father, and then her sister’s premature death from AIDS.  
The more interesting aspect of her work is that she consciously addresses body 
and related issues. She has long been fascinated by human anatomy and what she sees as 
the physical, social, spiritual, and even political significance of the human body. But the 
origin of this intrigue is a bit more pedestrian. "I had a boyfriend who was a book buyer 
at the strand and he brought home Gray's Anatomy for me one day. And so it was really 
simple. Before that I was painting his guitar," Smith says. 
She says: “Your body is like Everyman, where all these things are played out and 
you’re like a hemophiliac just trying to keep your blood in while all these external forces, 
these vampires, are trying to get at it (Smith, 1991). A work called "Tale" was described 
by the then director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, as "disgusting." She has said the 
work was about shame and humiliation. In a way, art is always trying to kick out space. 
So, that you have to be inside yourself," Smith explains.
132
 
In the early 1990s, she began producing images of nature—from insects, birds, 
and animals to the cosmos. Smith also discovered that the delicate line attainable with the 
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 Posner, 1998, p. 11 
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etching
133
 medium was particularly evocative of feathers and fur. She sketched from 
specimens in natural history museums. I’m trying to think about this relationship between 
Nature and human nature, their different objects”134. 
The selected works include themes such as the abject body, where the nude 
defecates on her hands and knees legitimating a hitherto unpresentable topic; internal 
organs (Male and Female Uro-genital Systems, see Engberg, 2005, figure 12); woman-
as-nature (Daphne, see Engberg, 2005, figure 3; Untitled-Roses, see Engberg, 2005, p. 
30), a contemporary rendering of an age-old theme previously discussed, now to be taken 
in light of woman’s fertility; birth (Through a Hole)135, and body (Mother/Child 136,  
Milky Way [see Engberg, 2005, figure 14], and Virgin) 
137
. The installation Mother/Child 
has a nude female sucking her breast and nude male sucking his penis, indicating a sad 
situation where there is no one for whom the milk or the sperm will serve a life-
sustaining purpose. Milky Way is a nude from whose breasts spring stars/milk. Virgin is 
                                                 
133
 Etching is a technique of printmaking where a design is cut, carved, or scratched onto 
a metal surface, whereupon corrosion is induced to expose the design, so that multiple 
impressions can be made of it in paper. 
134
  Weitman & Smith, 2003. 
 
135
 
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_9sHp3UvWwtI/S8veSniBaXI/AAAAAAAABag/m6IZDsx39e
c/s1600/Kiki+Smith+the+Hole.jpg 
136
 http://images.artnet.com/images_US/magazine/features/saltz/saltz4-6-10-5.jpg 
 
137
 http://www.artseensoho.com/Art/SEANKELLY/corpus98/corpusGIFS/smith1.jpeg 
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an enshrouded body whose eyes and labia are exposed 
In her nudes, Frida Kahlo depicts herself and her experience of pain, e.g. What the 
Water Gave Me (see Lomas, 1993, plate 1) Henry Ford Hospital (see Lomas, 1993, plate 
2) My Birth (see Lomas, 1993, plate 3) and The Broken Column. Kahlo had wanted to 
become a medical doctor before her crippling accident rendered her incapable of carrying 
a pregnancy to term. These two facts in her life are the main concern of the paintings in 
which she is the nude subject. Her iconography is mainly religious, medical, and 
biographical. Her anatomical knowledge studiously acquired from reading 
Ramsbotham’s obstetrics text appears in recurring symbols of the fetus, pelvis and spine 
attesting to that. Kahlo has developed her own pictorial language to express the physical 
pain never leaving her throughout her life. What the Water Gave Me shows her toes 
peeking out of the bath water on which float images from her life, among which are: a 
dress, plant, and animal symbols in place of her genitals, her parents, and a skyscraper 
from Diego Rivera’s work. Constant, excruciating pain is visibly present in The Broken 
Column. Kahlo’s naked torso is torn and split in the middle where her spine is and 
through its length is visible a broken column propping her neck. Her body is pinned with 
many nails, the torso in a brace, and a cloth partly held by nails covers her hips and pelvic 
region. 
“Hey, but what if you didn’t have all your limbs? I’ve seen a veteran painting by 
holding a paintbrush between his lips, and he was pretty good at it!” Peter added. 
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I went to a concert where a blind college student played on the recorder. After the 
concert, he spoke to us about his experiences as a blind person. He said that because that 
he couldn’t see, it didn’t mean that he couldn’t imagine or have feelings. He also said that 
music made him feel things he never felt before.” Andrew contributed. 
“Of course, the beat and lyrics make you feel a lot of things.” Roshan said. 
“No, he meant without lyrics. He said that he hoped we could imagine or feel 
something in his music-making.” 
“When I feel extremely elated, I like to dance. I don’t much like writing,” Tyrone 
added. 
“I can’t imagine what it would be like if I couldn’t sing,” Cristina complained, but 
“I could. . . . if you know what I mean. That’s why I’ve remained silent all this time.” 
“What you’re all saying, it seems, is that you can express yourself in some form of art. 
Right?” concluded Millie. 
 “It was certainly a better piece of writing than I had ever done before!” Mei-ling 
proudly said. “And I do write a lot not just for our class, and I keep a notebook of 
poetry.” 
 “Well, I really owe Mrs. Longbottom a lot. She guided me through the poem 
writing process, encouraging me along the way, making sure that my ‘baby’ survived the 
‘birthing process’,” Anica explained. 
“I have Mrs. Longbottom to thank, too,” echoed Andrew and Samantha. 
“She pointed up a problem in my life, and encouraged me to explore it in poetry!” 
Anica elaborated.  
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“I really liked your poem, Anica,” Belle emerged from her silence. “I think that 
what you had to say and how you wrote it in a poem was very thoughtful and touched 
me. Remember how we were talking about music affecting us by their rhythm and 
lyrics?” 
“And what about music without words? Can we be moved by rhythm and melody 
alone? Does that kind of music have meaning?,” Tyrone continued. 
“Can you appreciate other kinds of music?” Mrs. Longbottom asked. 
“I’ve been playing the piano since I was five years old,” Roshan confided, “and 
my piano teacher, Mr. Rabinowitz, encourages me to play with feeling. At first, I didn’t 
understand him. Frequently, he wrote in pencil on the page ‘faster’, or ‘not so loud’ or 
‘slower’ or ‘careful, DON’T run over the notes and KILL them! He wasn’t just talking 
about tempo or speed. So, my teacher played the music to demonstrate how he would try 
to communicate emotion in music. Mei-ling, can you help me out?” 
“I play the violin. There are directions such as allegro which is cheerful and 
andante which is ‘in the manner of walking’ which indicate emotions that a musician 
tries to communicate as he plays certain musical pieces. In The Joy Luck Club, for 
example, Jing-mei learns a piece by Schumann from his Scenes from Childhood. In fact, 
my sister in the 12
th
 grade who accompanies me, knows much more about emotions in 
music. Would you like me to ask her to come next week to tell us more about it? 
“Well, what kind of music do you two play?” asked Tyrone.  
“Classical music,” they intoned. 
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The following week, Mei-ling’s elder sister, Soo-ching, came to class. She had 
just finished playing a video of five pianists performing Wagner’s The Ride of the 
Valkyries, and was now reading various comments on the music that the group had 
written.  
Piano Extravaganza-Walkürenritt (Ride of the Valkyries)(2004): 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQd2pse-psU&feature=youtu.be 
“Well, listening to classical music and being able to understand the emotions in 
the music, I believe, takes as much practice for the listener as for the performer. For 
example, the piano piece known as the Funeral March by Chopin
138
 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LEqRw_9hwc), which we can listen to later, is so 
familiar to you that you almost naturally feel sad, or that it has something to do with 
death. Da-da-da-da-and-the-dead-will-pray-for-you.  
“Or ghosts!,” Samantha added. 
“That’s classical, you say, by Chopin???” Millie was skeptical. 
“That’s what’s so amazing,” Roshan added, “there is so little classical music that 
we listen to, but there is so much of it, really, that has become part of the fabric of our 
lives. We never question where that tune originated or try to find out who was the first 
one who used it in the context of death.” 
                                                 
138
 Sonata No. 2, Op. 35 in B-flat Minor: Marche funebre - Lento 
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“To get back to what we were talking about. We all need to listen more to the 
music if we want to be familiar with the cues for different emotions,” Soo-ching 
explained. 
“Cues, as in a stage play?,” Anica, who was active in the school’s Drama Guild 
questioned. 
Soo-ching continued, “Exactly. I prepared a chart which illustrates five emotions 
that are commonly expressed in music.” 
“Only five?” Antonio asked. 
“There are 44 that have been scientifically measured, according to my piano 
teacher. They were identified by a pair of researchers in 2001, and I believe, the study 
was just a part of an ongoing bigger project.” Soo-ching explained. “But, there is enough 
here to get us started.” 
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               EMOTION                          CUE 
Happiness Fast tempo, small tempo variability, 
staccato articulation, high sound level, 
bright timbre, fast tone attacks, small 
timing variations, increased durational 
contrasts between long notes and short 
notes, small vibrato extent 
Sadness Very slow tempo, legato articulation, small 
articulation variability, low sound level, 
dull timbre, large timing variations, 
reduced durational contrasts between long 
and short notes, slow tone attacks, flat or 
falling microintonation, slow vibrato, final 
ritardando, phase decelerando 
Anger High sound level, sharp timbre, spectral 
noise, fast tempo, staccato articulation, 
abrupt tone attacks, increased durational 
contrasts between long and short notes, no 
                                                 
139
  Juslin, 2001, p. 221; Sloboda, 2010, p. 500. 
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ritardando, sudden accents on tonally 
unstable notes, crescendo, phase 
accelerando, large vibrato extent 
Tenderness 
 
 
Slow tempo, slow tone attacks, low sound 
level, small sound-level variability, legato 
articulations, soft timbre, moderate timing 
variations, intense vibrato,  
Fear 
 
Irregular, low, mostly legato 
 
“I’m handing out these! Guys, when you attend a concert, better leave your bodies 
outside the concert hall. Just bring in your selves. Welcome, ghosts in mac-hines (she 
said McHeinz).  
 
The Ten Commandments for Concert Goers
140
 
I 
Thou shalt hearken unto the music with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and all thy mind,  
to aid thee in thy endeavor. Study thou thy programme notes and hereby be sore fully 
prepared to garner the blessings of the inspired melodies which are about to be sounded. 
                                                 
140
 Goehr, G., 1992, p. x 
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II 
Thou shalt not arrive late, for the stir of thy coming disturbeth those who did come in due 
season; neither shalt thou rush forth as a great wind at intermission time or before the end 
of the programme; nor shalt thou trample to thy left nor thy right the ushers or the 
doormen or the multitudes that are about thee. 
III 
Thou shalt keep in check thy coughings and thy sneezings for they are an abomination, 
and they shall bring forth evil execrations upon thee and upon thy household, even unto 
the third and fourth generations. 
 
IV 
Thou shalt not rustle thy programme, for the noise thereof is not as the murmur of the 
leaves of the forest but brash and raucous and soothest not. 
V 
Thou shalt not yahoo unto thy relatives, nor unto thy friends, nor unto any member of thy 
club or of thine household, nor unto any of thy neighbours. 
VI 
Thou shalt not whisper, for thy mouthings, howsoever hushed they may be, bring discord 
to the ear of those who sit about thee. 
VII 
Thou shalt not chew with great show of sound or motion. Remember that thou art not as 
the kine of the meadow who do chew the cud in the pastoral serenity which is vouchsafed 
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them. 
VIII 
Thou shalt not direct thy index finger at persons of public note and say unto thy 
neighbour, “Yonder goeth so and so,” but reflect that some day thou shalt perchance be a 
celebrity, and thou shalt be in great discomfort when thou art pointed at and thou shalt 
not be pleased one jot or tittle thereby. 
IX 
Thou shalt not slumber, for in thy stupor thou hast ears and heareth not; peradventure 
thou possesseth a rumbling obbligato when thou sleepeth and, verily, the rabble may be 
aroused thereby to do thee grievous harm. 
X 
Thou shalt not become a self-ordained music critic and with booming voice comment 
garrulously about the players or the playing; neither shalt thou hum, or tap thine foot; for 
thou hast come as a listener and a lover of music, not as a critic nor as a performer, and 
remember that none among the multitudes has paid to hear thy hummings or thy tappings 
or to listen unto thine opinions 
“This one’s better. I got you a poem. Natch!” 
 
Concert Etiquette  
Thou Shalt Not: 
Talk… 
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Hum, Sing, or Tap Fingers or Feet… 
Rustle Thy Program… 
Crack Thy Gum in Thy Neighbor’s Ears… 
Wear Loud-Ticking Watches or Jangle Thy Jewelry… 
Open Cellophane-Wrapped Candies… 
Snap Open and Close Thy Purse… 
Sigh With Boredom… 
Read 
Arrive Late or Leave Early… 
 
-Byron Belt
141
 
 
1. Exercise: Guided Imagery 
Take your notebook and paper to your local art gallery - or call in at a gallery while you 
are holidaying. Sit quietly in front of a painting that you find yourself drawn to and 
permit yourself to become a part of the scene. Do some relaxation exercises to warm up 
and to get yourself into the mood. Then permit yourself to be transported to the world of 
the artist. Wait until words rise from deep within. Only then begin to write. 
Do not stop to think. Just write about where you are and what happens. Please identify 
the imagery you have chosen if you do this. 
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 http://www.texasflutesociety.org/CONCERTETIQUETTE.htm 
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2. Exercise: Listenership 
Have two groups in class, i.e. the Tchaikovsky and the Prokofiev. Determine with the 
students corresponding research topics of relevance. Acquaint them with the audience 
culture of such performances.
142
 
 What do I hear? (Focus on the music, especially the move from harmonic unity or 
equilibrium to disharmony or disequilibrium.) 
 What do I see/feel/think? (Focus on response to the music. Listen for how the 
music unfolds and for how we are feeling as it is restored to harmony or 
equilibrium) 
 So what? (What do I think about the music?) 
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 Hanley, 1997, p. 37 
